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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ISLAMIST WOMEN IN THE POST- 1980s MODERN TURKEY :  
AMBIVALENT RESISTENCE
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Supervisor: Assis. Prof.Dr. Tahire Erman 
 
January 2001 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the situation of Islamist women in the post-1980’s Turkey. 
Islamist women who have participated in the Islamist movement of the post-1980’s, 
have become the objects of the struggle between the Islamist and secularist 
ideologies. Despite their increasing public visibility, they have been rendered 
invisible as active subjects, and attempted to be silenced. Islamist women are 
actively struggling for their presence in the public sphere and for holding active 
subject position, while rejecting the traditional ways of life. They are resisting to the 
stereotypes of the ‘ideal womanhood’ imposed on them by both to the secularist and 
Islamic patriarchy. However, this process of resistence, and the resultant identities 
and ways of life are full of contradictions and dilemmas stemming from the 
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ambivalent position they are placed into by the conflict between the Islamist and 
secularist ideologies. 
In this thesis, the ambivalent resistance of Islamist women in the post-1980’s 
Turkey is elaborated with regard to the survival and resistence strategies they 
developed at the levels of both discourse and practice. Throughout the analysis, 
Islamist women’s literary works and the interviews conducted with them by several 
social scientists, as well as, the findings of the field research I conducted with ten 
Islamist women by using feminist methodology are utilized. 
This thesis aims to listen to the voices of Islamist women by moving beyond 
the hegemonic framework based on secularist/ Islamist and modern/ traditional 
dualities. From a feminist standpoint, the thesis tries to reveal the active agency of 
Islamist women and to understand their life experiences, without falling into the trap 
of re-objectifying, re-victimizing and re-silencing Islamist women in Turkey. 
 
Keywords: Secularist ideology, Islamist ideology, Patriarchy, Islamist women, 
Survival/ resistance strategies, Duality of modern/ traditional 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the post 1980’s Turkey, a large number of women has been mobilized by the 
rising Islamist movement. These women have become the signifiers of contradictory 
constructions developed within the scope of the Islamist and secularist discourses. 
The ongoing debate between the Islamists and secularists on the political 
participation of women in the Islamist movement is framed by a binary oppositional 
structure based on dualities, such as modern/ traditional, secular/ Islamic and 
backward/ progressive. Moreover, each argument colors its own picture of reality 
and draws the boundaries of this picture by referring to certain essentialist 
assumptions on the individual, society and the differential ontological status of the 
sexes. While both discourses are pushing women, in this case Islamist women, to the 
margins of their narrations, they are constructing and reproducing the social reality 
built upon asymmetrical power relations in the society and discourse of hegemony, 
that is the identity of the ‘Self’, by turning back to the margins, that is to the site of 
the ‘Other’. In a sense, the presence and political activism of Islamist women in the 
secular public space becomes central to the construction of both the Islamist and 
secularist identities competing for hegemony.  
During this discursive war between the Islamist and secularist ideologies, the 
numbers of narrations, all of which are ‘re-veiling’ the reality, are constructed on the 
identities and lives of Islamist women. This play of ideologies on the basis of 
women’s identity has led me to write this thesis as a ‘secular’ and ‘modern’ woman 
who is engaged in feminist politics and who is living in Turkey. Why is the identity 
of women so crucial to both the Islamist and secularist discourses? How are women 
represented by these conflicting ideologies? What are the narrations of the ‘ideal 
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womanhood’ within the scope of their political projects? In what ways the tension 
between the secularist and Islamist discourses affect the narrations on and 
representation of women? What are the reflections of these hegemonic narrations and 
of the tension-laden relationship between Islam and secularism on the lives of 
Islamist women? And, what are the realities of Islamist women’s lives concealed by 
these patriarchal images? The aim of the thesis is to try to find at least partial but less 
hegemonic answers to these questions. 
The thesis consists of four main chapters, and introduction and conclusion 
chapters, namely, the investigation of the reciprocal/ contradictory relationship 
between Islam and secularism during the history of the Republic, of the secularist 
and Islamist discourses on women, of the experiences of Islamist women regarding 
the secularist and Islamist ideologies and practices, of the lives of Islamist women as 
narrated in the in-depth interviews conducted with Islamist women. 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the ongoing relationship between the Islamist 
ideology and the secularist state ideology during the history of the Turkish Republic, 
with a short review of the late Ottoman period, is presented. The role of Islam in the 
Turkish political and social space and the post-1980 rise of Islamist political activity 
are attempted to be understood. The decision to write this chapter is not only taken to 
understand the historical existence and reality of Islam in Turkey, but to create the 
background to appropriately analyze the construction of Islamist women’s lives and 
self-images. One has to investigate the socio-historical plane on which the 
conflicting images of Islamist women are constructed in order not to end up with an 
a-historical narration of these women. Limits of identity and parameters of everyday 
life of Islamist women is to a large extent determined by the historical tension 
between the secularist state ideology and Islamist ideology. This tension reflects on 
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not only the two hegemonic representations of the ‘ideal womanhood’, but also, 
more importantly, on the identity construction of Islamist women. This is not to say 
that these women totally accept the hegemonic narration made on them, nor are their 
actions and ideas absolutely enclosed and determined by the Turkish hegemonic 
political sphere. On the contrary, they are active agents dynamically constructing 
their lives.  However, the limits of this voluntarism are drawn by the historical 
conflict between Secularism and Islamism, that is, the life/ survival strategies and 
self-identity of Islamist women are shaped on the discursive plane constituted by the 
tension between the two hegemonic discourses. Islamist women’s process of  
‘bargaining with patriarchy` (Kandiyoti, 1988) is realized on a socio-political-
historical sphere, not in a vacuum. For understanding the lives of Islamist women, 
the womanhood they experience, and the discourses they develop, it seems necessary 
to contextualize the abstract term of ‘Islamist women’. For that reason, in the first 
chapter, the very context in which Islamist women identity is constructed is 
investigated. The tension between the secularist state and Islam is tried to be 
analyzed historically to appropriately contextualize the discourses, self-images and 
everyday practices of Islamist women.  
The second chapter aims to narrate the secularist and Islamist representations 
of women, which constitute each other throughout a conflict-laden relationship 
between them. Similarities and differences between the two hegemonic constructions 
on the identity of the ‘ideal woman’ are tried to be revealed by considering the 
reciprocity between the secularist and Islamist discourses. My aim in this chapter is 
not to narrate all images attached to women by the Islamist and secularist discourses, 
but the images that are dominant, idealized and approved. Moreover, I do not assume 
that these images are fully realized in the real life, or the complexity of the different 
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ways of existence of women in Turkish society can be simplified into these images. 
In contrast, the reality is far more complex, and there are many models of 
womanhood. However, these hegemonic images are worth considering because, on 
the one hand they clearly reveal the patriarchal assumptions of both discourses, and 
on the other hand, although constructed, they have real effects on the lives of real 
women in a complex way by creating dilemmas, identity crises and by functioning as 
models or anti-models. 
In the third chapter, the critical discourse developed by Islamist women 
towards both the Islamist and secularist ideologies, which try to exclude them from 
the public sphere and to suppress their demands for active agency, is analyzed in 
order to understand the very specific context of the patriarchal oppression that is 
experienced by Islamist women because of their being squeezed between the ‘ideal 
woman’ stereotypes imposed by the Islamist and secularist frameworks. At the 
beginning of the chapter, the Orientalist scholarship on the Muslim women and the 
criticisms of the Orientalist assumptions about Muslim women are shortly reviewed. 
The Orientalist theoretical accounts on Islamist women do not go beyond creating 
stereotypical images of ‘oriental’ woman who is a super-exploited passive victim, 
and by these ‘scientific’ representations hide the reality of Muslim women. Within 
the scope of these criticisms, throughout the analysis in this chapter, Islamist 
women’s literary products and their arguments appeared in the interviews made with 
them are utilized to reveal the position of active agency of Islamist women which is 
in a stark contrast with the Orientalist theoretical accounts that represent them as 
being victimized by the Islamic religion. Hence, the analysis is based on Islamist 
women’s own narrations of their reactions and criticisms towards the oppression 
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which they face due to the patriarchal assumptions of both the Islamist and secularist 
discourses.  
In the fourth chapter, the interpretations and conclusions drawn from the field 
research that utilized feminist methodology and was conducted with ten Islamist 
women who had organic ties with Islamist networks are discussed. In the field 
research, in-depth interviews were conducted with Islamist women, and they were 
asked to tell about their life stories. These life stories are utilized to illuminate the 
characteristics of the Islamic construction of women’s way of life, the survival 
strategies they developed in the public and private spheres, and their strategies of 
resisting to Islamic patriarchy. The necessity felt for such a research was due to the 
need felt to listen to the lives of Islamist women without a mediator. The analysis of 
the narrations in this chapter differs from that of the narrations of Islamist women 
given in the third chapter in two respects. First, the narrations in this chapter reflect 
the ‘naked’ reality of Islamist women’s lives and everyday practices, rather than 
being based on fictional and literal elements or directly reflecting the process of 
critical thinking of Islamist women, as in the case of the previous chapter. Secondly, 
the method of analysis in this chapter is shaped by the preference of inferring 
through analysis with Islamist women’s dynamic process of constructing their 
identity and their ways of life from the concrete details and experiences in the sphere 
of practice that are revealed in the stream of their everyday lives, rather than asking 
direct questions on the process of ‘living’ as and ‘being’ Islamist women. 
Additionally, it is thought that in order to hear their voices or to listen to their 
silence, one needs to transcend the dualities of these hegemonic frameworks/ 
discourses and diffuse into life/ practice where Islamist women carry ‘active’ agency. 
It is necessary to investigate the life strategies and everyday practices of Islamist 
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women, decentralizing and de-unifying the ‘hegemonic’ discourse. It is necessary to 
direct the gaze from the hegemonic sphere of discourse to the unclosed (partially 
open-ended) sphere of practice and to the reciprocal/ contradictory bargaining 
relationship between these two spheres.1  
In the last chapter, conclusions are tried to be drawn on the basis of the 
discussions made in the previous chapters. In the light of the analysis made with 
reference to the levels of discourse and practice, Islamist women’s current situation 
is evaluated. The ‘new’ Islamist women identity, and the discourses and survival/ 
resistance strategies that are developed by Islamist women, all of which are, to a 
large extent, affected by the tension between the Islamist and secularist ideologies in 
Turkey, are tried to be revealed, as well as, the representations of the ‘ideal 
womanhood’ within the Islamist and secularist frameworks, and the suppression of 
Islamist women by the secularist and Islamic patriarchy. The thesis is finalized with 
a short discussion about the possibility of ‘Islamist feminism’ in Turkey and on the 
positions held by Islamist women towards the feminist discourse. 
                                                
1
 However, it should be noted that there are not clear-cut boundaries between the 
spheres of discourse and practice, as they do not have self-evident existence. Thus, 
these terms are employed as ideal types to make a meaningful start.  
 
 
 7 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN  
THE ISLAMIST AND SECULARIST IDEOLOGIES 
 
In this chapter, the nation-state formation process in Turkey is tried to be explored. 
Then, the relationship between the secularist state ideology and Islamist ideology, 
which is a combination of conflict, suppression and reciprocity, is reviewed by 
considering the changing positions of two discourses with respect to each other. The 
inter(re)active development of two discourses during the history of the Republic is 
analyzed by situating both of them in the terrain of modernity. 
In this chapter, in an effort to transcend the Orientalist bias in the analysis of 
rise of Islamist fundamentalism, the tension between Islam and the secularist state 
ideology is tried to be located in its time-space matrix. Considering that the conflict 
is embedded in history and determined by the complex interaction between social, 
cultural and economic spheres of society, the structures and differences behind the 
homogeneous stigma of Islam is investigated.  
Instead of taking Islam as an unchanging entity free from all social, cultural 
and economic effects, it should be investigated in terms of what kind of transitions 
and changes has been occurred in the religio-cultural level and in the organization of 
cultural sphere starting from the late Ottoman period, what has changed about the 
existence of Islam in the society after the 1980s. 
 
1.1. Modernization Project Reflected in Nation State Formation 
Nation state formation in Third World countries displays many similarities in the 
sense that the process is determined by the modernization project and by the 
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adaptation of institutions and mechanisms of the First World countries.  Throughout 
the formation of nation states, grounds for legitimization are invented; an ideology 
and discourse appropriate to new nation are searched for, new symbols, and identities 
consistent with the invented authentic tradition are created. (Anderson, 1983) The 
ideological formation is as important as economic and social formation during the 
process. The legitimate boundaries and identity of new nation is constructed 
throughout a complex process of selection. For the definition of the identity of the 
nation, some new elements are introduced, and some existing features are redefined 
by inclusion/exclusion of some pre-existing values and identities.  
The selection mechanism is made within the framework drawn by the 
modernist understanding. Chatterjee (1986) looks for the reflections of Orientalist 
thought map on the identity of the East, more specifically postcolonial nationalism 
process. He analyses (1986: 38) these reflections at two levels:  
The thematic refers to an epistemological as well as ethical system which 
provides a framework of elements and rules for establishing relationship 
between elements; the problematic on the other hand, consists of concrete 
statements about possibilities justified by reference to the thematic.  
Nationalism in the non-Western countries is the result of the quite complex, selective 
and varied relationships between the thematic, the problematic and the Western 
conceptual map. These relationships are one of contradictions, because, on the one 
hand at the level of problematic, the Orientalist assumptions are rejected and colonial 
object regains its subjectivity, on the other hand, at the level of thematic, basic 
premises of Orientalist epistemological and ontological framework are accepted, 
such as the distinction between the East and the West (Chattarjee, 1986: 25-58).  So, 
continues Chatterjee (1986: 38): “There is consequently inherent contradictoriness in 
nationalist thinking because it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose 
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representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power nationalist 
thought seeks to repudiate”.  
During the process, the West is rejected as intruder on the one hand, and 
Eastern cultural heritage is rejected as the reason of the backwardness, on the other. 
Throughout the process, the idea of nation is constructed around an illusionary 
commonness and similarity while hiding the hegemony and power differentials in the 
society. Naturally, this kind of a state and society structure, and an idea of ‘nation’ 
coerced from above is very alien to the “native” people of the country, who have 
histories and cultures different from the West. Many of the Western mechanisms 
have no place in their mental map. The hegemonic discourse of national unity that is 
created with inclusion/exclusion mechanisms and imagined by the modernizing elite 
of the country naturally lead to identity crisis and tensions among the different 
sectors of the society according to their relative material and cultural distance to the 
hegemonic nationalist discourse and praxis.  
Turkish nation state formation is the reflection of the secular national 
sovereignty rather than the popular sovereignty; society is conceptualized in 
Durkheimian terms and organic state acting in the name of people created a national 
identity on the basis of practice of inclusion/exclusion and of binary oppositions of 
progressive/conservative, modern/traditional (Kasaba, 1997). In a continuity with the 
Ottoman state structure and in the absence of a large landlord class and of any strong 
opposition group, the Turkish reformist elite selectively imposed some modern 
institutions and values on the objects of the process, the people, and limited the scope 
of modernity within the framework of their understanding of modernization (Keyder, 
1997). 
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As Keyman (1997) argues during the construction of modern Turkish identity 
the main motive was the ‘will to civilization’ manifested itself in the necessity of 
westernization, industrialization, and formation of secular national identity. And, as 
in other parts of the Third World, a reversed Orientalism is produced carrying both 
rejection and acceptance of dominance of the West.2 Similarly, Göle (1997) points 
out that Turkish modernist elite, who builds upon French positivism, have behaved 
with the motto of order and progress and tried to establish a modern, secular, 
rational, national identity. Thus, all differences are seen as a threat for unity and 
progress. 
During the process of nation-state formation, because “state does not posses a 
coherent ontological identity, instead its very identity is discursively constructed... 
State identity is performatively constituted through its repetitive acts of producing a 
boundary between identity and difference” (Keyman, 1997: 101). In the process, 
Republican elite defined the Islamic identity as the ‘Other’ of the modern identity 
and “in short, in their quest to reorganize the Ottoman- Turkish society, the 
reforming elite ended up isolating itself from society at large and became a closed-
minded and inward looking ruling class” (Kasaba, 1997: 29).  So, in the Turkish 
context the secularist/ Islamist division and the relationship between two discourses 
is one of the tension-laden areas in the crisis of national identity. The process of 
Turkish nation-state formation is what created the long lasting tension between the 
secularist and Islamist ideologies.  
                                                
2
 Using Chattergee’s framework, Keyman (1997) argues that on the one hand essentialism and 
oriental/occidental divide are accepted, on the other hand passivity of the oriental subject and 
hegemony of the West are rejected. But still the occidental subject is the privileged one as universal 
rational subject, and oriental subject has to try to catch up with it.   
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1.2. Historical Review of the Constitutive Tension: The Antagonism between the 
Islamist and Secularist Ideologies 
The rise of Islamist movements especially in the late 1980s has been faced with a 
great shock and surprise by the secularist commentators who interpreted the events 
as signals of the return of ‘the darkness of the Middle Ages’ and the establishment of 
the Shari’a (Holy law; organization of the law system according to God’s principles) 
system. Such a reductionist and reactionary approach is the result of the total, 
conservative ignorance of the interactions between the different segments, views, 
structures and realities existing in the society. To understand the so-called `revival of 
Islam` and position of the politically active Islamist women, one has to contextualize 
the tension between the two hegemonic ideologies. 
Studies on Islam and Muslim societies made from an Orientalist theoretical 
stance, results in over-simplistic analysis of the contemporary rise of Islamist 
fundamentalism. Gilsenan (1984) in his critique of Orientalist accounts of Muslim 
societies points out that in these accounts, Islam is represented as a powerful 
irrational force determining all dynamics of the society. He argues that Islam has to 
be discussed not as a single, homogeneous, bounded structure but rather as a word 
that identifies varying relations of practice, representation, symbol and worldview. 
He points out that religion is a way of perceiving the world and Islam in practice 
bound up with many dimensions of life, hence, the political, economic and symbolic 
structures should be considered. On the other hand, Al-Azmeh (1993) directs 
attention to the dominant Orientalist attitude of conceptualizing Islam as essentially 
homogeneous and trans-historical continuity frozen at some point of history. He 
claims that there is nothing mysterious and exceptional in Islam that cannot be 
explained by reference to ideology and relations of domination and subordination. 
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He puts that explaining conflicting situations by reference to culture3 that constructs 
a framework in which differences are explained, is the dominant attitude in the post-
imperial world. To conceptualize the revival of Islam in Turkey from such an 
Orientalist theoretical framework does not take one far from the reductionist reaction 
to a socio-historical reality and does prevent to understand the dynamics leading to 
this revival, and to analyze the content behind the stigma of ‘Islam’. 4 
 
1.2.1. The Heritage of the Ottoman Empire 
The state ideology displays continuities, as well as breaks, with the Ottoman period. 
In that sense, neither 29 October 1923 is a Anno Domino nor ‘new’ Turkish society 
and Turkish culture are tabula rasa. 
To understand the ways of existence and effects of Islam in modern Turkey, 
the different versions of Islam in the Ottoman society, relations of and interactions 
with these versions to the wider structures of the society and the Ottoman state, and 
maybe most importantly, the debates in the late Ottoman period that are inherited by 
the modern Turkish Republic should be considered. 
In the Ottoman society, Islam had never been a homogeneous and monolithic 
belief and practice system. Instead we observe a separation of rural and urban, elite 
                                                
3
 Ironically, defining ‘other’ in cultural terms is a discursive practice shared by the opposite camps of 
both Western Orientalists and Muslim fundamentalists (Al-Azmeh, 1993).  Muslim fundamentalists 
while creating an alternative identity for themselves cannot exit from the modernist Western 
intellectual tradition and conceptual framework that they criticize, and develop a discourse based on 
authenticity, trans-historical truth and essence. Halliday (1995) suggests that myths created by the 
non-Muslims are now used by Islamists to provide justification to their own cause. Characteristics of 
unity and authenticity, uniqueness of Islam are shared by both fundamentalists and its enemies.  
 
4
 Geertz’s (1968) comparative analysis of Moroccan and Indonesian societies is a very successful 
example of a search for the reality that is concealed by the Orientalist stereotypes. He conceptualizes 
the Islamist fundamentalism as a discourse having similarities with the other discourses, which aims 
to change the established order. Geertz by approaching to religion as an entity existing with the 
practice of everyday life and as a reflection of tradition and the ideological content of the social 
practice tries to explain the rise of Islamist fundamentalism with reference to the changing and 
destroyed balances of power in these societies. (Geertz, 1968) 
 
 13 
and popular versions of Islam, each of them in itself and in their mutual interaction5 
changing historically.6 The orthodox version of Islam, which reflects the urban elite’s 
religious practices and beliefs, was dominantly scripturalist having strong emphasis 
to the Koran and hadith (Sayings of Prophet). On the other hand, heterodox/popular 
Islam reflecting the religious beliefs of the dominantly rural masses, contained some 
elements of the pre-Islamic beliefs and rituals, and had not a systematic and 
sophisticated theology like the orthodox version (Ocak, 1999: 44).  With the 
transition of caliphate to the Ottoman Empire, the separation between the orthodox 
and heterodox Islam was deepened due to the formation of an official, orthodox 
religious structure relying on Shari’a (Tapper, 1991: 10-11). Mardin (1997: 95) 
argues that both versions of Islam were institutionalized in the course of time, one is 
represented by the official state ideology, institutions and official ulema (religious 
authorities; religious elite) and other by the tarikats (Sufi Muslim brotherhoods)7. 
Tarikats had become a part of legitimate state mechanism and formed relationships 
with the official institutions relying on reciprocal cooperation (Mardin, 1997: 97-
101).  
The reciprocal relationship between the popular and orthodox Islam 
transformed into a conflictual relationship with the hegemony of the secularist 
bureaucracy from the 18th century onwards. During the Tanzimat period, military, 
education, administration, and legal structure were even more secularized. With the 
                                                
5
 Ayata (1991, 134-135) suggests that tarikats were developed as centers of opposition against the 
state’s and ulema’s orthodox Islam.   
 
6
 Mardin (1997) suggests that from 13th century onwards official Islam and Islam of the lower strata 
separated. While urban elites were accepting orthodox version of Islam, rural communities and non-
elites choose the heterodox, Sufi version of Islam.  
 
7
 Popular Islam of the mass had never been the equivalent of the tarikats’ Sufi version of Islam, 
although it was shaped by the effect of tarikats, which became a shelter for the people in many senses 
and was playing an important symbolic role (Mardin, 1997: 97-101). 
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effect of Tanzimat reforms aiming at reducing the religion’s power and weakening of 
tarikats, the gap between the elite and masses was widened due to the erosion of 
political institutions, central ideology and common value system tying center and 
periphery to each other. However, to maintain the legitimacy of the Empire, there 
was a strong need for a central value system and a common identity (Tapper, 1991: 
10-11). There were two important trends trying to develop an identity and strategy to 
prevent the collapse of the Empire: Islamists and modernist reformists. Both 
Islamists and reformists were sharing the idea that Western science and technology 
was superior and had to be adopted (Turan, 1991: 42-43).8 However, Islamists were 
rejecting the Western culture, arguing that it was inferior to the Islamic culture. They 
were suggesting that, to save the Ottoman Empire, social organization and economic 
structure should be shaped on the basis of Islamic principles by returning to authentic 
Islamic sources. On the other hand, liberal reformists who were affected by the 
Enlightenment philosophy and 19th century positivism, were proposing the adoption 
of western culture and value system, a nationalist, secularist project, modern, 
scientific education and administration, reforms in industrial structure and law 
system.  
 
1.2.2. Establishment of the Secularist Republic 
Attempts towards modernization in western sense accelerated with the establishment 
of the  Turkish Republic in 1923. However, Toprak (1984: 295) states that “(t)he 
Islamic movement and its secular opponents in Turkey have inherited debate which 
began in mid 19th century with the westernizing reforms in the Ottoman Empire”. 
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ent from the liberal Reformists of the late Ottoman 
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 Turan (1991) suggests that the history of the late 19th and early 20th century is the history of the 
struggle between these two groups.  
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period, Kemalists9 had not lived the paradox of articulating the traditional structure 
with the principles of modernity as the Ottoman reformists. On the contrary, they 
rejected all elements of the traditional order and tried to construct a totally new 
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modernism and republicanist nationalism to the place of Islam in the value system 
(Tapper, 1991: 13). This project of modernization from above was aiming to 
consolidate a capitalist economic system and to create a ‘nation’ sharing a unique 
homogenous culture. Within this framework, religion was one of the elements of the 
traditional culture that had to be suppressed. Insel and Aktar (1987: 22) making 
ÖÙùnÙñàánØñàÙùÖÛ×sÛ$ôﬀàAÛ¢×ﬀóßàáâ{ãàAÜúÖ4øûﬀûÚÍÖ4ÛVÛ$ôﬀàAÛ¢àñyÛ$ôﬀ×!øûﬀôöÛ$ôﬀÚá.ÚÙDÖ=àØ×ﬀðÛ$ÙðÍøÙ{Û,ÜOãÚAÛ,üÚÚð
the late Ottoman  and early Republican periods, one of meaningful differences worth 
of considering was the change in the subject of modernization, namely, the 
problematique of modernizing the state had been transformed to modernizing the 
society.   
Throughout the Turkish nation state formation, society tried to be organized 
in a ‘modern’ way in all spheres of life. Social and historical structure inherited from 
the Ottoman Empire and Islamic tradition were tried to be erased and a social 
structure taking West as the model had been tried to be settled. As a part of 
ideological mobilization for accommodation of cultural nationalism, Turkish history 
has been reinterpreted by emphasizing the pre-Islamic Turkish history. 10 Secularism 
was one of the most important parts of the modernizing reforms. After 1923, religion 
                                                
9
 In the thesis, the terms, such as Kemalist, Kemalism, are used when they are used by the other 
authors whose arguments are utilized for the discussion. Except these, the terms are not preferred 
throughout the text, with consideration to the possibility of oversimplification and a-historicism that 
may be created by the usage of these terms. 
 
10
 Jayawardena (1986: 3-5) argues that during the formation of nation state and national identity, on 
the one hand, nation is tried to be modernized and old order is tried to be changed, on the other hand, a 
legitimate ground for national unity and identity is created with reference to a distant past and good 
old days.  
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was redefined by the state elite as a private, individual matter11. The most important 
secular reforms were the abolition of the Sultanate (1923) and caliphate (1924), the 
secularization of the legal system by the abolition of Shari’a (1924) and the 
introduction of a new civil code modeling the Swiss civil code (1926), the 
prohibition of medrese (Collage of religious education) (1924) and tarikats (1925), 
the removal of the Islamic principle from the constitution (1928) and placing the 
secular state principle to the constitution (1937) (Tapper, 1991: 12-13). However, the 
Turkish version of secularism was direct intervention and the control of religion by 
the state and political authorities rather than the separation of religious and political 
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content of Islam with rational and modern elements. Starting from 1924, the state 
tried to monopolize religious education and the recruitment of the religious elite by 
establishing BDC6EC  Hatip schools (Prayer Leader School) and Theology Faculty. The 
state attempted to construct and impose its own version of orthodox official Islam, 
which carried on some Islamic values and practices. However this official version of 
Islam which is quite weak in ritualistic level, has been unsuccessful in the 
countryside (Tapper, 1991: 14). As Köker  (1997) suggests, modernization project’s 
ignorance and repression of cultural diversity of the society for realizing national 
unity had become sources of many paradoxes. Ironically Republican elites, while 
trying to create a nation from an ummah (community of believers), had created a 
national ummah by emphasizing the values such as unity and solidarity against the 
‘Other’, and, in some sense, continued the social and cultural tradition of the 
                                                
11
 According to Tessler and Jesse (1996) there are mainly there responses to Western colonialism in 
Islamic world. First was to adopt a policy of secularization (Turkey). Secondly, Islam played a crucial 
role in the development of anti-colonial nationalist movements and as national ideological system 
became more oriented towards secularization Islam appeared to be confined to the area of personal 
belief and practice (Egypt, Iraq, Syria). Last one is the recent development of fundamentalist militant 
Islam as a reaction to secularization, westernization and consumerism of the postmodern era (Muslim 
Brotherhood).  
 17 
Ottoman society which they wanted to get rid off  (Turan, 1991: 50). On the other 
hand, Republican idea of national development aimed at total modernization of the 
society without coming to terms with tradition (Köker, 1997). Maybe the most 
important mistake of the state elite of the early Republic was their ignorance of the 
importance of Islam in the value system and everyday life of the ordinary people. So 
they could not – maybe even did not attempt to- form a meaningful ideology for the 
masses. The elites of the Republic could not understand the crucial nature of the 
social and personal functions of Islam in the lives of ordinary people and supposed 
that they could easily transfer these into  other mechanisms. While they were trying 
to modernize  and control the orthodox Islam by using the state apparatus, they either 
did not realize the existence of popular Islam or they took the popular Islam as 
exceptional and consisting only of superstitions (Mardin, 1997: 147-148).  Moreover, 
Mardin (1994: 163) suggests that “the Republic had not been able to propagate a 
social ethics that was sufficiently meaningful to the rural masses to enable them to 
react positively to its modernization drive”. The modernist value system, which is 
quite alien to the masses, had no corollary and functionality in their meaning 
universe. As  Göle (1994: 225) argues: 
Secular ideologies have had only limited success in replacing the religious 
faith as a cohesive force…(T)he republic was a clear rejection of the 
traditional gemeinschaft society. There had been no social revolution; 
however, RPP (Republican People’s Party; Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) basing 
its power on limited social participation and its ability to recruit a substantial 
part of the local elite, controlled the state by distancing the center from the 
cultural periphery in the countryside. 
Thus, although Islam seems to be withdrawn from the public and political sphere as a 
result of secular reforms and especially of the prohibition of Islamic organizations 
and tarikats, popular Islam has continued its existence and influence among the 
masses. Moreover, tarikats continued their informal, illegal existence and activities 
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with a quite silent manner up to the 1950s. They have been nearer to ordinary people 
than the carriers of the orthodox Islam and the religious elite, which are part of the 
state bureaucracy during both the Ottoman and Republic periods. Özdalga (1998: 46-
51) suggests that offence towards türbe and tarikats, which are very important and 
functional in the everyday life of the people, although did not cause a wide 
opposition, had created a suspicion towards the secularist program. However, up to 
the 1950s conflict between Islam and the Republic was more of a matter of the 
educated elite. 
 
1.2. 3. Transition to the Multi-Party System 
 With the transition to the multi-party system, Islam reentered into the public and 
political sphere as one of the most important components. Competition for votes led 
to the softening and regression of secularist radicalism 1945 onwards.12 Practice of 
secularism started to be questioned even within the Republican People’s Party (RPP; 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). With the advent of competitive politics, center began to 
lose its dominant position, and rural society controlled by the state elite was 
transformed into a dominantly urban society led by politicians having roots in the 
periphery (Mardin, 1994: 161). The Democratic Party (DP; Demokrat Parti) 
defending liberal democracy and using Islam as one of the most important elements 
of its propaganda, won the 1950 national elections, taking the powerful support of 
tarikats and Islamic communities against the ‘atheist’ RPP13. Mardin (1994: 161) 
states that “new ideas described as conservative were now expressed in the 
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 In 1949 religion courses were added to the elementary school programs, many F7GIHJG  Hatip Schools 
were opened and many newly established parties put Islam to their programs as an important 
principle. 
 
13
 For example it is known that Nurcu communities had supported DP. 
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parliament”. According to Mardin (1997: 168) after the 1940s there were generally 
two trends emphasizing Islam: first one was in the line of the orthodox ulema and 
wanted to open a wider space for Islam in the society, while the second one was the 
wish of the masses to return to the folk Islam .  
In the 1960s, mass migration to the cities since the 1950s as a result of  the 
mechanization of agriculture led to low life standards due to the absence of sufficient 
industrial structure to create employment in the cities. This led to further suspicions 
about the modernization project. Islamist discourses presenting familiar meaning 
systems, religious symbols and a sense of belonging, have found support by the 
migrants who are in the unfamiliar urban environment.14 Islam’s reference and 
solutions about everyday life and its being a paradigm explaining and ordering all 
spheres of life also has given Islam an important and strong political KLMLMNPONQKROJS*T:U KR
(1995: 133-134) argues that Islamist opposition in Turkey has two sources: in the 
underdeveloped areas of Turkey, Islam is the ideology of the dominant class due to 
its role of forming statism in the traditional societal environments, and secondly in 
rapidly developing areas, it is the ideology of the oppressed groups as a reaction and 
opposition to the system. Moreover, after the 1960s VDW
XW  Hatip Schools turned out 
to be alternative education centers, and graduates were employed in the public and 
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-102). 
In 1969 first Islamist party, the National Order Party (NOP; Milli Nizam 
Partisi) (1969-1972) was established, and after it was closed by the Constitution 
Court in 1972, the National Salvation Party (NSP; Milli Selamet Partisi) was 
established in 1972. On the other hand, the changing balances of power in the 1960s 
with the effect of industrial development and centralization of capital challenged the 
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 These validates the Geertz’s (1968) idea that religious crisis are the result of an effort of adapting 
traditions with the necessities of modern life. 
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existing class coalitions in the political area in the DP period, and Anatolian 
bourgeois which was dominantly small scale, supported NSP against the Justice 
Party (JP; Adalet Partisi) supporting central bourgeois. Some Nurcu (‘Seekers of 
Light’; they are follower of Bediüzzaman Saidi Nursi) communities who were better 
in economic situation were supporting the JP, whereas tarikats in Anatolia, such as 
Kadiriler, zr{|}~M ~> , and  pŁ/
 kQ  were supporting NSP (Bulut, 1997: 
256-263).15 With the effect of its voters, NSP became anatolianist and gained a 
dominantly Islamic identity due to the participation of traditional strata and tarikats 
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-18). According to Toprak (in Arjomand. 1984: 9), NSP was in a 
direct continuity with the late 19th century Ottoman Islamists in the sense that it was 
searching for an Islamic model of modernity. The Party leaders named their ideology 
as the ‘national outlook’(Milli r"  ), suggesting that theirs was the only indigenous 
view, which was not alien to national experience. They competed with leftist 
ideologies with their statist, populist and anti-imperialist discourse (Bulut, 1997: 
234). They proposed co-operation among Muslim countries instead of integration 
with and simulation of the West (Toprak, 1984: 126-127). Similar to the Islamists of 
the 19th century,  NSP argued for the adoption of the technology and rejection of the 
culture of the West. Industrialization and development were the most crucial 
components of the Party’s outlook although it did not have a detailed economic 
program.16  Toprak (1984, 126) states: “NSP promised to initiate rapid development 
through revitalizing indigenous cultural values which would supply the necessary 
spiritual and moral qualities for a new work ethic”.  
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 For NSP-Nurcu ¡M¢£¤¥Q¦§"¨k©Mª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¤ﬂ´ : 1985, 60-61. 
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 During its participation in the coalition governments between 1973 and 1978 NSP controlled the 
Ministry of Industry and Technology. 
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The Party’s success was also due to the its wide and strong organizational 
network. It had close ties with the youth and professional, workers, migrants, and 
tarikats and Islamic communities (Toprak, 1984: 126).17 In the 1973 national 
elections, it received 11.8% and in 1977 national elections, it received the 8.6% of all 
µ ¶·¸º¹$¸º¹» ¸¼½Q¾ﬀ¿¿ÀÂÁMÃ¶4ÄÆÅrÇ¾J·¶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1995: 20). In 1973, 67.2% of its votes and in 1977, 63.2% of its votes were from the 
rural areas and it was more successful in the less developed areas (East and Central 
Anatolia) and rapidly urbanizing and developing regions of the country (Toprak, 
1984: 132). After participating in Ecevit’s coalition between 1973 and 1974, and 
Demirel’s ‘national front’ (Milli Cephe) governments between 1977 and 1978, NSP 
was closed after the coup d’etat of September 1980 (Toprak, 1984: 129). 
 
1.2.4.The 1980s Onwards 
The so-called ‘revival of Islam’ in Turkey after 1980 has been due to the shifting 
economic and cultural politics that lead to changes and transformations in the 
organization, structure, characteristics and functions of Islam. Before 1980,  the 
dominant economic policy of Turkey was planned development and industrialization 
based on import substitution policies. But these policies faced with a crisis especially 
with the effect of the world oil crisis of 1973 because of the dependence of Turkish 
industry on oil, and this was followed by increasing foreign debts. As a result, with 
the decisions made in 24 January 1980 proposed by the World Bank and IMF, a 
turning point in Turkey’s foreign and economic policy was lived. Economic policy 
based on import substitution was given up and, instead, policy based on export-
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oriented production was adopted. State relinquished from many areas of production 
and reduced its regulations on trade and market. Moreover, after 1980, Islamic 
capital and  economic relations with the Petro-Islam countries have been supported 
by the state policies.18 Islamic finance institutions and Islamic banking supported by 
special legal arrangements, such as the exemption from Turkish bankruptcy law, and 
widening tax exemption (Bulut, 1997: 212). Starting from 1984, many Islamic banks 
and Islamic finance institutions were established using these privileges.19 Besides we 
observe a great increase in Islamic firms in import, export, construction and 
manufacturing sectors. These firms are using anti-Judaist discourse, have organic 
relations with tarikats and rise on the bases of community and kinship co-
operation20, and some of them came together under the same roof by establishing the 
Ł 
A    
-225).21 So, we can talk about a stratum which tries to 
get share from the national profit, using religious symbols for competition under the 
name of Islamic economy22. 
Besides, political conservatism is adopted in contrast to the adoption of 
liberalism in the sphere of economics. As Göle (1994, 218) states “if the liberal 
movement represented the economic dimension of the autonomisation of the civil 
society, the Islamist movement represented the cultural dimension”. With the 
military coup of 1980 on the one hand political liberties have been extremely 
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 Suudia, Kuwait and Iran firms have been entered to Turkey. See Bulut, 1997. 
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 The most important of these Islamic finance institutions were Al-Baraka Turk, Faisal Finans, 
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 Roy (1995:12) suggests that Islamic economy is nothing more than a 3rd worldist statism or 
economic liberalism.  
 23 
restricted, on the other hand restrictions on religious groups are reduced to balance 
the leftist movements. Tapper (1991: 18) interprets this removal from the rigid 
traditional secularism as the adoption of a new approach for preserving secularism. 
State adopted Turk-Islam synthesis23 in cultural and social level in order to form 
national unity using Islam (Güvenç and et.al. 1994: 11). 
In the 1983 national elections, the Motherland Party (MP; Anavatan Partisi), 
which would further the economic liberalism and political conservatism won the 
elections.24 During the MP period, pragmatism had become the dominant norm of the 
Turkish political system and Islamist communities and tarikats, such as the 
687#9:ﬀ;=<2>?#@A;
 and Nurcu, supported the Party. Göle (1994: 219-220) defines the MP 
leaders as ‘Islamist engineers’ and the party as ‘conservative progressive’ in its 
efforts towards synthesizing market economy and western model of development 
with Islamic values. So, as a result of the economic and cultural policies of the 
1980s, Islam has become not only a legitimate part of political system, but also has 
become a crucial component of the official state ideology. 
These liberal conservative policies have had deep effects on the societal level. 
As a result of economic liberalism, informal sector has expanded, social security 
system has been depressed due to the state’s cutbacks of the  expenditures on social 
security, health and education, wage levels have fallen and life standards have been 
deteriorated. In the face of the increasing competition for employment and 
decreasing life standards, the importance of informal cliental networks has increased 
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reinforcement of religion in education but they are against Islamic state and politicization of religion 
(Tapper, 1991: 18-19). 
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 In this elections only 3 parties had competed: Motherland Party, National Democracy Party and The 
Populist Party. Turan, 1994: 50. 
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for the households and individuals, who have found themselves in a position to cope 
with their fates by their own strategies and efforts.  
Moreover the bureaucracy, which is assumed to be one of the most important 
markers of modernization, was quite insufficient and malfunctioning. This might be 
related to the strong paternal state tradition, which considers people not as citizens 
but as reaya, which leads to the continuation of life with informal networks and 
principles. Besides, these networks are very crucial in symbolic adaptation to the city 
and form important social network and create a sense of belonging in the alien city 
environment. In a Third World country where bureaucracy is malfunctioning, and 
informal traditional networks and clientalism are crucial parts of survival strategy, 
supporters and members of traditional Islamic communities and tarikats which are 
consistent with the traditional identity, organizational structure and life style, have 
rapidly increased. In addition, due to the increasing polarization as a result of the 
adoption of Turkish-Islamic synthesis by the state, differences formerly taken as 
cultural are politicized. Religious groupings, which have crucial functions for 
cultural identity and economic survival, have started to redefine themselves more in 
the realm of politics. Traditional Islam has been politicized to a large extent and 
traditional Islamist groups have been articulated to the political and social system. 
Thus, we observe important breaks from the pre-1980 Islamist movement.25 
New Islamism also has gained dynamism with the emergence of radical Islamist/ 
fundamentalist groups.26 Although they are not representing the general tendency in 
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 For detailed information on the post 1980 Islam in Turkey, see Cizre, 1999: 104-116, 128-138. 
 
26
 The emergence of the radical Islamist trend in Turkey is to a large extent affected by the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. 
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Turkish Islam27, their radical discourse affected other Islamist  groups, which are 
more traditional in the direction of radicalization and increasing dynamism.  
 
1.2.4.1. Islam in the post 1980’s Turkish Party Politics: 
The Case of the Welfare Party 
The best representative of modernist Islam in Turkey is the Welfare Party (WP; 
Refah Partisi) –which is closed by the constitution court in 1998 and continues its 
existence under the name of the Virtue Party(VP; Fazilet Partisi) - who mainly 
supported and suspended by the Islamists in different degrees, as well as, by the 
l3mnoﬀp0qrtsunlwvyxtrupzmﬂ{}|O~)ms##)g#2ﬀŁ]{m{p0#mArtqp0qonjn#Anl3nﬀpﬃ]{3m{r#p0#m
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®¯«­
-16) suggests that WP is not an Islamist party 
because the source of its statutes and program is not the Koran, it has not a consistent 
Islamist ideology and it takes the capitalist institutions as its model. Its Islamist 
appearance is more of an effect of its supporters- its relations with the traditional 
Islamist strata- and secularist camp’s attitude. Moreover, WP’s theory, and discourse, 
as well as, its supporters are changing, and in the Party’s ideology, a transition from 
the statist attitude of  NSP to free market, liberal economy  discourse is observed 
partially as an effect of the Anatolian bourgeois’ integration to the world system and 
°§±²³´#µ¶·2¸\´#¹»º0¼u±½º0¾¿À2¶iº0¶´#·#¿²Á!Â+²¿µ¶Âwº-Â0º0¾3¿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1995, 32). With its 4th general congress in 1993, WP’s process of breaking up with 
NSP tradition has been completed. They suggested that real religious freedom can 
only be possible with WP, adding that they are not opposed to secularism but to its 
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 Gellner (1992) suggests that balances are shifting from folk Islam in Moslem countries. Although 
this is not totally valid for Turkey. After 1980s we observe trend of orthodox which rejects ‘false’ 
traditions and proposes to return the true sources of Islam –although it is a minority in the Turkish 
Islamist politics, it is important in the sense that it is a new formation and effects the political 
atmosphere. 
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imported practice in Turkey which tries to create a religion with state intervention 
ÊË#Ì\ÍÎtËﬂÏ0Ð3Î#ÑcÒ!ÓAÔËuÕ×ÖØ#Ø)ÙÚJÙÛØ
-60).28 In the congress WP leaders have claimed that WP 
is the best representative of democracy (Cizre- Ü)ÝÞAÝßßàá#â#ßiãäcåæ#æ#æ]çèåé#ê -104). 29 
It seems clear that the WP is supporting liberal capitalist economic model. 30  
The discourse of ‘just order’ (Adil Düzen)31 of the party shapes around the idea that 
the good sides of the capitalist and communist systems that are created by the 
western civilization will be taken. In this sense Islam is less a determining factor than 
the western civilization in the areas of economy, state, political and administrative 
structure, and Islamic elements are considered mostly in everyday human relations 
ë!ìAíî#ïñðò#ò)óôJõöóﬂ÷øcù»úuí¯ûAüAýþ/ß ½ý4ý#ßzýþß 
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which private property, free competition and profit are allowed and only interest is 
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-48) suggests that in the ‘just order’ discourse, Islam is 
being used in order to legitimize the inequality and exploitation, and at best it can 
create a social state paradigm with a well-defined social security system on the basis 
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 A survey research conducted in April- May 2000 by Bilkent University shows that arguments of 
Virtue Party deputies on the issue of secularism are in continuity with the principles of 4th General 
Congress. While defining secularism as in the same way of secularist deputies as the separation of 
state and religious affairs, they put emphasis on preventing state to intervene the religious affairs, 
while secularist deputies are emphasizing the prevention of religion to interfere to the state affairs. VP 
deputies argue that they are not opposed to secularism, on the contrary they are for real secularism. To 
empower and legitimize their arguments, they frequently refer to the application of secularism in USA 
and Europe. In a sense they are criticizing secularists with their traditional examples and arguments. 
They demand for the redefinition of the term in the constitution, in the words of one VP deputy: “In 
Turkey secularism is not defined clearly in the constitution. This ambiguity gives opportunity to some 
power holders to interpret the term as irreligiosity and use it as an oppressive tool towards religious 
people”. 
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 This attitude is criticized by radical Islamists emphasizing the different references of Islam, to the 
God, and democracy, to the individual. Dilipak says; “Democracy is the political apparatus of 
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the economic system Islam demands for is capitalism and Islamist movement has not an specific and 
original economic program to propose. 
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 ‘Just Order’ has theoretically based on the utopic community project created by Süleyman 
>CŁﬁﬁi>*DM0qﬁ0C>
siﬁV9.*ﬁ!M>!Cs ¡¢M0
>ﬁ!Fﬁ0 MCV!ﬁMVC!>£0¤,s¥ﬁ£
1995: 232- ¦§¨*©>ªq«M¬®­9«M¬C¯i°ﬁ±²«M¬C­V³s´°«M±9«M±D´µ¯D¶ ·C¸º¹»´q«M¬C¼0¯s¬!½N¹C¯!¯z¾,³s¿Àﬁ¬ÁÂ!Ã0ÃÄqÅqÂs§qÂ -149. 
 
 27 
of zekat principle. With WP’s interpretations, Islam becomes a tool for capitalist 
development. Akçam (1995, 172) suggests that WP uses Islam in similar role of 
Protestantism in the development of Western capitalism while trying to combine 
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even secularizes the Muslims because it tries to develop projects on the concrete 
problems of Turkey instead of working on the reproduction of religious issues. 
Similarly, the central role the party attaches to the elections can be thought as 
a sign of its distance from the goal of a radical transition. Moreover, WP seems to be 
comfortable with the rules and institutions of liberal democracy and the basic 
organization structure of the party is quite consistent with the political party 
organization style of Western liberal democracy. However, WP has more than one 
organizational dynamic and style such as organizing within the tarikats and Islamic 
ì*íîïîð®ñòôóòõaö!÷õaöó(øùúﬁòö
ûòñüþýòﬁß!õ*ìMóQìíñNó(ø*ìó ëòóû òﬁñýò%òýað7øúö®õñ%÷	


-90). One of 
the advantages of WP and the weakest point of other parties, is its powerful organic 
relations with its supporters. Probably the underdeveloped Turkish political culture 
has also played a crucial role in the success 32 of WP33. In that sense, WP seems the 
most successful political party with its strong rootedness in civil society. Benton 
(1996: 115-121) suggests that its success is due to its strong gross-roots organization, 
door to door canvassing and acquiring votes from urban migrants by providing them 
financial assistance and presenting itself as the ideology which conforms to the 
traditional religious ideas. Additionally, the activism of the Party’s Ladies 
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 Welfare Party increases its vote rates systematically. Its election performance is as follows: 4.4% in 
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 According to Özbudun (1997) political society standing between civil society and state is quite 
weak in Turkey. Özbudun states that votality, fragmentation and ideological polarization are the main 
characteristics of Turkish political party system stemming from the destructive effects of military 
interventions and weak rootedness of Turkish political parties in civil society.  
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Commission has a very important role in the party’s success. The role of the women 
in the rise of Islamist politics and movement is described in length in the third 
chapter of the thesis. 
Although WP articulates different trends of Islamism under its roof, the most 
dominant discourse of the party has many continuities with and similarities to the late 
Ottoman century Islamism. It has generally a positive dialog with the Western 
ideology in the sense that although they criticize the Western civilization, they highly 
value material technology and industrial development, and make use of the modern 
institutions and techniques, such as party and parliament in their social organization, 
and of the modern c YZ[ﬀ\],^ﬂ_`_+a[9bdc)_ﬂegf\9hiYj[9kﬂcB[ml4e	\ﬀnGac9o1p^ql4esrqkﬂ\ﬀ\BfYthvu'w	xjZ\Gy -Ayata: 
174). They argue for the Islamic version of knowledge, technology and modernity. 
Islamist thinker Bulaç (1992a: 20-25) labels the followers of WP as ‘Protestant 
Muslims’ arguing that they are proposing a secularized, modernized and reformed 
Islam consistent with the western institutions and capitalist system. 
 
1.2.4.2. Tension Between Two Hegemonic Discourses Both of which are 
Embedded in Turkish Modernity 
Political Islam in the post 1980’s Turkey has radical breaks from previous Islamism. 
In the 1980s all versions of Islam gained a political content and dynamism especially 
with the effect of rising radical/fundamentalist Islam after the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution. Political Islamists made their first radical appearance in the Republican 
political area in these years. Moreover, previously rural oriented Islamism has been 
carried to the cities and Islamist movement has become an urban political movement 
which is not supported only by lower classes or low educated but its wide range of 
supporters are from well educated professionals of middle and upper middle classes. 
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Besides main Islamic actors today are trained by secular institutions and are products 
of urbanization and modern education. With the increasing publicity and 
institutionalization of Islamist groups, tarikats and WP, the continuity and 
commonality between Islam and modernity has become visible (Bilici, 1998: 90). 
Saktanber (in Benton, 1996) suggests that Islamist revivalism in contemporary urban 
Turkey is based upon a demand for an alternative moral, social order and resistance 
to secular form of modernity. It is not a phenomenon carrying traditional 
connotations, but a quite modern, urban resistance movement. It is not the return of 
the archaic, but one of the recent products of modernity.  
Islam in the post 1980’s Turkey stays within the boundaries of modernity. 
They use the modernist dichotomy of East/ West with a different emphasis. Their 
main opposition to West evolves around the criticism of cultural modernity rather 
than the material contours of modernity such as Western technology or capitalism. In 
that sense, Islamist discourse operationalizes some claims of postmodernism and gets 
closer to the discourse of postmodernity. This is due to the fact that postmodernist 
discourse presents a fruitful theoretical ground for the Islamist arguments by its 
critique of modernity, science, objectivity, and active agency of the knowing subject. 
However, when it comes to the postmodern advocacy of relativism, Islamist 
discourse based on the belief of absolute authority of God and the Truth allies itself 
with the modernist discourse. So, the Islamist discourse seeming to go forth and back 
between the modernist and postmodernist discourses, is indeed rejects a special kind 
of modernity, namely, Western modernity. By criticizing Western modernity, 
Islamists are trying to construct an alternative modernity. 
The discourses of Islamists are embedded in the modernist framework, both 
in the sense that they are using the conceptual and political tools of modernity and 
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that they create urban centered political Islamist movements. Moreover, the identity 
and political sphere of political Islam in Turkey is determined by the ‘modern’ 
tension between Islam and secularism, which is the result of the modernization 
project in Turkey. In a sense Islamists are trying to create an urban lifestyle 
alternative to the one proposed by the Kemalist modernization project. But this is in 
no way outside of the limits of modernity. Indeed this effort and the way of struggle 
itself shows how the Islamist discourses and politics are embedded in modernity.  
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CHAPTER II 
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN TURKEY:  
THE SECULARIST AND ISLAMIST DISCOURSES 
 
In Turkey with the rise of Islamist movement, debate between the Islamists and 
secularists has become an important part of Turkish political agenda. Reviewing the 
hot debate lasting nearly for two decades, one can easily see that arguments are 
developed around few concepts within a simplistic framework taking shape around 
the dichotomies of traditional/modern, secularism/Islam. As a result of the rise of 
Islamist movement, the use and control of the Women’s body has been carried to the 
heart of debate between the secularists and Islamist in Turkey.  Women’s 
participation in and support for Islamist movements seems somewhat 
incomprehensible and unintelligible to the outside observers, especially those having 
‘western’ minds and inspired by western rationality and secularism. However this 
standing have danger of carrying an Orientalist34 attitude to the situation at hand and 
may lead to simplistic interpretations by leading to evaluate the facts at their face 
value and preventing the comprehension of deeper meanings, causes and factors 
about the topic at hand. As Saktanber (in Benton, 1999: 127) demonstrates we should 
not see the present situation by bipolar lenses within the framework of binary 
oppositional system of secular/Islamist, traditional/ modern which reinforces the 
Orientalist views of Muslim women by masking the complexity.  
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 The term Orientalism is used in loyalty with the Said’s (1979) conceptualization. Here, Orientalism 
rises on the basis of the basic ontological separation between East and West. Within this framework 
all positive features are attributed to Occident in contrast to the Orient represented as the carrier of all 
negative attributes. Orient is defined as a-historic, stagnant, static, irrational, exotic, barbaric… 
Parallel to this ontological status of Orient, social phenomenon and changes in the region are 
explained by referring to enigmatic, exotic, irrational oriental traditions. 
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For that reason this chapter aims to critically evaluate both the Islamist and 
secularist discourses on women for creating the possibility of a third space to develop 
an alternative narration from within. However, the issue will be limited to the 
hegemonic constructs of  both sides and alternative, critical narrations within each 
discourses will not be mentioned. 
The secularist and Islamist discourses present us two alternative and 
conflicting narrations of the ‘ideal’ femininity, giving hegemonic “voice” to women 
within the process of Othering and objectification. And in the current context of 
Turkey Islamist women are at the heart of this discursive ‘war’, because of their 
rising visibility in the public space with turban. These women are defined by the 
secularists as irrational for supporting Islam, a religion with strong patriarchal 
emphasis, and wishing to become slaves of men submitting to  the rules of Islam. On 
the other hand, patriarchal discourse of Islamist movement defines them as self-
sacrificing, half-conscious, innocent victims. In the middle of the debate on them, 
Islamist women who are actively participating in a political movement, are silenced. 
They become more and more visible as the object of debate as they become invisible 
as active subjects. 
 
2.1. Women’s Participation in Islamist and Early Nationalist Movements 
Throughout history, women formed a very important potential for political 
movements. After late 19th century we observe that women have crucial place as 
active militants and as symbols both in nation state movements which have 
modernist and progressivist perspective and in fundamentalist movements which 
attract attention with their anti-modernist discourses. Another common characteristic 
of these movements which seem as totally different form each other is that, despite 
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the crucial place  women have in the movement, they try to preserve their patriarchal 
discourse and structure. Moreover,  generally they make room for women only in 
certain patriarchal conceptual frameworks. It is clear that women as main actors in 
social and biological reproduction have crucial potential for political movements. 
Women are defined by these movements within the framework of their place in 
family which do not give priority to women’s emancipation and at best consider 
women’s rights as a tool and at secondary importance.35 
In these movements important duties are attached to women as the mothers of 
the nation or community. They are waited to devote themselves to the struggle for 
national liberation and development, or for jihad  within the given framework and 
sacrificing their priorities and interests. Moreover, all new social movements feel the 
need for creating a history and identity for legitimizing itself. As trying to define an 
a-historic and authentic identity, woman becomes one of the most important 
references of this ideal, ‘real’ identity. It is as if that it is waited for this ‘ideal’ 
woman to descend from the heaven and she becomes one of the most crucial symbols 
of the movement. By the image of this ideal woman, it is reminded to women 
participating in the movement that they are very important for the movement and 
they have to behave and struggle in appropriate ways suiting to the image of the ideal 
woman. Generally, in such political movements the existing low status of women is 
criticized and explained by the defects of existing malfunctioning system. Paidar 
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 Again to refer to the survey research with TGNA Deputies by Bilkent University, the “women 
problem” and “women right” are interpreted instrumentally by proponents of both Islamist and 
secularist ideology.  D.S.P. deputies, on the one hand display the most egalitarian and least sexist 
attitude towards women, on the other hand, they are the most intolerant ones towards the headscarved 
women. whereas, while Virtue Party deputies  display a mild egalitarianism on women’s rights, they 
become very libertarian in supporting the rights of headscarved women.  this findings clearly shows 
that ideological polarization even on the issue of women’s rights, is not based on sexism/ 
egalitarianism divide, but on the secularism/ Islam dichotomy. The discourses about women’s rights 
are constructed on the basis of the dichotomy between secularism and Islamism. Namely, women’s 
rights are attached to either ‘modern’ women reinforced by secularist discourse, or to the headscarved 
‘Muslim’ women supported by the Islamist discourse. 
 34 
(1996: 52) writes on the discourse of nationalism in Iran at the beginning of the 20th 
century: “It was constructed as an alternative discourse as Islam was associated with 
traditionalism and backwardness. During the constitutional period, secular 
intellectuals played an important role in constructing concepts such as 
constitutionalism, nationalism, modernity and women’s emancipation”. Similar 
epistemological framework giving reference to women for its legitimization was 
used with the rise of Shi’ism in 1970s Iran. Paidar (1996: 57) continues:  
The Islamic campaign on women included appeals to reject ‘westernization’ 
and exploitation of women as ‘sex objects’ which was seen as the 
consequence of Iran’s economic and cultural dependence on the West. Instead 
women were urged to embrace the new Shi’i model of womanhood which 
represented ‘authenticity’ and ‘independence’ and emphasized women’s dual 
role as mothers and revolutionaries. 
 
Katz (1996: 92-93) makes a similar argument in her analysis of the role of 
gender identity in Early Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms, and argues: “Whether 
waxing eloquent on the future of the ‘barren wastelands’ or in the volatile debates 
about women’s rights, nationalists as self appointed modernizers, imagined women 
as both the vehicles and objects of civilization”. It is claimed in the discourse of both 
nationalists and Islamists that women will get the proper place in the ideal society. It 
is repeated to women that they have to participate in the struggle not only for the 
liberation of the nation or of the community or for social good, but also for their 
emancipation. However, because understanding of women’s emancipation is 
developed only in pragmatist grounds as a tool, it is seen that patriarchy continues at 
different levels and spheres in newly established social system. In sum, as Nashat 
and Tucker (1999: liii) states: “Nationalist struggles in the 19th and 20th centuries 
mobilized women  in the Third World. But once the state was established (or gained 
its independence from external conquerors), women often seemed to loose in the 
process”.  
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2.2. Women as the Symbol of Modernity and ‘New’ Nation 
In the morning at six, Mohan Srivastova, school master, heard an 
uprear…Quite a few people have crowded around the map of India that had 
been carefully drawn… Today is independence day… Filling the entire 
Indian peninsula from the ocean of Himalayas, here lies bonded labor spread-
eagled, kamiya-whore36 Douloti Nagesia’s tormented corpse, putrefied with 
venereal disease, having vomited up all the blood in its desiccated lungs. 
Today, on the fifteenth of August, Douloti has left no room at all in the India 
of people like Mohan for planting the standard of the independence flag. 
What will Mohan do now? Douloti is all over India37(Devi, 1995: 93). 
 
Yuval-Davis (1997: 23) states; “the mythical unity of national  imagined 
communities …. is maintained and ideologically reproduced by ….. a whole system 
of border guards …. (which) can identify people as members and non-members of a 
specific collectivity”. Gender symbols play a significant role in this process, and 
discourses about  “women’s emancipation” or  “women following tradition” become 
central to the ideology of nation state (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 23). According to Yuval-
Davis (1997: 21) there are three major dimensions of nationalist projects: 
genealogical dimension which is constructed around common origin, cultural 
dimension which is constructed around common tradition and civic dimension which 
is constructed around common citizenship. One or more of these dimensions is 
emphasized during the ideological formation of nation state and in all of them 
women as a symbol become one of the central areas for struggle for legitimization 
and reproduction of national ethics. The control of women’s sexuality is generally an 
internal part of nationalism because of her biological reproduction capacity. 
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 Kamiya means bonded slave. 
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 This is an extract from the story ‘Doulati the Bountiful’ written by Mahesweta 
Devi in Imaginary Maps. To summarize Doulati who is a daughter of a bounded-
slave in India becomes a Kamiya whore as a result of her arranged marriage with a 
Brahman who argues that he is against bounded slavery and believes the equality of 
all citizens. At age 27 Doulati gets tuberculosis and when traveling back to her 
village she dies lying on the India map drawn on the ground by the students for the 
celebrations of national Independence Day. 
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However, cultural reproduction is at least as important as biological reproduction in 
the formation of the ‘imagined community’, and domestic sphere and women as 
mothers of the next generation of nation are significant for transmission and 
reproduction of cultural identity. So modern nation state distinguishes between the 
private and public space, and hence between men and women, and different rules are 
applied in each sphere. On the other hand, while symbolizing the reproduction of 
tradition, women also seen as ‘barometer of modernization’ against backwardness, 
and legal equality of women in the public space, their citizenship rights, educational 
levels start to signify the civilization level of the new nation. As Jayawardena (1986: 
12-113) states: 
This new consciousness demanded an ‘enlightened’ woman …a woman who 
was ‘presentable’ in colonial society yet whose role was primarily in the 
home. These women had to show that they were the negation of everything 
that was considered backward in the old society: that they were no longer 
secluded, veiled and illiterate, with bound feet and minds, threatened with 
death on their husband’s funeral pyre.  
 
Although one can not suggest a single path for the relationship of gender and nation, 
it is clear that searches for authentic national identity is, to a large extent, based on 
discourses about women’s roles and status, and “ the entry of women into the 
national area, as cultural and biological reproducers of the nation and as transmitters 
of its values, has also redefined the content and boundaries of ethnicity and the 
nation” (Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989: 287). Jayawardena (1986) emphasizes three 
sites of struggle during the establishment of modern nation states in the Third World. 
First is the struggle for modernizing society by internal reforms. Secondly, struggle 
against pre-capitalist structures is carried out. Lastly, efforts are made in the direction 
of constructing a national identity. That is, they try to modernize the nation and 
change the old order on the one hand, and create a legitimate ground for national 
unity and identity referring to, in most cases, a distant past and good old days on the 
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other hand. (Jayawardena, 1986: 3-5) In search for new national identity, women are 
made the carrier of both tradition and modernity. While symbolizing modern with 
her existence  in the public space, she is expected to reproduce the ‘tradition’ of 
nation in the private space. For that reason discourses  about emancipation of women 
concentrate around public space, and some primitive feminism of equality arises. 
Emancipation of women is understood very limitedly and reforms are made 
selectively. In general, and unfortunately at best, reforms include legal equality, 
education, property, working and voting rights. However, these reforms have little 
impact on the lives of ‘ordinary’ women and only a small number of elite,  upper 
class women have the chance of taking the advantages of these reforms. This is due 
to firstly the fact that they do not go beyond legal level, de jura,  and secondly, 
women’s subordination in the private sphere is not questioned.   
 
2.2.1. The Secularist Representation of Women 
Mustafa Kemal says: 
I see women covering their faces with their headscarves or turning their 
backs when a man approaches. Do you really think that the mothers  and 
daughters of a  civilized nation would behave so oddly or be so backward 
(in Jayawardena, 1986: 25) (italics added). 
 
Namus (family honor) comes from the Greek word nomos which means tradition, 
ethical culture, arrangement of human relations in society. In Turkey namus is 
associated with the behaviors of women which leads to us to conclude that a strong 
association is assumed between the behaviors of women and tradition, the 
arrangement of human relations in society. Then it is not surprising at all that during 
the formation of the Turkish nation state, behaviors and the identity of women 
became one of the major areas of intervention for cultural formation. 
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Generally, in Third World countries efforts to establish modern nation states,  
and development projects which take the modernization process of First World 
countries as the model, are produced and they are put into practice by active policies. 
For Turkey, this mentality finds its most clear manifestation with the Kemalist 
modernization project. Since 1923 is a point in continuity started with 2nd 
Constitutional monarchy rather than a total breaking point, it will be convenient to 
briefly look at the period between 2nd Constitutional monarchy and the establishment 
of Republic of Turkey. during the period liberal reformist discourse was in rise and a 
‘male feminism’ was emerging. Women became one of the central components of 
the national ideal and civilization. Men of the period were also under the pressure of 
patriarchy, and were opposing against their suppression under the hegemony of older 
males of family. They were protesting against arranged marriages and wanted to 
marry women with whom they could ‘speak’, ‘enlightened wives who would care 
their children’(Kandiyoti, 1991: 26). They claimed for the education right for women 
and claimed that woman was one of the important building stones of the nation. Ziya 
Gökalp was saying “ In the future Turkish ethics must be founded upon democracy 
and feminism, as well as, upon nationalism, patriotism, work and strength of the 
family”, while Tevfik Fikret  was saying “When women are debased, humanity is 
degraded” (in Jayawardena, 1986: 12).38 
However these ideas started to reflect in the practice by legal arrangements 
mainly after 1923.  In this period we see that society was tried to be organized in a 
‘modern’ way, from dressing to political system, education to state structure. 
Kemalist reforms were mainly directed towards changing the super structure of 
society and were in the form of intervening the cultural forms and institution of 
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 For the ideas of Turkish thinkers on the ‘women problem’ see also Kandiyoti, 1991 
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society. They mainly aimed at the modernization of society, and modernization was 
tried to be realized by changing the cultural construction of society.  
Within this cultural reformation process, the representation of women as 
citizens had a different path and connotations than that of men, namely on the one 
hand, they were part of the nation like men, but on the other hand there were specific 
rules which related only to women. Representation of women became one of the 
major areas of intervention. The low status of women was equated with 
underdevelopment. Göle (1993) suggests that in Islamic countries, the status of 
women in society is seen as the determinant of the limits of the modernization 
project, and the ‘woman problem’ becomes  the ‘culture and civilization problem’.  
She says that modernization movement is mainly determined by the entrance of 
women into the public space (Göle, 1993: 14-15). Within the framework of  the 
secularist state ideology, the identity of ‘modern’ woman is constructed around the 
duality of Islam/ West, traditional/modern, difference/equality, mahrem/namahrem. 
Kemalist project contains both civilization and nationalization, and women become 
the symbol for both nationalist ideology and Westernization project. Arat (1994: 
108) says “The most significant function of Kemalist reforms on women’s status 
may have been the strengthening of secularism”.  
In 1926 Turkish Civil code, which took Swiss Civil Code as its model, was 
accepted, and polygamy was prohibited, divorce and parenthood right to both 
spouses were given.(Arat, Z., 1994) Acceptance of women to citizenship took place 
in two stages. Firstly, in 1930 voting right in local government elections, then in 
1934 voting right in general elections  were given to women. Tekeli (1985) states 
that these rights given to women have two strategic functions; first is that they are an 
important part of the  attacks against the Ottoman Empire’s ideological and political 
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foundations, and second, they are the  symbol and proof of democratization for the 
West. She also states that this was also an undertaking for separating Turkish single 
party regime from the period’s fascist dictatorships and used in the representation of 
Turkey as a country which elected women to the parliament (Tekeli, 1985: 48-60). 
Kandiyoti (1997b: 88) reminds that these reforms are parts of a wider struggle for the 
consolidation of the concept of citizenship and elimination of theocratic institutions 
of the Ottoman Empire. The ‘equality’ between men and women and the high status 
of women in pre-Islamic Turkish cultures were emphasized (Kandiyoti, 1991: 40-
41). Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1997: 149) suggest that the control of woman and 
sexuality of woman are at the center of national and ethnic processes because of their 
central role in the reproduction as ‘mothers of nation’. Mustafa Kemal says in 1923:  
History shows the great virtues shown of our mothers and grandmothers. One 
of these has been to raise sons of whom the race can be proud. Those whose 
glory spread across Asia and as far as the limits of the world had been trained 
by highly virtuous mothers who thought them courage and truthfulness. I will 
not cease to repeat it, women’s most important duty, apart from their social 
responsibilities, is to be a good mother. As one progresses in time, as 
civilization advances with giant steps, it is imperative that mothers be 
enabled to raise their children according to the needs of the century (in 
Jayawardena, 1986: 36). 
 
Kemalism finds the synthesis of civilization process and nationalist ideology in the 
image of ‘new’ woman, and the status of women is seen as the determinant of the 
success of the Kemalist project. Existence of women in public sphere is supported by 
the state with several reforms and services, and women become the symbol and 
carrier of the new nationalist ideology, national reborn. Attempts are made for 
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with the best examples of this ‘new’, ‘ideal’ woman. The ‘new’ woman is an 
emancipated, virtuous, nationalist woman hero. She is self-sacrificing , asexual 
comrade. Kemalist reforms on the one hand realized the unveiling of women, on the 
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other hand gave imaginary veils- veils of repression of sexuality, to compensate this. 
(Kandiyoti, 1997b: 137-147) The secularist ideology changed the images of veiled 
women with the images of women entering athleticism contests, talking in front of 
masses, using technology, working in factories and public institutions, as the symbol 
of the dynamism of the new nation. However, Schick suggests that photograph of an 
unveiled woman was not different from a railway or tractor in that it only symbolized 
another example of the success of men, and women became objects of political 
discourse carried out by men and for men once again by these images (in Kandiyoti, 
1997b:154).  
Within the scope of early Turkish nationalist movement, women started to 
take place more in the public life ‘near their men’ as national actors, mothers, 
workers, teachers, even as soldiers. Kandiyoti (1997b: 5) argues: “The emancipatory 
measures directed at women (education, employment, legal reforms) by postcolonial 
states were never intended to lead to renegotiation of men’s existing privileges, but 
merely to endow women with additional capabilities and responsibilities”. The limits 
of existence of women in the public sphere and their culturally acceptable behaviors 
were also drawn within the scope of state feminism flourished as the secularist state 
ideology.  
Women’s education and employment in occupations in the form of 
continuation of their motherhood, such as nursery and teaching, was supported, their 
participation in social life for being useful to the nation and people was reinforced. 
Modern Turkish women entered to the public space as an extension of her mother 
role, and obliged to repress their femininity and sexuality in the public life. As 
Kandiyoti (1997b: 179) points out, new unveiled women of the Republic adopted 
new patterns of behavior which drew new limits to their identity: dark colored 
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costume, short hair, and a face without make-up. And this both shows that women 
who devoted themselves to working life had no time for adornment, and functions as 
a powerful symbolic armour. The ‘new’ women’s sexuality was not controlled by 
veiling as in the Islamic tradition any more, but by internalization and repression. 
 
2.2.2. Internalizing of the Image of ‘Modern’ Woman 
Kemalist reforms have meaning for and give advantage to women only from certain 
groups. More clearly, only the daughters of bureaucracy and native bourgeoisie were 
able to take the benefits of reforms and to enter into the public domain. And these 
advantaged women internalized the values and aims of the Kemalist ideology, and 
saw themselves as + 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§¡¨¥¦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¤!¬1¤!­)®m+¤¦§?¯°±®9¢¤;²¡£³´¦tµj¶m·¦¸¬·¹ª¬¡ﬀ®9¨'¬»º¼¥2½®m½¡G¥¾¤!§
her memoirs that they were privileged as girl students and mentions positive 
discrimination and appreciation accorded to them. She continues by saying that they 
were the vanguards of the Republic which aimed at participation of women in the 
public life with absolute capacity and personal freedom.(Göle, 1993: 71-72). This is 
also a point emphasized by Nermin Abadan Unat (1998: 96) who considers herself 
very lucky. She adds that she has never felt herself secondary due to her sex, and she 
is grateful to Republic and its supporters (Abadan Unat, 1998: 296). These women 
made incredible efforts to realize the ideal of ‘new’ woman , sacrificed their own 
wishes and ignored their gendered reality. They were bound to the Kemalist 
modernization project from the heart. They felt a deep responsibility towards nation 
and Kemalist ideals. Meral Ruacan says it is the responsibility of the enlightened 
Turkish women to preserve Atatürk’s revolution (Toska, 1998: 82). They feel 
themselves powerful and able to transcend every difficulty because of state support 
behind them. However, because of this support they felt themselves indebted , lived 
 43 
an enormous tension because of their responsibilities and were afraid of failing  and 
making mistake. These women were so assimilated to Kemalist ideals that they even 
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that Mustafa Kemal pointed out that a woman’s most important duty is to be a good 
mother and Turkish women’s responsibility towards Atatürk and his reforms is to 
serve the nation as wives, mothers, and working women, and perform the duties 
given to women by Mustafa Kemal (Toska, 1998: 83). In 1935, Duygu Köksal 
defines the ‘new’ woman as a congenial and intellectual companion to her husband, 
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 herself as Kemalist and states that she is never 
harrasted because of her sex. However, then she describes how she was punishing 
her son when he was 5-6 years old by threatening him that he would be a girl if he 
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Q#:ﬀﬂﬁﬃ41!ﬀ"R?S%'&&)( : 196). Another striking character of 
narrations of the first generation women of Republic is their style of expression. 
They do not talk about their private life, their relations to their husband, children, and 
other people who probably had significant effects on their private life. Even if they 
mention these, they tell about their thoughts and opinions, not about their emotions. 
For example Mina Urgan (1999) in her autobiography, only narrates her relationships 
in the public life and demonstrates her thoughts about many issues, but does not 
speak about her feelings and emotions nearly at all. She says that she is never 
oppressed by men, and for that reason, has never become a woman in the sense that 
de Beauvoir suggests. (Urgan, 1999: 119) Moreover, in many places of the book, she 
talks about her disapproval of women who excessively adorn themselves out, and she 
is proud of her plainness.  
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In general, all of the women surveyed here define themselves in accordance 
with Kemalist ideals, use words, such as ‘duty’, ‘responsibility’, ‘love’ towards 
nation while mentioning their thoughts and sacrifices, and devote themselves to the 
ideals of the Kemalist project. They see themselves as advantaged and ‘emancipated’ 
women. they accept the secularist state ideology without any criticism. They tried to 
ignore their gendered reality, and this creates some tensions and inconsistencies in 
their identity and perceptions of life. And maybe questions, Füsun Özbilgen is asking 
to herself, are also coming to their minds:  “What and how  we lived as daughters of 
the Republic ? Did we try to be male before being female?” (Arat, 1998: 115). They 
defined themselves in the framework of national ideals and feelings of responsibility 
feeling which are attributed to them by state, at the price of repressing their own 
personal emotions. 
In brief, on the one hand, although small in size, this first generation women 
of the Republic created a legitimization ground for the existence of women in the 
public space, and on the other hand, be as Tekeli correctly observes, state feminism 
led to a ‘schizophrenic identity’ for this group of women (in Göle, 1993: 74). Tekeli 
claims that women’s primary role continued to be defined as motherhood, although 
employment opportunities for the women were created; any change was not 
supported nor in domestic division of labor, neither in sexual ethics. These factors 
caused a split between the private and public identities of working women. (in 
Kandiyoti, 1997b: 216). 
Additionally, ‘state feminism’ of the era includes the efforts to domesticate  a 
possible feminist movement within the state ideology. State, while giving citizenship 
rights to women in 1935, ironically, closed down ‘Türk TVUWRXZY/[BU\  ]_^a`<bc^ﬀde^8f  which 
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bridged the late Ottoman39 and Republican era Women’s movement, with the 
argument that there was no need for such an association anymore, because Turkish 
men and women had equal rights (Tekeli, 1995: 31). As a result, a generation of 
women who identified themselves more with Kemalism than feminism was created. 
Between 1950 and 1970, as ‘liberated women’, they established associations to 
protect the ‘gained rights’ of women in the face of danger of Islam, they struggled 
for Kemalism and laicism, and did not criticize the patriarchal aspects of the ‘state 
feminism’. 
To sum up,  it can be said that the effects of Kemalist reforms on the status of 
women should be critically approached. It can not be denied that it had some positive 
effects for the women, it had an important role in the legitimization of existence of 
women in the public sphere, it gave some basic citizenship rights to women. Arat 
(1994) argues that Kemalist reforms are among the factors that open up the 
possibility of post-1980 feminist movement in Turkey. She argues that first feminists 
of the era were educated professionals who “had utilized the opportunity space 
created by Kemalist reforms”(Arat, 1994: 122). She argues that on the one hand 
Kemalist reforms unintendedly opened up a space for such a politicization, on the 
other hand, feminist movement of the 1980s both challenged and furthered the 
Kemalist vision in the society (Arat, 1994: 101). However, although  these reforms 
created ‘opportunity spaces’ for women in the Turkish society, they were not made 
in the framework of the emancipation of women, but in the framework of the 
modernization and nationalization project. They were far from being comprehensive 
and creating radical changes in the position of women, then only created changes in 
the surface. The deeply rooted  patriarchal assumptions were left intact and even 
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Demirdirek (1993). 
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reforms were made on the basis of these assumptions. Women continued to be 
defined primarily in relation to the private sphere and with her mother/ wife roles, 
and the limits of her presence in the public sphere were determined by her presence 
in the private sphere. A new image of woman was created within the limits of the 
patriarchal ideology. The secularist state ideology created a new form of patriarchy 
and triggered the transition from ‘private patriarchy’ to ‘public patriarchy’(Walby, 
1990). 
 
2.3. Islamist Representation of Women 
The status/ role of women in the society is one of the most debated issues among the 
Islamist writers in Turkey.  There are several reasons behind the popularity of the 
issue. However, the most important reason is the  efforts of the Islamists to answer 
the secularist accusations directed towards them especially with the effect of vast 
participation of women in the Islamist movement. So, two major interwoven 
responses can be observed: an effort towards explaining the status attached to women 
in Islamic philosophy and an effort towards falsification of the secularist critics. 
Islamically constructed women identity becomes more an effect of the secularist 
opposition rather than the ‘free’ consideration of the Islamic principles. This can be 
understood  by reviewing the most frequently emphasized issues such as polygamy, 
inheritance, paid labor, veiling, all of which are used by the secularists in order to 
proof the non-egalitarian attitude of Islam towards women. So, similar to Kemalism, 
the cornerstones of Islamist identity construct of woman are determined by the 
secularist/Islamist tension in the country. Moreover, similar to the secularist 
ideology, representation of women plays a very crucial political function for the 
Islamist ideology. The dichotomy of West/Islam, secularism/Islamism, are to a large 
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extend constructed on the basis of   difference of the women’s identity in this two 
separate social projects. In this framework identity of Muslim woman becomes the 
indicator of real Islam and the discursive sphere on which authenticity is constructed.  
 For that reason, in this part, I will not look for the construction of woman’s 
identity in the scripture, nor review the historical development and change in the 
construction of woman is Islamist discourse.40 The analysis is limited temporally and 
spatially to the hegemonic narrations on women by Islamist thinkers in Turkey after 
1980 assuming that there is an epistemological break in Islamist thought and politics 
in Turkey by late 1970s due to new reading of Islam within the confines of ‘new’ 
politics born as a result of globalization and ‘postmodernity’ and due to the vast 
participation of women in the movement. Because, after 1980, movement gained a 
new dynamism and probably with the effect of women’s active participation in the 
1979 Iranian revolution, Islamist movement in Turkey included women not only as 
symbols, but also as active agents struggling for the Islamic cause. So, women are 
once again politicized in a movement whose aim is not the emancipation of women. 
Hassan al-Turabi simply states the significance of women for Islamist fundamentalist 
movement as follows: “Women are the symbolic and substantive key to the new 
Islamic movements”(in Goodwin, 1994: 9). Interestingly, in the Islamist narration, 
there is no clue about role of the women in the ‘new’ order that will be established as 
a result of the struggle, except their economic and political/ideological role in 
reproduction.  
Generally, in the Islamist literature, on women’s place and status in Islam, the 
main philosophic  sources are the holy scripture, and hadiths. The time period 
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 Reviewing the arguments of contemporary Islamist thinkers rather than critical reading of The 
Koran, is more appropriate for the aims of the thesis. Cause, what has direct effects on the lives of 
Islamist women is the interpretations of the scripture. The interpretations of the Koran display 
variability in time. Multiplicity of the interpretations is due to the semantic structure of Arabic 
language and  limitations put on the interpretations by the accumulated knowledge of interpreter. 
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referred in the examples of the realization of this ideal situation is asr- w/+ , 
namely the golden age of Islam and many examples of the life practices of the 
women in this era are given. Moreover, ideal Muslim woman is constructed with 
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Moreover, a strong defensive attitude is felt when the literature is reviewed. This 
probably stems from two main factors. First factor is the universally accepted value 
of equality between the sexes, whereas, second is intensification of the secularist 
criticisms to Islam on the status of women. In their endeavor  to prove that women 
are not accorded a secondary status in Islam, Islamist writers are playing the game 
within the boundaries of modernist framework and demonstrating covertly that they 
are not so far away from the modernist precepts and social construct. Keddie (1999: 
19) states: “These movements are not wholly traditional in their ideas about gender 
relations, but retain a modern, sometimes Western influenced, belief in a love-based 
nuclear family, women’s education and on acceptance of women in the work place”.  
µ¶ﬂ·3¸E¹Sº:»/¼¼¼3½_¾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wrong assumption of being wretched as the agent of the first sin as in the case of 
Western religions. In contrast they are accepted as beings who have rights from the 
beginning. It is argued that the status of women in the society improved and their 
‘real’ value attached to them by God was reconstructed by the Islamic practices in 
ÕÖ×Ø/ÙÚBÛ×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It is accepted by the Islamist thinkers that women are oppressed in modern 
societies. However, it is claimed that this has no relation to Islamic principles. 
Women’s degradation in the current Muslim societies is seen as the result of 
Õâ Ý>Û3íﬀÕíZÙ1ÜﬂÝ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life-style and immorality reinforced by the modern capitalist social system.  
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In the analysis of Turkish society, it is argued that women are enslaved and 
become sex objects in Turkey (Dilipak, 1988: 118-120). However, after criticizing 
the patriarchal values, norms and practices, they make a quick slip and separate their 
criticisms from feminist criticisms. A hostility, especially towards second wave 
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degenerated the women’s rights struggle by shifting the emphasis to sexual freedom. 
Feminism, conceptualized within this framework, and is seen as a movement 
destroying the equilibrium and order created by God because of its demands of 
sexual freedom and ‘absolute’ equality between the sexes because these demands 
reinforce hostility between the sexes and call for a unisex society which will lead to 
abandonment of all religious and moral norms, degeneration of family, and so of the 
society (Dilipak, 1988: 24-25). 
However, although existence of feminist movement can be face with a some 
level of tolerance by the Islamist writers due to the lack of Islamic alternative and 
super-exploitation of women in Western societies,  feminist movement in Turkey is 
conceptualized as totally wrong and unacceptable. Dilipak (1988: 22) argues that 
feminists in Turkey who are backed up by the state and bureaucracy, are simulating 
the West, importing the rights gained in the West as a result of long historical 
struggle, and failing to consider the religious, moral and traditional values of Turkish 
society.   
Saktanber (1995) points out that in media ideal woman is  constructed on the 
axis of sexuality. In this construction there are two kinds of women: those who are 
purified from sexuality, and those who have only sexual identity. The first ‘kind’ of 
women are under the guardianship of a man and they area self-sacrificing mothers, 
devoted wives, whereas the second kind of women are sexual objects. The latter are 
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constructed as free and ‘easy’ women. Their sexuality is open to every kind of 
watching and usage, it can be easily confiscated, used for several purposes by 
dividing to pieces (Saktanber, 1995: 213-217). Islamist authors use the same 
hegemonic framework in defining the  ideal woman. According to them, second 
‘type’ of women are the ones who are oppressed and enslaved by the modern social 
system. Their criticisms of patriarchy are limited to questioning the existence of 
‘easy women’. They are fearful of the possibility of increase in the number of ‘easy’ 
women, they promise Muslim women that Islamic principles will save and 
emancipate them from the exploitative mechanisms of modern capitalism. As Faruqi 
(1991: 30) states, it is claimed that “Islamic traditions would dictate that women’s 
progress can be achieved in tandem with the wider struggle to benefit all members of 
society”. So, Muslim women are invited to participate in a movement whose aim is 
not emancipation of women and they are expected to sacrifice their wishes and 
ignore their specific oppression for the Islamic cause. Moreover, in most cases 
Islamist emancipation of women refers to emancipation from the sexual 
objectification in the market, not to the emancipation from the patriarchal limitations 
and oppressive guarding of the family. 
According to Islamist thinkers, epistemological source of the Truth is not 
sexual identity, reason, utility and social good or society, but transcendental 
principles of the scripture. On the other hand, the Islamic ontology carries many 
inconsistencies with its epistemological premise. Because, imagination of social 
structures and relations are dominantly based on the principles of function and utility. 
Ontologically, society/community is given priority over the individual, and within 
the lines of social functionalism, it is seen as the combination of properly functioning 
parts placed within an efficient division of labor. In this image of society family has 
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a crucial place. In Islamist discourse, establishment and continuation of a ‘truly’ 
Islamic society and struggle for this end is based on Islamic family, which is the 
nucleus of the Islamic community. In Parsonian terms, family forms the lowest order 
of the whole social system feeding the higher levels of society with producing the 
life energy and reproduction necessary for the continuation of the social whole. The 
family becomes the nucleus of and energy-producing center of the Islamic 
community. Faruqi (1991: 6) express this view as follows: 
In order to promote the brotherhood of all men, Islam thought and stressed 
the importance of family as the focus of solidarity rather than the tribe which 
had until that time been such a powerful separating force in human social 
structure. 
 
‘Naturally’ very important roles and responsibilities are attached to women within 
this framework. Keddie (1994:4) states that the representation of women in Islamist 
discourse is “oriented towards restoring the key parts of an idealized (and partially 
modernized) version of traditional patriarchal and religiously sanctioned roles of the 
sexes in the family and society”. The control of women’s body and being, which are 
the main bearers of (social) reproduction, becomes a central issue for the well being 
of the community. As Dilipak (1988: 10, 70) argues, women who can reach eternal 
happiness and freedom in family, do not only give birth to babies, but to society. 
Consistent with the principles of social functionalism, it is argued that God created 
people with different &')(+*-,.(  (characteristics that are given by creation) in accordance 
with the different places in the division of labor, and because management is 
necessary for social order, some are created as superiors of others (Özek, 1996: 51). 
Roles within family and domestic division of labor are determined by this principle 
and women are conceptualized by Islamist thinkers mainly as mothers and wives. 
Women’s reason of existence is seen in relation to their ‘duty’ as homemakers, 
whereas men are breadwinners of the family and head of the household. Dilipak 
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(1988: 44, 104) states that if woman whose main responsibility is motherhood, loses 
her /0)1+2-3.1  determined by creation, the collapse of family and community will follow.   
Within Islamist ontological framework, individual is conceptualized as an 
organic part of social unity/totality with reference to his/her position within the 
division of labor established according to the social good principle, along with the 
lines of communitarian arguments. Society is conceptualized as a harmonious 
totality, in the words of Faruqi (1991: vi): “the nature of cosmos is teleological, that 
is purposive, serving the purpose of its creator and doing so out of design. 
Everything that exists thus so in a measure proper to it and fulfils a certain universal 
purpose.    The world is indeed a cosmos, an orderly creation, not a chaos”. There are 
rigid and essentialist postulates for the place and responsibilities of each sex assumed 
to be bounded with their characteristics determined by creation. Woman is an 
essentially passive, emotional, to be desired, obedient and naive ‘creature’, as 
opposed to man who is an active, rational, desiring, firm hero (Dilipak, 1988: 26, 
4$56798;:=<>?;4A@@BDCFED4A?GEH@I7KJML>NOQPR?S4A@@BDCG44$5T$U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other, as Dilipak (1988: 27) states with strong homophobia: men should be like men, 
women like women. So, rigid boundaries are drawn between the ontological statuses 
of the sexes. However, it is argued that the characteristics attached to men and 
women are incommensurable with reference to inferiority and superiority: they are 
complementary to each other, and instead of a simple equality, there is an equity 
principle between sexes based on active equilibrium and harmony (Dilipak, 1988: 
17-19). Both women and men who are the different parts of the same whole are 
incomplete without each other. On the other hand, although both have equal status 
and value before the god, men are more equal than women or ‘primus inter pares’ in 
the words of Hatemi (1999: 36).  
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Priority of men is legitimized by the argument that there are differences of 
no[prqts.p
 between the sexes, and the priority of men over women is due to the creation 
with different 
no[prqts.p
, a measure taken by God for the harmonious continuation of 
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Dilipak, 1988: 48) Moreover, Özek (1996, 18) argues that ontologically man comes 
first, because God created Adam first, then, Eve for the happiness of Adam. So, in 
the Islamist literature in Turkey, women, the ‘other’ is constructed functionally in 
accordance with her place in the community and the life of man, the ‘self’. She is 
like a satellite turning around and controlled by the center; giving light and shape to 
the darkness and amorphousness of The Identity. 
Moreover, issues of employment of women, polygamy, marriage, inheritance 
rights and veiling are argued within the scope of social utilitarianism. For example, 
MﬃH r¡¢ r£¥¤¦A§§¨D©ª«§
-246) states that polygamy is good for men, since it increases the 
value of men in the eyes of his wife, and it is good for women, since it gives 
opportunity and free time to woman for developing herself in certain skills, and it is 
good for society, since it stabilizes the society and decreases unemployment. The 
necessity and purpose of marriage are explained with reference to its functions of 
balancing the individual needs and group welfare, controlling the sexual behavior, 
creating a stable atmosphere for the children, assuring the material needs of women 
during the period of child-bearing (Faruqi, 1991: 65). Similarly, on the issue of 
women’s employment , it is argued that the husband is responsible for the well being 
of his wife, and women should not be forced to work. However, there is no Islamic 
rule forbidding the paid employment of women (Canan, 1996: 103). If she has 
sufficient knowledge, she can also work in the public offices (Dilipak, 1988: 30). 
There are many examples of Muslim women who were interested in science, art and 
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literature, and worked as nurses and teachers in the golden age (Dilipak, 1988: 30; 
¬­®¯R°A±f²`³i´Aµµ¶D·9¸¹
-74). Moreover, it is argued that if there is need for female work 
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1988: 34). In the case of necessity, woman has to look firstly for the jobs she can do 
at home (Canan, 1996: 105; Özek, 1996: 60), and she has to work in a ‘legitimate’ 
job, such as, child bearing, teaching in girl schools, medical care and nursery to 
¾À­¿À½ÁÐËÌM°®Â²Q»R³i´Aµµ¶D·´$¹Ñ
-129) – in the kind of jobs which are the continuation of 
their traditional domestic roles; in a legitimate manner, that is in a modest and veiled 
appearance without ignoring her home and children and with the permission of her 
husband (Aktan, 1996: 266- ¹¶¸IÒÓÌM°®Â²r»³i´Aµµ¶D·´$¹9´ - Ô$Õ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1988: 34-35). But, if she enter to competition with male work force, this can damage 
the social construct due to the increasing unemployment and decreasing levels of 
payment because of the increasing labor supply (Dilipak, 1988: 34-35). 
Within the same line of argument, it is stated that unequal share of women in 
inheritance is necessary for preventing the social harm that will be caused in a 
opposite situation such as fragmentation of property, weakening of the authority of 
father/ husband in family, and discouragement of women to get married (Dilipak, 
1988: 160-164). In a more co éêRÙÛëçﬃìãëÙíårãQéÙïîðeçÛkñòóÀÙéÃìkÜôØMÙÃÚÙÛöõAÔAÝÝ÷Dßø÷ -47) 
suggests that economic independence of women would lead to corruption of family 
and confusion of the sex roles.  
In summary, it can be said that Islamist thinkers in Turkey, with a theoretical 
framework mixture of essentialist pragmatism, social utilitarianism, and organic 
functionalism, construct an ideal Islamic community working with the principle of 
harmony and free form conflicts. Within this theoretical construct, Muslim women 
become an element of equilibrium and a source that can be exploited in order to 
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prevent social ‘deviance’, conflict and inconsistencies. Moreover, construction of 
women as obedient, natural, innocent and semi-conscious establishes a safe home for 
the calls of authenticity. Women’s existential Otherness becomes the constitutive 
element of ‘true’ Muslim community and Muslim male identity. Gaining visibility by 
her invisibility, her body becomes one of the major sites that the ideological values 
and means of indirect control are inscribed. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EXPERIENCE OF ISLAMIST WOMEN IN TURKEY 
REGARDING THE SECULARIST AND ISLAMIST 
IDEOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 
In the first chapter Orientalist approach of the traditional Middle Eastern studies is 
shortly discussed. Generally, traditional scholarship on the Middle East 
conceptualize and theorize the area with respect to its so-called ‘exceptional’ 
character. This leads to explaining the historical changes, political trends, economic 
structure and relationships in the area by using standards that are  different from 
those used in the analysis of Western societies. The analysis of the developments and 
conditions in the region is made on the basis of the religio-cultural factors, instead of 
making materialistic and realistic accounts. Mernissi (1995: 33) argues: “Samuel 
Huntington, Ernest Gellner and some other Western intellectual leaders and Islamic 
experts have come close to this kind of unreasonable bellicosity by producing 
‘scientific’ and ‘philosophical’ grounds that encourage crusade-like trends in 
Western academic circles”.   
This exceptionist attitude is legitimized on the grounds that the existence of 
Islam in the region disables all ‘rational’ accounts due to the abundance of irrational 
elements stemming from Islam in the very construction of all levels of societal 
relations of culture, economy and politics. Within this context, underdevelopment of 
the Middle East, lack of democratic consolidation the area, and the recent rise of 
Islamist fundamentalist movements are tried to be understood with reference to 
certain, ‘fixed’ features of Islamic principles. However, these traditional accounts of 
the Middle East are being criticized by many scholars in the last decades and many  
sociologically oriented accounts are being produced. 
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General pitfalls of the traditional Middle Eastern studies reflect themselves 
also in the studies of the Middle Eastern women. Nashat and Tucker (1999: xxviii) 
argue that the roles, positions and statuses of women, that is the so-called super-
oppression of women, in non-Western societies are central to the stereotypes about 
non-Western world, labeling it as primitive, backward and barbaric.   
Orientalist works on the Middle Eastern women end up in an analysis based 
on stereotypes about the Eastern women who are represented as totally hegemonized 
by the Islamic precepts and are certainly different from the Western woman with 
reference to active agency and resistance to patriarchy. As Ahmed (1992: 152) points 
,out in these narrations both Muslim women’s oppression and the underdevelopment 
of the Middle Eastern societies are explained with reference to Islam by the argument 
that  “Islam was innately and immutably oppressive to women, that the veil and 
segregation epitomized that oppression and that these customs were the fundamental 
reason for the general and comprehensive backwardness of Islamic societies”.  In 
these analyses Muslim women are represented as absolute objects of patriarchal 
societal vision and as silent slaves who accept and internalize all patriarchal values 
and norms in a stark contrast with the Western women who struggle to emancipate 
themselves from the boundaries of patriarchy.  Kahf (1999), in her study on the 
representation of Muslim women in Western literary texts finds the same Orientalist 
attitude. She says: “‘The Muslim woman is being victimized’ is the common axis 
undergriding a wide variety of Western representations” (Kahf, 1999: 11). Kafh 
(1999: 177) adds that this representation permits the existence of only two kinds of 
women in the Muslim world:  
The dominant narrative of the Muslim women in Western discourse from 
about the 18th century to the present basically states that the Muslim woman 
is innately oppressed; it produces Muslim women who affirm this statement 
by being either submissive nonentities or rebellious renegades- rebellious 
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against their own Islamic world, that is and conforming to Western gender 
roles.  
 
On this problematic nature of the traditional scholarship on the Middle Eastern 
women, Zuhur (1992: 2) claims that “some of the methodological problems in 
assessing the status of the Middle Eastern women may be due to an overemphasis on 
Islam or alternatively to what Edward Said has termed an ‘Orientalist’ approach”.  
However, development of women’s studies and gender studies in the 1970s 
led to a theoretical shift in the analysis of oppression of the Middle Eastern women41. 
As Göçek and Balaghi (1995: 9) point out: “In their attempts to present a more 
integrated view of Middle Eastern society, some scholars began to seek out the 
voices of the women and do acknowledge their role in constructing their own 
experiences”. 
On the other hand, Kandiyoti (1995: 21) argues that with the introduction of 
postmodern and multiculturalist approaches to social science world, micro level 
studies on Islamist women have increased and enabled us to recognize “their 
capacity for agency and interpret their strategies as alternative forms of gender 
activism”. Kandiyoti (1996: 9) relates also the shifting approach in the studies on 
Muslim women to the anthropological accounts opening up the possibility of a more 
direct look to the reality of the Middle Eastern women behind the stereotypical 
images, and claims: 
Academic enquiries into the various concrete contexts in which Muslim 
women live may be found in the work of anthropologists whose materials 
reveal that women lead rich, rewarding and meaningful lives behind the 
apparent limitations set by segregation and that they wield considerable 
influence and power… Such work constituted a welcome and essential 
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 It is possible to claim that same theoretical shift on the studies of Islam and women, has been lived 
in social science circles in Turkey. There is an increasing sensitivity for escaping from Orientalist 
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(1993), Özdalga (1997), Saktanber (1994), Acar (1995) can be enumerated among the works produced 
with such a sensitivity. 
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departure from stereotypical, Orientalist descriptions of subjugated women 
entrapped in the fast-frozen relations of an a-temporal Islam. 
 
However, she also warns that micro level studies may fall into the trap of inability to 
relate micro-level factors and macro-level developments to each other (Kandiyoti, 
1995: 21). This warning should be considered, especially when studying Islamist 
women in Turkey. Because, both micro and macro level factors and conflicts are 
very important for understanding the discourse and practice of Islamist women in 
Turkey. Their position of being in the middle of the struggle between the secularist 
and Islamist ideology for hegemony and legitimacy, makes it crucial to situate the 
macro level political developments to the everyday existence of Islamist women. 
Their experience and discourse is shaped to a large extent by the conflict between 
Islamist and secularist discourses both of which suppress and frame Islamist 
women’s struggle for public visibility and for active agency.  
This chapter consists of three parts: the experience of Islamist women 
regarding the secularist ideology and practice, the experience of Islamist women 
regarding the Islamist ideology and practice, and Islamist women’s struggle for 
public visibility. In these parts the analysis is based on the  Islamist women’s own 
narrations of their reactions and criticisms towards the oppression and suppression 
they are objected to due to the symbolic/strategic position they hold in the conflict 
between the secularist and Islamist ideologies in Turkey. 
Women are becoming actively involved in the Islamic movement that has 
become strong particularly after 1980. In this political picture, it is seen that Islamic 
women mobilizing massively for an Islamic ideal in the 1980s and 1990s have 
replaced Republican women struggling for the Kemalist Revolution in the 1930s and 
1940s. This fact is inexplicable and surprising for the observers for three basic 
reasons. First of all, politics is realized in the masculine sphere and in this sphere the 
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existence and active action of women who are confined to the private sphere in the 
patriarchal social structure is a difficult situation. The situation becomes even more 
difficult in the case of when these women politicize in the Islamic and anti-secular 
movement in a country where secularism is one of the most important grounds of the 
state ideology. 
The second reason that makes the ‘Islamist women phenomenon’ 
inexplicable is that they do not conform to the expectations developed in 
modernization history and project. The expectation is that if women are to be active 
in the public sphere, this must be realized in a modern outlook that conforming to the 
secularism project. This is because within the ideal of gender equality of state 
feminism of the 1930s’ and 1940s’ that deals with the realization possibilities of 
gender equality and public appearance of women, there is no room for the ‘Islamist’, 
‘closed’, ‘veiled’, ‘pre-modern’ or ‘anti-modern’ woman. And this construct is 
internalized by almost all layers of the society whether they be Islamist, secularist, 
modernist or traditional. 
With the last factor that makes the politicization of Islamist women 
surprising, the whole picture comes about. Until the midst 1980s, the Islamist 
movement was carried out by men. Afterwards, while women’s faithful, insistent and 
sacrificing activism in the movement evoked severe criticisms and accusations from 
the secularists, Islamist men responded to this in a suspenseful silence.  
Islamist women’s appearance in the political arena, plus their will for active 
political action for political purposes brought about more or less the same reaction 
among the secularist and Islamist men though both sides were uneasy for different 
reasons and in different ways. The reactions were in direction of defining, framing 
the Islamist women, and thus gaining control of the situation. Islamist women have 
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been struggling in this chaotic ground created by the conflicting definitions and 
reactions. Their struggle is for public visibility, and they adopt different and 
contradictory discourses while struggling. While they attempt to form a new model 
of Islamist women, they do not have at-hand models from the past, or clear, pure 
utopias that define the daily practice for the future. In addition, while they are trying 
–consciously or unconsciously- to reconcile their Islamist and gender identities in a 
different way than that was presented to the women, they are repeatedly re-defined 
by patriarchal discourses existing in Turkey and each time they stumble, they 
confront the terminating accusations of Islamists and secularists alike. And this leads 
to an identity, practice and discourse that is full of contradictions. 
On the other hand, the pacification of the Islamist movement and the 
accumulation of experience of Islamist women in the public sphere and in the arena 
of politics enable Islamist women to talk more loudly and make them more visible in 
the public space. They, now, are exploring the power of words, whereas in the past 
they could just ‘act’ but not ‘talk’. The disappointment of Islamist women about the 
Islamist movement, especially about the Islamist men, led them to be more 
suspicious towards the Islamist movement, and now they are evaluating their fifteen 
years of experience through a more critical eye. Although its future outcomes cannot 
be totally foreseen today, this new stance of Islamist women should be seriously 
taken into consideration without sticking into the debate of “does Islam make women 
free or slave?” 
This chapter aims to listen to the ‘meager’, ‘weak’ and ‘hoarse’ voices of 
Islamist women. Although these voices are quiet humming and full of contradictions, 
Islamist women are questioning their own prejudices, their role in the Islamist 
movement and their form of existence in the public space. This process of listening 
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will be realized through utilizing the literature produced by Islamist women 
themselves, and the research and interviews conducted with Islamist women. 
 
3.1. The Experience of Islamist Women Regarding the Secularist  
Ideology and Practice  
The secularist ideology proposes the image of ‘modern woman’ as the condition and 
way of existence in the public sphere for women. This is, to a large extent, related to 
the Republican ideology’s legitimacy ground in the process of founding the nation 
state that was explained in the previous chapter. The secularist state discourse of the 
1930s imposed a model of ‘modern’ woman whose realization would also imply the 
success of the modernization project. Intellectual Islamist women are criticizing this 
‘ideal’ of ‘modern woman. Islamist woman politician Sibel Eraslan claims that 
women are being used as a tool of legitimization within the scopes of both 
modernization project and opposite discourses: “Since the Tanzimat period, 
Westernization projects have been viewed from the point of women: Both 
;<ﬂ=ﬀ>ﬀ;@?A/>ﬀ?BCD=E&CFGF<4Hﬀ<4CD=I<ﬂ=KJLE/MN<ON<<4CQPREF<>ﬀJS;BUTNVJXWYBZPR<&CU[]\@^
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their discourse they relate the limitations they experienced to the attitude of using 
women as tools throughout the monﬀpﬀqNrrstvuﬀwZpsxt4ry'nﬀyzR{|/}ﬃ~8wpm+s{4zKymﬀnRKp@yn+t4psU
Ł4R4&'4&DﬀLX ¡N¢ﬂ£¤£¥§¦Z4US¨U©ªL«D£I¢4¡o¬Zﬂ£¨­£®£oﬀ¡U©G ¡NZ¥¯Z¥ ﬀ
hypocrisy of the secularist ideology’s discourse about the emancipation of women. 
For her, within the limits of the secularist ideology, the headscarved women have 
¡NZ°U±®R²4L«X¨²¬¨a4©Nﬂ£¡ﬀ4¡ ﬀ4²ﬀLRN«4¡@²N¡o¦Z4]¨¥ﬀU³3Ł &R44LZ
(1998: 134) describes the role and place defined as appropriate for them by the state 
as follows: 
Their demand for being as themselves in the public sphere is a crisis point 
where the state remains undecided, although it puts itself as the authority in 
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the compulsory modernity project… In this sense, the headscarf can be 
tolerated in times and places where it symbolizes affiliation to the past,  to 
the traditional, the rural. The best headscarved woman is one who is 
ignorant and who remains silently where she is situated. 
 
´µ¶@·R¸&¹]ºo»N¼¼¼U½¸4¾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Republic and that the headscarved woman who is defined in opposition to this are 
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“modern” women are situated as “the real owners of the public life”, whereas 
Muslim women are perceived as those “breaking the prohibition for entrance into the 
ìÛÕ'óê+Ò4àKôÕxÒÛõ5àRÛN×Ò4Ü@âUÞêóUöLØÝZÞ­ß@àRá4â÷ãoäNåååUéøùî¯ìUÞaÕÒá4Õ­òÛ]Ò4àKôìLáﬂò@ÞúÞâUûêﬀìÒRÔ4Õáòò
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of this reaction, contends that the “modern” woman image is defined with reference 
to the “bureaucratic elite” of the Republic whereas the headscarved woman is 
defined with reference to the “ordinary people”. In this sense, Islamist women claim 
that by the prohibitions on headscarf, not only a certain type of women are excluded 
from the public life, but also they are tried to be excluded from the advantages of 
public life. 
Moreover, they argue that the reaction of the state on headscarf corresponds 
also to the efforts about excluding people from power that is constructed in the 
“modern” power and authority structure which is shaped throughout the history of 
üﬀýþßþ 	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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For the bureaucratic elites of the Republic, who value women’s education in 
the process of the modernization and secularization, the headscarf is a 
symbol that hinders westernization and modernization… Women who are 
willing to get university education and gain existence in the professional 
sphere with their headscarves mean that these people gain power in the 
public life. Not only with its political meaning but also with its anti-modern 
associations, the headscarf is a ‘development’ that must be banned or 
controlled according to the political authority.  
 
According to the arguments of the Islamist women, they are excluded from the 
important public spheres such as education, or profession, or as they are forced to 
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sacrifice in order to get the opportunity to exist in and to make use of these spheres. 
Many of them emphasize the sacrifices they made and tensions they lived. Hidayet 
.0/132046587	9;:=<02?>@47ACBCDEGF@/HI/9KJ0/ILMD/FON=DL?PC465Q58D/ :RD/E7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University, explains the conditions of women who had to take off their headscarves 
because of the pressures and prohibitions of the state as follows: 
Too many psychological problems were lived. Many of them got ill. I know 
those who had tumors in their breasts. Some of them got separated from 
their partners. They are living the difficulties of carrying a dual personality. 
For myself I can say that the headscarf is my symbol for becoming 
religious. It has never been a political symbol… To take it off will mean 
almost to end this process. That means to lose our previous sensitivities. On 
the contrary, you have constructed your personality as an alternative one by 
relying purely on these sensitivities, and they are taking away the symbol 
from you… We are talking to friends who have taken off their scarves. 
None of them are happy. One of them said: “I am going to school, I am 
going to the mirror to take off my scarf, and I could not get used to this 
image of mine for mon`8abdcfe gh'ij	k@lm0nnn*opq -38). 
 
While women who had taken off their headscarves confront psychological tension 
and estrangement, the ones who continue to wear headscarves face a different 
tension. They are exposed to humiliation in the secularist public spheres for their 
Islamist identities. This results in exclusion from the general social structure and 
social relationships, and in a feeling of distress while being present in the public 
spheres other than the Islamist localities. The example above illustrates, though on a 
different level, the experience of identity fracture and feeling of worthlessness of 
women who did not take off their headscarves. This has become a daily component 
of their lives. One of the women expresses the problems she faced at the university 
and its effect on the construction of her identity as follows:  
After the headscarf prohibition, we heard that the dean had said that these 
were more dangerous betrayers and enemies of the state than the Red 
Russian bastards. After the prohibition when we returned to school, our 
relationships with the schoolmates and the assistants had been bothered. Our 
friends perceived us as terrorists… I started to feel distant to women without 
headscarves due to the prejudice at school. I mean I still feel uncomfortable 
when I meet someone without headscarf. We had different phobias because 
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of the unequal treatments. I can say, we developed social phobias as they 
succeeded to construct negative approaches towards us. I do not want to 
remember my school life. We lir0sItVuwv s'xdxdyKz{s|sZ}~v8xu0ssZvdu	xŁ0*
70). 
 
This exclusion has created a similar  ‘social phobia’ in Teacher Leman who 
participated in Özdalga’s (1998) research. The Islamist woman who are present in 
the public sphere is always busy with the thoughts of how she is going to protect 
herself against the threats that she may face. Leman describes the times when she is 
in public as such: 
You always have to be ready. When you go somewhere you have to look 
around, decide where the next action will come from and be ready to skip it. 
You have to make plans in your mind as to how you can skip that situation 
without being hurt and face further problems. All these thoughts and 
mechanisms invade your mind when you meet others and make you feel real 
different (Özdalga, 1998: 53). 
 
Especially after the mid 1980s, when the headscarf struggle became widespread, 
since Islamist women became actively involved in the political struggles, the 
secularist discourse tried to restrict and silence Islamist women by defining them as 
the negative image of the ‘modern’ woman. One of the women in the Islamist 
movement during these years describes her feelings as follows:   
The mediatic discourse of the year 1987 defined us as women covering 
because of family pressure, unable to decide for our own lives, rejecting 
science and modernity by preferring headscarves, as spider-minded, 
conservatives. This discourse aimed to isolate us from the society and create 
sZ}8v8x@u0s'"sZvdux@0*+\  
 
Islamist women with such an image could not exist in the ‘modern’, ‘western’, 
ﬃ'"'@68 	¡£¢d¤'@QZ¢_	¥	¦I§¨Q8¤§¢@I60 d©¢~@¢\ª«¬­®¦¯ Kw°±'²²³µ´¶±\··¸
criticizes the discourse of “Kemalist women” who want to exclude them without 
considering what they want with the following words:  
Women wearing headscarves are being accused of being militants, of being 
politicized, aiming to take the country to ‘darkness’ without considering 
how Islamist women define themselves. They do this, in order not to 
legitimize Islamist women’ s demands for education, profession and status.  
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However the headscarf struggle and Islamist women’s activities for twenty years 
have not only been for Islamist purposes but also for an existence emerging from 
while getting to know the public sphere, and gaining status and authority in the 
public sphere. To be a student at the university gave them the opportunity to break 
the traditional structures that were imposed on them. One of the headscarved students 
in Göle’s (1993: 112) research group describes the alternative socializing opportunity 
¹º@»Z¼»½Z¾ »¿|¾ ÀÂÁ»ºÄÃ+Å|¾8Á»OÆ0½ÇKÈ»ºÉ¼dÇÊ¾3ÅÌËZ¼Q¼8ÆµÍÁ*ÎÐÏ\ÑÒÅÔÓ8ËÕCÇ	ÖKÅÔÇ	½Ò×Ø¼dÙÇﬃÚ»ÁÇ	º"¹0»º ÕCÇK¾@¼"Õ"»£¾ À
stay here since I attend the university and I can postpone marriage, but if I went to 
the Koran course this would not prevent them from marrying me”. The words of 
ÛÝÜÞßKàÜCá_âã0äåæ'çQèé'êêëµì0ííîÐïCåð§ñ0æ'ò~ó8ßôß	ñ0æ\ó ÜõQæô6ó8ßKöÜ÷Kà;ß	ç"ó8åÜ_åÜæõøôæòdùø~ó8ò~ã0úú÷¡ÜZøødåðï
how important it is for a woman to come to university and live in the dormitory away 
from her family, who until therein was kept under pressure in her traditional 
environment: 
Girls remain more in the family compared to boys and establish their 
relationships with the outside through their families. That is why the 
contribution of dormitory life to get to know life and to settle direct 
relationships with other people cannot be rejected. 
 
áŁâã0äIåæç[ûé'êêëµìüé'ýíîïþåð£ï"æ®ø_ðß÷	ßú0ÜõOÜßKó8åÜòó ð£ó æÞ0Ü;ðù3ùÝåÜòØåÜæõ ø@ôæò ùðòó ðOò@Ü6ó3ã0òdç
back home since the head scarf was prohibited is aware of life awaiting her if she 
leaves the university: “If I returned home I would get married with someone in 
several years. I was thinking of the social network around me, and I was imagining 
ó8åÜ ñß¡ô6ó3ã0ò@ÜÐïðã0÷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the meaning of university is to escape from a life similar to that of her mother and to 
get share from the distribution of social status and power. She describes the meaning 
of university for her as such: 
The distribution of the role and status in the society I lived was to a large 
extent through the university. The knowledge, experience and the diploma 
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that the university would give me, were not things that could be rejected for 
me. Reaching the highest point was my natural right. I was at the university 
for this... On the other hand, there were neither Islamic nor social reasons 
for leaving myself to the mercy of others. So I was thinking that education 
and getting the opportunities that education provided was necessary 
ﬀﬁﬃﬂﬀ! #"$ﬂﬀ%&
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headscarved outlook were also demanding the right for existence in the public sphere 
that is available to ‘modern’ women of the Republic. However, Islamist women 
suffered from the legal procedures which put pressure on the Islamist movement. On 
the one hand, this was because of the visibility that their headscarves had given to 
them, and on the other hand, it was because of the idea to see women as passive 
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appropriate analysis, contends that the lack of experience of Islamist women in the 
public sphere has also caused Islamist women who, she thinks, match with the profile 
of VWXHY  (sister), to suffer more than Islamist men as a result of the silencing politics 
of the secularist discourse:  
Z\[]H^
 has a distinguished profile in the current public-private discussions. 
Nevertheless the life that she has lived makes her, against her will, to get 
involved in discussions which are strange to her. That is where problems 
start. Everything is so imposed from the top that the public sphere cannot 
become an arena for multiple identities. In our country the public sphere is 
open for citizens who fit to the type that the official ideology defines. Using 
signs is a failure for only one group. Hence in this public sphere the 
headscarf is a symbol, a sign. Therefore since men can get a space more 
freely; in a way they become the guardians of women. And this reaction is 
one hat strengthens men and weakens women. Men have the advantage of 
having continuous experience in the public sphere. It is women who leave 
work and sacrifice for home when necessary. In the recent years the 
problem of visibility has made this sacrifice more functional. Sure, men also 
experience difficulties about living their belief in the public sphere but 
whatever it is, they are more established in public life better because of the 
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secularist ideologies, contain many hints about Islamist women’s being limited 
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within the borders of male dominated discourses, the male dominated content of 
secularist ideology, and also how this supports and enforces Islamist patriarchy. The 
male dominated Islamist ideology defines woman’s place as the home, and this finds 
its counter part in the secularist ideology that excludes Islamist women from the 
public sphere. This is so because in both of within the conceptual frames of secularist 
and Islamist ideologies, men are the guardians and representatives of women, 
particularly Islamist women in the public sphere. So the secularist ideology that calls 
for women’s rights and that sets its strongest accusations to the Islamist movement, 
relying on Islam’s acceptance of women as having secondary status, cooperates with 
the Islamist ideology on the exclusion of a group of women from social life. This 
situation weakens the legitimization grounds of Islamist women who are struggling 
for existence in the public sphere. 
Eraslan claims that the Islamist ideology becomes a hindrance for women 
during their struggle on headscarves and that women’s existence in the public sphere 
is seen as nothing more than a political strategy. On men’s relationship to the 
headscarf struggle, she says: “I don’t know if they believed in the headscarf struggle, 
but by writing on the headscarf they gained good seats by collecting votes through 
GP4 ¡¢
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making a critique of the struggle for women she continues:  
But all the mistreatments and pressures were practiced upon women. I have 
friends who had psychological disorders and lost their mental health. When 
I think of what we have in hand after all these frustrations, I conclude that 
life is lived through experiences and that we develop our individual 
identities by these experiences. The women had to get face to face with 
GHg¤jG9£
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There are parallels between Eraslan’s analysis and Mualla Gülnaz’s assessment of 
the headscarf struggle. Islamist writer Gülnaz emphasizes the same points with 
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different words when she describes where Islamist women have reached after all this 
struggle: 
All these people think that they are left alone when they are paying for 
believing and for their religious sensitivity. They trust neither the state, nor 
the politicians, nor their families nor the men with whom they share the 
same belief. They feel that they are the victims of a big play which different 
groups play on them and that they become a part of that play whatever they 
ÂÃÄÅgÆﬀÇÈ=ÉÊËÌÌÌÍ1ÎHËÏjÐ
 
 
As is expressed clearly in the words of Eraslan and Gülnaz, Islamist women in 
general think that they are left alone during the attacks of the state, that they could 
not find the support of the Islamist movement, and that the Islamist men cooperated 
with secularists to send them back to the private sphere. Besides, the arguments and 
narrations of the Islamist women show that, the fact that the headscarf remains as a 
problem to be solved, prevents them from settling their lives and personalities in 
different areas and in different ways, since all their energy and actions revolve 
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reactions against the misconceptions that both the secularist and the Islamist groups 
create on the Islamist women authors: 
There are those who think that a headscarved author writes only on the 
headscarf issue… The conservatives have always tried to confine women 
authors to house and kitchen corners. On the other hand, it is as if the 
Jacobin secularists feel suspicious of the intellectual activities of women 
that go beyond their control and that contradict to their definitions of 
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in loss of time and energy and how prohibitions on the headscarf prevent them to 
develop an alternative Islamist woman identity: 
Because of prohibitions the headscarf occupied too big of a place and has 
been an obstacle for women…They were harmed on their productivity, 
artistic abilities, and their existence in the public sphere in the general sense. 
This prevented them from focusing on the private sphere and to attempt to 
ÉÕ×¥Ã1ÒÖEÓGÉEÑ#×9ÓéáAÓÊ×4Û;ÆﬀÉá=Øêtá=Òë)ÓGÔ
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secularist state causes Islamist women’s agenda to be confined to the headscarf 
struggle and also that they limit themselves to the problems of Islamist women who 
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headscarf problem on the creation of a new Muslim woman identity. Here, she 
emphasizes that the criticisms of Islamist women majorly rely on the secular ‘other’ 
and that their struggle is confined to certain areas of the public. Below 
GIHJ.HK0H-LMNO!PRQTSIUV-WW*X;YZV\[FV\]_^
ords which also contain an important self-criticism are 
quoted: 
However, when we confine the event only to the university students, always 
resistance remains limited and enough space cannot be created for an 
alternative life. Do we follow the fate of women who have gained 
professional formation with thousands of difficulties while we are crying for 
the headscarved girls?… Is it always suppressions introduced by ‘others’ 
that make them forget everything else and disable their knowledge and 
abilities? Do women’s efforts to open new ways and of resistance in 
marriages in believing families meet enough counterparts? We cannot hear 
the voices of these women. Can’t we hear the voices of these women as they 
marry and get confined to the private sphere although they shout or is it 
someone repressing their voices in the name of Islam? How can we 
overcome the problem that is always set on the duality of secularism and 
Islam without looking at our inner tensions? 
 
On the other hand, Gülnaz expresses how, as a woman, the prohibitions on the 
headscarf prevented her from questioning pressures and oppressions because of 
being an Islamist woman: 
They cannot establish the relationship between the prohibition and being a 
woman. The ones who are oppressed think that they are bound with the 
system only but with not the male dominated system. The headscarf 
problem comes before everything and indeed this situation serves men. 
Women who are exposed to the headscarf ban in work life, ignore all of the 
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, 2000: 52). 
 
As can be seen clearly from the words above, Islamist women feel that the only 
factor that suppresses their existence as individuals and their will to be themselves is 
not the oppression of the secularist state ideology, and that they are also limited by 
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the Islamist male domination which entraps them in the narrow structures of the 
Islamist environments. They are thinking that they have to struggle with both the 
secularist and Islamist ideology to gain autonomy and agency. 
 
3.2. The Experience of Islamist Women Regarding the Islamist  
Ideology and Practice  
The demands to take part in the public space, including the universities, came from 
the large number of woman graduates of the Prayer Leader Schools (p$qsrqut.r;vxw y
Lisesi) can be considered as one of the most important factors in the participation of 
women in the Islamist movement. Moreover, it was clear that a movement that 
wanted to grow big had to include women. However, the Islamist movement asserted 
that the independence of women could only be realized within the Islamist ideology. 
Göle (1993: 111) points out that the political Islam, which gives women the roles of 
mümine or mücahide, delays the solution of  the ‘women question’ to the future 
Islamic society. Within this understanding, the struggle of women for the Islamic 
cause meant the struggle for themselves. This discourse explained the reasons of 
oppression and humiliation of women within the existing situation as a natural 
outcome of the societal corruption created by the injustice system of the ‘evil’ 
capitalist order. In the Turkish case, this explanation referred to the secularist system. 
Sallan-Gül and Gül (2000) argues: 
Since the 1980s, the proponents of Islamic revivalism have intensified their 
efforts to mobilize women against the Kemalist elite’s view of the twin evils 
of secularism and modernity for the misery and unhappiness of womankind 
for the exploitation and degradation of women in Turkish society. 
 
According to the Islamist argument, the hegemonic atheist, positivist and 
individualist ideology damages the community ties and social relations, and it 
glorifies profanation; so this leads to a moral decline, and the eradication of the 
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family institution; and it also blurs the demarcation of gender roles. Women 
particularly suffer from this moral collapse: they lose the value and importance 
attributed to them for their motherhood, and they have to sell their bodies and labor 
in the worst conditions because they are not under the protection of the family 
institution any more. 
In sum, the solution proposed by the Islamist discourse to women’s 
emancipation is a return to happy old community ties by establishing a life style 
dominated by Islamic principles. The earthly paradise promised to women is to live 
under the protection of men without any ‘obligation’ of going out to public life. 
Islamist theologian Tuksal explains the ontological approach of patriarchal 
conceptualization, which sees women as inferior and subordinate:  
According to the sayings of the prophet, woman was created from the rib 
bone of man. Man is straight, but woman is crooked... This is in our all 
books of the Prophet’s sayings. These books are very important for 
Muslims, and are the fundamental sources of the religion... There are also 
some very well known Islamic scholars explaining these sayings. Their 
interpretations are very and effective, as well... They say: “Woman is a 
being created for man”.  Woman is only accepted as a being in her role of a 
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Islamist women face these patriarchal  conceptions in public and private spaces, and 
they are expected to behave within the framework of this ‘ideal woman’. Tuksal 
narrates the oppression she was exposed to as a student at the Faculty of Theology at 
the Ankara University due to the patriarchal nature of Islamist framework, as 
exemplified in the expectations of Islamist male students from Islamist female 
students:  
Girls were in a very strange situation in that environment. First, it was seen 
very strange when they talked in public. Men thought: “ The primary duty 
of women is motherhood, it is nonsense for them to study at the university. 
But, lets accept that they committed an error and came to the university, 
then at least they should leave us alone, they s ﬃ ¢¡ﬂ£¤¥¡¦¨§<¤ﬃ©ª«§m¬.­Z®=¯°±©?²
2000: 18).  
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According to this understanding of Islamist men, the existence of Islamist women in 
the public may be tolerated to some extent, if women do not demand too many rights, 
and remain invisible. However when the Islamist woman does not know her place 
and starts to take decisions for herself, then it is more likely to be harshly suppressed. 
Again Tuksal explains this situation through her experiences as a teacher at  a Prayer 
Leader school:  
We were also talking about the current issues, for example, we advised the 
girls at the last year of the school that they should want official marriage 
instead of religious marriage. So, they ( the Islamist men ) objected 
severely: “Modernist women have come here, and since they are against the 
religious marriage, they have created confusion in the girls’ minds.” 
According to most of them, it was impossible to understand that we were 
earning money, because the wives of most of them were not working... They 
were criticizing me by sayin ³ﬃ´µ·¶I¸ﬃ¹+ºR¹?»¼½¾¿sÀÁ¢ÀÃÂ»¿ÅÄ%¾\¿_ÆjÇÈÉÊﬃË?¾¿»ÃÌ¾DÍ¹
his slippers, how could you wear men’s clothes?” Or one of them was be 
wildered and said: “You said to a woman that she could pray wearing her 
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22 ). 
 
Islamist women were afraid of being labeled as modernist or accused of acting 
against Islam. We observed how harsh the reaction could be against any challenge 
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-known Islamist woman 
for her challenges against male-dominant, patriarchal character of the Islamic 
discourse and movement. Tuksal explains the attitude of the Islamist movement 
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Iktibas Journal... She was silenced when she 
wanted to talk in the group. Then, Gonca decided to behave more actively. 
She was saying, “Many people know Islam wrongly, many things about 
women are articulated in a wrong way. I will try to change them”. In one of 
our meetings, she said, “I want the theologian women rewrite the translation 
of the Koran, because, up to now, men have written it from their point of 
view”. She was a very brave woman, and she anticipated that she would be 
killed because, she knew the Hizbullah that she involved in... At last, it 
happened and she was killed. When she was kidnapped, we prepared an 
announcement as 18 women from different provinces, but no newspaper 
wanted to publish it, and when we called some important people in Istanbul, 
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they said that Gonca had been working for the state, and that she would 
come back in a short time and for this reason they would not support us. At 
that time, our newspapers called her as a feminist. No one called her as a 
$&%('*)+,.-0/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– 33 ). 
 
Islamist women face with the threat of being excluded from the Islamist movement, 
while they struggle for their rights and for becoming actively involved in the public 
life. Islamist author Elif H. Toros questions the probable reasons of the silence of 
Islamist women: “Why don’t we tell our stories? We internalized being invisible so 
much that we do not want to be visible by means of writing. We do not want to be 
hurt. We are afraid of being misunderstood, condemned and excluded” ( Toros, 
2000: 206). 
Turkey of the 1990s’ does not offer any living area to Islamist women 
outside of their Islamist environment. This situation forces Islamist women to be 
quite cautious and careful, and also to accept the oppressive mechanisms imposed on 
them. They also tend to control and  limit their own actions and  discourse  through a 
kind of auto-control mechanism. Tuksal’s  observations of the spirit and decision 
making mechanisms of the Capital’s Women Platform (HJIKMLONPﬂQJRSITﬂUPWVJX atformu) 
which is constituted of various Islamist women’s groups and associations, may help 
to clarify how these auto-control mechanism are operating: 
We have to find a way without making anybody uncomfortable. The other 
women’s associations also have the anxiety that our friends have. So, they 
usually need to express that they are not feminists, because they are really 
afraid of being caste out. A woman’s doing something from another group 
(from secular groups) is very different from a covered woman’s doing of the 
same thing. When one of us do something, she can be reacted as “How can 
she do that? While so many people trying to harm us from outside, she is 
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Similar patriarchal expectations and pressure mechanisms mirror in the political area 
where Islamist women  actively participate. Islamist conceptualizations that are made 
from within a patriarchal ontological framework about women’s political activity  
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and their participation in the Islamist struggle, which is supposed to be, also for their 
own emancipation display consistency with the principles of the hegemonic Islamist 
discourse. Accordingly, women are expected to work at the levels of politics, which 
require more effort, but which do not promise a career, while men have the authority 
and initiative. The two important areas of activism of the Islamist movement mainly 
carried out by women, namely, the WP Ladies Commission and the headscarf 
struggle, exemplify this understanding.  
In the case of the WP Ladies Commission, in spite of the fact that women’s 
active work in the Commission for the Party was one of the most important 
determinants of the Party’s success in the municipality elections of 1994 and national 
elections of 1995, none of the women in WP was nominated for a mayor or deputy; 
women were not allowed to take high position and participate in decision making 
processes. Women who worked actively were not allowed to high positions in the 
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attitude towards women wearing headscarves in the municipality buildings ruled by 
the Party and the Party’s insincere investment on the women in WP as follows: 
In the municipalities, job opportunities for covered women were not created 
for high status levels. Even when the Ladies Commission was being formed 
in the municipality of Istanbul, they didn’t search for intellectual women in 
the Islamist circles. Covered women were used for the purpose of show-off 
in the most visible places of ±0²³µ´p¶#·3¸j¹¸^º#»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deserved, and that women were used only for show: “Women wearing headscarves in 
WP do not get the status they deserve…  Women are used in the political platforms 
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Parliament by the other political parties, caused a legitimate ground for the 
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discrimination towards women in the Party. Thus the secularist state’s bans were 
used as an excuse and explanation for not allowing women to have active roles in the 
Party, and the pressures practiced on Islamist women by the secularists rescued the 
men in  WP from being the target of accusations. So, seemingly conflicting 
ideologies helped each other for sexual discrimination and meanwhile it was Islamist 
women whose lives were restricted. 
The terms ‘voluntarism’ and ‘self-sacrifice’ are the most common words 
used to define the women’s activities in the Islamist movement. This understanding 
is also internalized by many Islamist women. Tuksal’s observations about the 
expectations of the women in the Ladies Commission show the role of this dominant 
understanding in the women’s political participation: 
They didn’t give promises to women. Maybe their husbands were hopeful. 
Men took advantage of women’s activity in the Party; women helped them 
to be successful. That is to say, women worked either for the sake of Islam 
and Allah ﬀﬁﬃﬂ ﬁ"!$#%&'ﬃ
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Sibel Eraslan who is one of the founders and leaders of the WP Ladies Commission, 
explains the reason of women’s working for the Party without any expectations: “We 
had the belief that being deputy or mayor was something worldly that would 
decrease our worth. We thought that being politically active only for the sake of God 
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Islamist women from questioning the unjust attitude towards them in the Party. They 
question the fact that while they were working voluntarily without any expectations, 
the Islamist men, with whom they worked together for the Islamic cause, got worldly 
and material success. Eraslan continues: “After a while, one starts to ask: “They 
(men) are our friends working for the same purpose, they are working for the sake of 
l
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2000:97). 
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In addition, Islamist women are also bothered by the Islamist men who try 
to control women in the struggles and activities carried out by women themselves. 
The headscarf issue is a good example of a process in which men tried to control the 
activity of Islamist women. The headscarf movement was a women’s movement at 
the beginning, since it was carried out by women and these women,  who were once 
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43) who was actively involved in the struggle and who wrote about her experiences, 
the headscarf struggle was “the first demonstration experience of the Muslim girls”. 
Çetin  (1998: 28-29) expresses herself as follows: 
I’m pleased to see men joining to the slogans of women. We, women, 
learned everything from each other. I think that men who joined to our 
slogans while discussing whether the voice of women was religiously 
sanctioned, understood the importance of the participation of women in the 
Islamist movement and the necessity of our demonstrations. I am happy to 
see that the idea of “what the hell are these girls doing at the university” is 
vanishing. We are happy… 
 
As the quotation above displays, Islamist women are redefining themselves. They 
break the limits of the womanhood that are imposed on them by their traditional 
environments, and construct themselves as active agents in life. They are trying to 
construct an alternative Muslim woman identity by questioning the traditional 
Islamist assumptions, throughout their struggle against the headscarf ban in which 
they reject both removing their headscarves and returning to their homes. This makes 
them see themselves different from the ‘ordinary’ women in the society, and 
provides them self-confidence and self-esteem: 
We are not passive audiences any more. Now we are actively resisting 
(Çetin, 1998:  21). 
 
We are not ordinary people. We were always resisting in some part of our 
lives. While we were civil servants, students… life was the struggle to exist 
with our ideas. Many times we  were treated as if we did not exist. We first 
showed our existence by discussing, and offering own our ideas, in short by 
breaking our chains (Çetin, 1998: 97). 
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A woman who participated in the headscarf demonstrations narrates the development 
of this process and how Islamist men have grasped the control of the process as 
follows: 
We have struggled but later on we were pacified. In fact, we lived through 
the struggle and took it naturally and we didn’t have any expectations 
whatsoever. We had already been outcaste long before we came to our 
senses. It seems that there were so many to exploit our activity. The ban of 
the headscarf was not just a repression by the system in Turkey; the veiled 
women were pressed between the state and the conservative circles. When it 
comes to men, their attitude was being against the state rather than for us. 
Men, who perceived demonstrations as a masculine act, are still confused, 
because the ban was not something tha£¥¤ ¦Q¦§-¨F£§-©r£ªﬃ§«¬©­ ®6§¯¨F£°P±³²´1¤µ¶ ®6·q¸¹¹¹$º
64). 
 
Another woman express similar feelings about the attitude of Islamist men towards 
the headscarf demonstrations: 
Although men believed in the irreplacibility of the veil, they thought that 
our insistence on our right to education was somewhat irrational. The 
primary reason of their support was not their sincere belief in our case. 
Instead, for them it was rather a resistance, a struggle, jihad against the 
malice of the elite class who abused these symbols for its enmity towards 
the people and religion. Some men offered individual solutions rather than a 
long-term humane struggle. The most vulgar of these was proposing 
marriage to save women from being squeezed between the family and 
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As can be seen from the above statements, the meaning of the headscarf 
demonstrations had never been the same for Islamist men and women. However, I do 
not agree with Özdalga’s (1997, 1998) claim that Islamist women’s headscarf 
struggle  was a exclusively  call for their individual rights. Their struggle, similar to 
that of their male comrades, was a political one for the Islamic cause, and they fought 
to live and express their Islamic identities. Keyman (2000:36), too, points out that the 
struggle around the ‘türban problem’ does not correspond to a claim of individual 
rights. On the contrary, the context of their rising demands was communitarian rather 
than liberal. However, for Islamist women, the headscarf signified a right necessary 
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to construct an alternative Islamist women identity and existence. What Islamist men 
ignored or failed to see throughout the process was the gender dimension of the 
movement. Thus, Islamist women fell that men’s support was related only to the 
provocative side of the demonstrations, because they think that Islamist circles either 
left them alone in their struggle to create an identity of Muslim woman taking active 
part in life, or due to the fear about the development of an independent Islamist 
women’s struggle, men anxiously tried ÁÂÃ¯ÂÄ.ÁÅ6ÂÆqÇ|ÂÈ|ÉÄqÊËwÌ È>ÌÍ.ÌÄﬃÂÎÆIÏLÐÑ ÒÒ
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describes the situation she and other Islamist women found themselves in as follows: 
When headscarved girls began to express out loud their own interpretations 
of life and their demands despite the secularist and Islamist bigotry, 
conservative circles disapproved their support for the struggle to take part in 
the public sphere and universities. We have even witnessed that they tried to 
spread the idea that educated girls would be disobedient to their husbands 
and thus unfit for family life. 
 
Especially after the February 28, 1997, with the  changing character of the Islamic 
movement, women’s doubts and distrust of Islamist men and Islamist circles 
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and pro-status-quo discourses about men-women relations, does not hesitate to 
express her doubts and distrust of the Islamist men and Islamist movement, almost 
from a women’s point of view: 
Personally, I would not want it if they said: “We are establishing the Islamic 
state tonight”. It seems  that I have understood that it is not the case. If a 
man treats his wife and children unfairly, if he beats his wife and insults her 
by telling that she is bad looking, he would behave in the same way under 
the Islamic state. I used to think that Islamic state would automatically 
improve everybody’s life. Now, I think it is important to improve the heart, 
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Especially in the process after the February 28, the Islamist movement in Turkey is 
in decline; it is trying to smooth its radical discourse by transforming itself into a 
human rights and democracy discourse. In the Islamist circles there is the tendency to 
try to articulate themselves into the secular political and public spheres, and make 
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their presence accepted there. At this juncture, the ‘headscarf problem’ seems to be 
turning into a burden rather than a tool of provocation for the Islamist circles, and so 
did Islamist women who believed in the Islamic cause. Now, what is expected from 
Islamist women is to return to their homes, and to accept the traditional way of life as 
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-94) demonstrates, Islamist 
women represent a break from the traditional womanhood of their mothers in terms 
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141) points out to the difference between conservative mothers and their Islamist 
daughters, and the latter’s will to create an alternative way of life for themselves: 
Girls from conservative families did not want to follow their mothers who 
were withdrawn from public life, who could not leave their neighborhoods, 
could not buy tokens and get on the ferry by themselves, although they had 
been living in the city for years. 
 
The new generation of Islamist women demand to benefit from the advantages and 
opportunities of the modern urban life and to actively participate in the public and 
political life. Moreover, they turn to their mothers with a consciousness to strip away 
from the traditional, and demand their mothers’ active participation in life and in the 
Islamist struggle as well. In this context, they deconstruct the traditional mother-
daughter relationship and the traditional roles and expectations imposed on women. 
Çetin’s (1998: 80-81) call to her mother who was worried for her during the 
headscarf demonstrations is meaningful to grasp this transition: 
I don’t want my mother to send us food or to knit for us. I only want her to 
be actively on the side of the Muslims. I don’t want her prayers, confined to 
the house. She is still worried, she says: “I saw the demonstration on the 
television, it is too crowded, you might get crushed, be careful”. Mother, 
mother, my holy mother, come now, stand up and come to life! Join your 
voice to ours. 
 
As revealed in the words of Çetin, Islamist women reinterpret and reconstruct both 
the meaning of womanhood and the Islamic worship. Their Muslim identity is not 
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realized in the confines of and squeezed to the private sphere, but it is in the streets 
and in every moment of their lives. In that sense, Islamic identity plays an important 
constitutive role for Islamist women when deconstructing the traditional womanhood 
and reconstructing themselves as active agents.  
However, they feel that especially in the 1990s, Islamist are expecting them to go 
back to their homes and to realize jihad RﬀSUTVWXY[ZMRWR2\DR]V^_&`ba2c2ddfe-gc=hh -145) 
describes the ideal Muslim woman that is nowadays imposed on women in a more 
obvious fashion compared to the past as follows: 
The Islamic tradition which had always treated men more tolerantly than 
women was intensifying its pressure on the women and conservatives, it of 
course, dictated the prototype of  Muslim woman most convenient for them: 
a woman who could find a place in this world if and only if she belonged to 
the husband, children and to the home, a silent woman expected to 
comprehend worship not as an individual, but within the anonymity of the 
family. 
 
Another Islamist express her concerns about the ‘ideal Muslim woman’ typology 
dictated to Islamist women by Islamic traditions and the notion of haram (forbidden 
by religion) and questions the double standard of this discourse: 
They are trying to isolate women from the society by using haram as a 
pretext. For instance, a Muslim man doesn’t let her wife go to school, work, 
travel on the bus. They think of haram when it comes to women. If I have to 
obey to the commandments of Allah (God), the same is valid also for men. 
They, too, shouldn’t travel by themselves (Göle, 1993: 123). 
 
Similarly, Tuksal describes how she felt that they were left alone without any support 
in the period after the February 28, and how the Islamist and secularist ideologies 
worked together to exclude them from the public sphere: 
The religious women are in a tight situation. When the system started to 
exclude the women with headscarves, men from our ideology did the same, 
because these women became harmful to their careers and public images. 
There was balance based on gain and loss before. Now this balance is 
ruined. There are many women who are excluded by both sides. This made 
women realize many things. In fact, they realized the necessity to stand on 
their own feet when they saw that their husbands and religious leaders have 
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Especially in the recent years during which the Islamist movement in Turkey started 
to soften its radical tendencies, the theme of betrayal of the Islamist men has become 
common in the writings of Islamist women. They feel that that their value and place 
were regarded in relation to political pragmatism, when they were left alone in their 
struggle to be present in the public sphere. An Islamist woman explains how the 
Islamist men broke off their relations with her when she could not enter to school due 
to the headscarf ban: 
While the other students were entering, we were stopped by the gate. This 
was very humiliating. Moreover, the ones who could enter, even the Islamist 
men, were staying afar  from us and passing without saying “hi” to us, 
thinking that they would be put in the blacklist if we asked for something 
*ﬃk$mŁ29ﬃ@Q=
 
 
Islamist women also emphasize that the men with whom they were together in the 
political struggle, tended to forget this partnership in the jihad, when the advantages 
they had due to their sex were in jeopardy. Tuksal puts it as follows: 
In the 1980’s everybody got married, started to work, became mothers, I 
mean, they became involved in the real life and its burdens. They married to 
their friends and soon realized that they were typical Turkish husbands and 
even that they could share nothing with their husbands. They saw that men 
were preferred in the labor market and women were excluded due to their 
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2000: 29). 
 
They feel that they faced with the same fate of their mothers when they got married 
to their friends in the Islamist movement, and the domestic roles and duties expected 
from their mothers and ordinary women were imposed on them. One of the heroines 
®ﬁ»¼¯¡¨¤$¥>«£½¤¯¾ﬀ²¯¡®A¿C2À@Á®L¤Á®ﬁÂ¥&²BµÃ 997: 51-52) illustrates how the disappointment 
that Islamist women live: 
Firstly, woman is a darling, everything she does is adored. Then the darling 
becomes the wife. She is the sweetheart who is both a child who satisfies the 
man’s protective impulses, and an affectionate mother. Days pass, not years 
or months, and then, one day woman realizes that she is perceived as fresh 
meal and the means to a clean and tidy home. 
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Our heroine tries to forget these thoughts in the monotony of dealing with her 
‘responsibilities’, but each time she feels her husband’s presence at home, she faces 
the reality of her life: “The best thing in order to forget is to prepare the meal. He 
orders me to turn on the television when I am walking towards the kitchen. And a 
glass of c ÄÅ>ÆÈÇÉﬀÊ$ËÌ;ÍÏÎDÐ*ÑCÉ2ÌÒ@ÉÌÁÄLÓÁÄﬁÔÅ&Õ-Ö+×2ØØÙQÚoÛDÜÝ=ÞCßàËHÌﬃËﬀÒﬁËÅjÓ Éá@Éâ9ã@ÓÊ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imprisoned in: “If only he had never come… When he was absent, I had a nameless 
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They expressed that their conception of the Islamic family and the ideal of 
the Islamic marriage collapse in the real life. Islamist women think that they can 
form Islamic families in which partners are respectful of each other and women are 
valued for other than being merely wives and mothers. However, they think that their 
marriages turn into jails, containing all traditional patriarchal values and norms. This 
theme is also used in many stories written by the Islamist w ﬀﬂﬁﬃ "!#%$&')(+*,ﬁ&.-/10ﬀ')$ﬃ 
stories, the utopia of the Islamic family life in which the marriage partners fight for 
the Islamic cause, read together the Koran in the evening chats, and try to understand 
Islam, a family in which the husband does not humiliate his wife, does respect her as 
an individual and as a Muslim, a family in which the housework is shared and the 
wife has the opportunity to enrich her intellect, is ruined with the mercilessness of 
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woman realizes that she has 
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81). It is revealed in their narrations that for them, it is very difficult to accept this 
situation, since they experienced the feeling of self-worth as individuals rather than 
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women’s expression of the need to talk loudly and in their own voices. These women 
want to get back the ‘voice’ that they used to have in the radical years”.  
Islamist women have lived strong disappointment especially in the 
Ë1Ì ÍÎÐÏ,Ï,ÎÐÏ,ÍÒÑ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questions the sudden change in her husband’s attitude after they got married. Our 
heroine tells about how her husband who seemed to have respect for her struggle to 
participate actively in the public life and who had told her, “what happy you are to 
have the habit of thinking and criticizing the world in which you live”, before the 
marriage, had suddenly changed into another man after the marriage: 
Before marrying to me, he was playing the role of a free-minded Islamic 
intellectual who had respect for women’s rights. Now, it suits his interests to 
play the role of a man who is devoted to traditions; he is religious, bearded 
and he expects full obedience from women. He has told me that I cannot be 
the woman of my house, because I have a confused mind and because of my 
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silent and somewhere between existing and not. This is because once she had 
experienced the struggle to exist as herself, she could not adopt to the role of the 
‘traditional’ woman that was expected from her. However, she feels herself as a 
‘patch’ also in the public sphere because of her ‘traditional’ and  covered appearance. 
The Islamist men’s preference to have relationships with women of ‘modern’ 
appearance intensifies this feeling. Islamist men do not question modern women in 
many things, while they do it for Muslim women. And, ‘modern’ women, who are 
uneasy with Islamist women’s headscarves and the Islamist understanding of what 
they represent, can easily establish relationships with Islamist men who are much 
more conservative than Islamist women. Islamic woman has been transformed into 
"#%$ﬂ&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‘modern’ woman, Lale, the academician in the English course, and the conservative 
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Islamist man, Sinan, both seem to appear as part of the same game to reject the 
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heroine to make an internal conversation: 
Sinan behaves as it he does not see me, as if it is not him who has led me to 
attend courses. He is more conservative than me, yet Lale is not disturbed 
by him, I don’t understand why… Lale says that she is just a woman of 
yKz{}|~
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, that she should be free in all things. Everybody listens to her, 
smiling, even Sinan… Lale has not liked me since the first meeting. She 
makes me feel that it is because of my head cover. 
 
Ironically, Islamist women feel that they are considered by the Islamist men in a 
lower status than modern women who are criticized by the Islamic discourse. They 
express the concerns that if for Islamist men, there exists a woman to discuss the 
issues about politics or intellectual issues, this is not the Islamist woman who is his 
comrade but the ‘modern’ woman who has been given the license of talking and 
entering into the public sphere by the secularist ideology. Eraslan (2000: 231) 
describes the Islamist men’s discriminating approach to Islamist women in the public 
sphere: 
Islamic men’s approach in the public sphere is interesting. In the media,  
medical world, court, office duty, even in the arts, just like in politics, 
Islamic men can treat uncovered women equally as their professional ‘team 
workers’, while they do treat covered women as their amateur ‘sisters’.  
 
They think that Islamist men’s asking to exist as an Islamist in the modern public 
sphere, in fact, is merely true for themselves. Islamist women’s carrying ‘traditional’ 
and ‘pre-modern’ images with their headscarves does not fit into the urban, modern 
public sphere. In this context, they feel that the female comrade with whom Islamist 
men have struggled for the Islamist cause is conceptualized as the 7
< who is 
subordinated to men, who is a child-woman under the protection of men. 
j
Łpﬁ71Łﬁ@Łl/71ﬁﬂDŁŁﬂ+ ¡¢£ﬁﬂ¥¤¦>@¥38§jŁﬂ¨O©;+ª«ﬁ
                                                
42
 A women’s magazine that is being published in Turkey. 
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opportunity to be easily adapted to the secularist public sphere, to look down upon 
Islamist women because of their headscarves and that Islamist men sacrifice covered 
women for the sake of being accepted into the modern public domain. Consequently, 
Islamist women who are the comrades of Islamist men in the struggle of establishing 
a new life, are mentioned by the Islamist women themselves as betrayed by Islamist 
men both in private and public spheres.  
 
3.3. Islamist Women’s Struggle for Public Visibility: 
Being Squeezed  between the Secularist and Islamist Ideologies 
The active participation of Islamist women in the public sphere emerged especially 
after 1980 within the rising Islamist movement. Two important developments formed 
the basis of the politicization and mobilization process of Islamist women: the 
headscarf movement and the organization of the Welfare Party’s Ladies 
Commission. The Islamist movement found its embodiment in these two 
developments through dynamic activism in streets and in the political arena. These 
two developments came to be seen as the most radical indicators of the existence of 
an Islamist movement. However, the meaning attributed to these developments by 
Islamist women was dramatically different from the meaning attributed by the male 
dominant Islamic discourse. Although these two different meanings shared a 
common aim of struggle in the name of Islam, the differences and contradictions 
became very much evident within the framework of the patriarchal Islamist 
movement.  
Islamist women had an important role in the Islamist movement, even 
though they are defined as “gues¬­¥®ﬂ¯O­ﬁ¬D°±!²1³p¬ﬁ®ﬂ°µ´j°¶q·<¶!¬ﬁ®ﬂ°µ¸1¹²º<·»!­>¸7¼» °½p¾8¿KÀ1¬D¼ÁNÂ
2000a), in the eye of the Islamist men. Islamist women were expected not to 
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transform the public sphere, but to make the Islamic movement more visible in the 
public sphere before their retreat to home. The expectations of activism attributed to 
men and women within the Islamic cause differentiated to a large extent in the 
Islamic discourse. Men would define the boundaries of the Islamic public space, 
Islamic lifestyle and Islamic cause, and they would decide about the ways and forms 
of the Islamist movement. They were defined as active agents in the Islamist 
movement. On the other hand, according to the narrations of Islamist women, women 
were expected to play a symbolic role, and to adopt and reproduce the values in 
accordance with the Islamic discourse, and also to realize an Islamic socialization 
through the transfer of these values to the next generations. Saktanber (1994:111) 
points out that in the process of  “everyday articulation of Islamic ideologies… 
private becomes the most strategic aspect of the transformation of Islam into a living 
social practice. Women, as the main actors of this field, turn out to be crucial agents 
of the everyday articulation and reproduction of Islamic ideologies”. Moreover, 
Islamist women express their disappointment due to the Islamic understanding that 
Islamist women had to take much burden of the Islamist movement without 
expecting any reward in return just because they were women. Men would produce 
the ideas and women would be responsible for the application of these ideas.  
Islamist women in general, were members of traditional, conservative and 
religious sections of society. Within this milieu, the patriarchal oppression took place 
both as an obstruction of women’s existence in the public sphere and as an 
imprisonment of the women to private sphere where the home was the center. In 
spite of the fact that families of Islamist women were living in cities, they were 
marginalized as the ‘Other’ who were out of the urban identity produced by the 
Republican ideology in terms of both spatial and class considerations. Islamist 
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women belonging to such social class and family structure were not familiar with the 
modern urban public sphere. They did not know about the manifestations and forms 
of patriarchy in such a public sphere. They defined themselves as the active subjects 
within this strange public space. Most of the Islamist women were experiencing such 
kind of existence in the public sphere for the first time.  
In the beginning of their existence in the Islamist movement, Islamist 
women accepted, without questioning, the identity, behavior and role patterns 
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this submissive attitude of women by pointing out to their lack of experience in the 
first years of their participation in the Islamist movement: 
In the beginning, Muslim women were being perceived completely as the 
anti-thesis of the women who were seen as the ‘Other’ by the faithful men 
because the women lacked the background to express themselves with their 
own voices. Who were the ‘Others’? Kemalists, feminists, local and global 
western women. 
 
As a result, a set of patriarchal rules and behavior patterns were imposed upon 
Islamist women, so that they would not resemble ‘Kemalist’, ‘modern’ or ‘feminist’ 
women. Moreover, Islamist women seemed to be submissive to these conceptions of 
themselves defined by the male-dominant Islamist movement. But, in time, they 
came under the pressure due to their existence both as women and Islamists in the 
political and public spheres. This process, at the same time, overlapped with a period 
in which Islamist women became the subject of a debate on political Islam and 
Islamist movement. Keyman (2000) who argues about the ‘türban problem’ in 
relation to the developments under the effect of globalization, suggests that the issue 
should be also handled as a ‘gender problem’. Keyman (2000: 35-36) continues the 
argument by pointing out to the objectification of woman’s body and of the Islamist 
woman subject within the scope of the technologies of self:  
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The space of speech has not been allowed to the self who experiences and 
has direct relationship with the türban problem, on the contrary, the problem 
has been discussed by the subject positions that expressed the Muslim and 
secularist discourses. 
 
The experiences of Islamist women who have become an important site of 
intervention for both ideologies which are in conflict with each other, were, however, 
different from the narrations of both of the secularist and Islamist ideologies. For 
Islamist women, participation in a political movement and struggle in the public 
space produced some important consequences for their self-perception. Islamist 
women were enjoying the feelings of self-confidence and self-esteem, but at the 
same time, they were trying to legitimize their new form of existence both in the eye 
of the Islamists and Secularists. This effort for legitimacy led them to question their 
womanhood, as well as, the Islamists and the Islamist movement, and to develop new 
discourses. 
However, the demands of Islamist women for the gains women in Turkey 
had through modernization process, such as the right to work and the right for 
education, and the mission of representation of the Islamic ‘ideal’ caused some 
tensions and contradictions. Islamist women tried to legitimize themselves by 
referring to the Koran, by looking for support from the Islamist movement, and 
sometimes by utilizing the feminist literature. They aimed to create a consistent unity 
by using all these discourses. Since these discourses seemed to be incompatible with 
each other, Islamist women never accepted any of them fully. Therefore, they did not 
affiliate themselves completely to any one of these discourses; hence they were never 
totally embraced or negated by these discourses. Islamist women were harshly 
criticized both as being ‘modern’ or ‘anti-modern’ and ‘traditional’; both as 
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claims that Islamist women were asked to ignore themselves, “this expectation was 
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seen as a requirement sometimes for being religious, and sometimes for being 
modern”. 
The most salient feature of the criticisms of Islamist women towards the 
patriarchal nature of the Islamist movement and Islamist men, is the cautious and 
ambivalent character of their discourse. The most significant factor, which causes 
ambivalence in their discourse, is the oppressive and pacifying character of the two 
ideologies effective over Islamist women: the official state ideology and the Islamist 
ideology. Within these tensions, Islamist women prefer –they may be compelled to 
prefer- the Islamist ideology, since Islam is the most prominent reference for the 
construction of their worldview and lifestyles. Moreover, firstly, they have to 
struggle with Islamist men to realize an Islamic way of life. Secondly, Islamist 
women need the Islamist movement’s support to resist the state oppression. Thirdly, 
Islamist women have been concerned of being excluded from the Islamist movement 
by being labeled as feminists, since, in 1990s’ Turkey, there is no other alternative 
public and private space where they can exist outside of the Islamist movement. In 
addition, solidarity between the feminist and Islamist women based on an 
understanding of shared womanhood is hardly possible. Another reason why Islamist 
women prefer to stay within the Islamic movement is that the Islamist environment is 
their familiar habitat.   
Both being Islamists and women, and trying to reconcile these two identities 
together, Islamist women are oppressed by the two ideologies dominant over them. 
Both secular and Islamist ideologies, ironically, share a common attitude towards 
Islamist women, although they have totally different roots. Both of them define and 
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(1996: 131) describes the process of being silenced that is experienced by Islamist 
women as follows: 
On the one hand, there was the elitist approach of ‘modern’ women 
approved by the Kemalist modernization project, and on the other hand, 
there were the Muslims who attribute to women the role of protecting the 
values and traditions, and for whom the public visibility of women was 
regarded as the loss of the last secure ground, and who wanted to repress 
Muslim women’s voices. 
 
To realize this undertaking to ‘disregard’ the voices of Islamist women, both 
secularist and Islamist ideologies neglect the struggle of Islamist women, and define 
these women as a pass RKSUTWV3XYZY\[]_^T[^`*Tﬂab	cﬂdXfe\ghiii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discriminative attitude of both Islamists and secularists towards Islamist women. She 
narrates how she and other Islamist women writers are affected by this gender 
discrimination: 
There are, on the one side, the Islamic intellectuals for whom laundry is the 
major responsibility of women, and on the other hand, the Jacobin 
secularists who want to limit our lives to the kitchen with a conservative 
perspective…  Both of them, in some way, reproduce patriarchal traditions 
t
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Both Islamists and secularists assert that only ‘modern’ women can exist in the 
public space, so Islamist women should stay at home. Although the secularist 
ideology criticizes the Islamist ideology as an oppressive ideology over women, it 
approaches to Islamist women from the patriarchal Islamic discourse as well.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE FIELD RESEARCH ON THE ISLAMIST WOMEN  
IN TURKEY 
 
This chapter is reserved to the description of the field research conducted with the 
Turkish Islamist women and the analysis of the data. Firstly, the research 
methodology, the research group and the research process are described. This is 
followed by the interpretation of the life stories of Islamist women in the research 
group by using three concepts as the basic tool of the analysis: the private sphere, the 
public sphere and identity. 
Within the scope of the discussions presented earlier a field research was 
conducted for the thesis. The aim of the research was to approach Islamist women, 
who had a certain social and ideological distance to the researcher, by the lowest 
possible level of objectification. There were several constraints stemming from 
conducting a research with a group of women who were very distant to the 
researcher with respect to their ideological and political orientation. The aim of 
conducting such research was to analyze the identity construction process of Islamist 
women without falling into the secularist/ Islamist dichotomy, both of which are 
hegemonizing the experiences of Islamist women and silencing their voice. In order 
to decrease the researcher’s own secularist bias, it is asked Islamist women who were 
participating in the research to tell their life stories, instead of asking them to answer 
the questions already prepared by the researcher.  
 93 
4.1. Feminist Methodology as the Methodology of the Research: 
Experience as the Basic Axis of Gender Analysis? 
In the research, feminist methodology is used. Feminist methodology exists on the 
basis of the epistemological critique of male-stream scientific endeavor and attempts 
towards establishing an alternative epistemological ground.  
In the 1970s, in search of an alternative epistemology, feminist scholars put 
the experiences of women to the center of their analysis as the source of more 
completed and less distorted knowledge and “insisted on the value of subjectivity 
and personal experience” previously ‘excluded’ from the domain of scientific 
knowledge (Reinharz, 1992: 3). Harding and Hintikka (in Grant, 1987: 105) claim: 
“What counts as knowledge must be grounded on experience… Women’s experience 
systematically differs from the male experience upon which knowledge claims have 
grounded”.  
In the feminist epistemology, knowledge is claimed to be based on 
experience and basic assumptions of science have been questioned in line with the 
argument made by Harding (1987: 181): “Once we undertake to use women’s 
experience as a resource to generate scientific problems, hypothesis and evidence, to 
design research for women and to place the researcher in the same critical plane as 
the research subject, traditional epistemological assumptions can no longer be 
made”.  
However, conceptualizing the experience as authentic, and language as 
transparent, and assuming the relationship between experience, individual and 
language as transparent is quite in the line with the male-stream tradition 
essentialism, leaving space for the possibility of transcendence and independence 
from time and space. Such an epistemological standpoint carries the risk of de-
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conceptualizing the actual women and their experiences as if they were self-evident 
and essential. Besides, not only the ontological status given to the experience is 
problematic, but also the epistemological status of it. The positionality of female 
subjectivity leads to different ontological positions and different life experiences of 
women, which creates dilemmas and conflicts regarding the epistemological status 
given to experience. As stated by Benjamin (1993: 17) “Where woman is objectively 
placed with respect to the existing social order determines the parameter within 
which or outside of which women speak” .  
Discourse is the place where subjectivity is constructed, and due to the 
multiplicity of discourse, “there is not one, stable subjectivity, but it is produced 
through the interaction of several social, economic, political discursive practices” 
(Benjamin, 1993: 21). As the product of this discursive area, experience does not 
have an authentic characteristic and inherent essential meaning, and transparent 
quality that will unconceal itself without any interpretive practices.  
Moreover, the interpretation of experience cannot be innocent due to the 
different positionalities in the power-knowledge network and the impossibility of 
knowledge free from power relations. According to Foucault, experience gains 
meaning via the discourses which are always part of the wider network of power 
relations (Benjamin, 1993: 105). Thus the subjective interpretations of experience are 
always embedded in their relations to several discourses and power networks because 
nothing can escape from the domain of power and discourses. However, Foucault’s 
theory of power can offer a rich insight into the feminist knowledge due to the fact 
that power is not always repressive and the analysis of power relations will help for 
the understanding of the construction and contextualization of experience in a 
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theoretical framework, seeking the relations between discourse, subjectivity and 
power (Weedon, 1997: 175). 
 
4.2. The Research Process and Research Group 
Feminist methodology is used in the research conducted with Islamist women. 
Although attention is paid not to destroy Islamist women’ self-narrations of their life 
experiences which is consistent with the principles of feminist methodology, the 
interpretation of these experiences by the researcher is a necessary part of the social 
scientific analysis. Also, it is thought that it might be misleading and carries the 
possibility of destroying reality to expect the experiences to talk for themselves, 
because, as discussed in the previous part, experience is not a self- evident 
phenomenon, but it is an outcome of macro-level social and historical formations. 
For understanding the principal characteristics of patriarchal oppression experienced 
by Islamist women, and the strategies and identity they have developed, it is 
necessary to pay attention to the context within which these women live and give 
meaning to their experiences.43  
The analysis and the interpretations of the life stories are based on the 
commonalities rather than the differences between the women interviewed. During 
the interpretations, it is assumed that being bounded by Islamist ideology creates a 
different form of patriarchy, so Islamist women have different resistance strategies 
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 It seems difficult to talk about a patriarchy that is experienced in the same way by all women in a 
given society, instead working of patriarchy significantly differs in line with class, ethnicity, rural/ 
urban background and age differentials, and for the case of this thesis, in line with the religious 
devotion. Yet, the concept of ‘patriarchy’ is employed as a political and theoretical tool to understand 
and explain the oppression mechanisms women are subjected to and to see the possibilities of struggle 
and resistance. I point out to the very general mechanisms working throughout all layers of society 
and enabling a system oppressive, subordinative and exploitative towards women. However, as I have 
pointed out, it has to be redefined and explained in every piece of work according to the issue. That is, 
the accurate narration of the mechanism itself is context specific and empirically bounded. For the 
discussion of the issue and very good contextualization of the patriarchy in the Turkish cities, see 
Erman (2001). 
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and meaning frameworks when compared to the women in the other sections of the 
society. Also factors such as class differences, urban/ rural background, educational 
level are very decisive factors. Thus, while interpreting the data, these factors were 
also considered when available. 
 
5.2.1. The Research Process 
The research was conducted during the summer of 2000. Although some credible 
people were attempted to be used to reach to Islamist women, many of them 
displayed unwillingness to participate in such a research. They said that the thoughts 
of Islamists were distorted in the social science studies and they were tired of this 
attitude of the researchers. Due to the state pressure on the Islamist groups in Turkey, 
most of the women who could be finally reached also refused to participate in such a 
research both as a result of their reaction to the ‘others’ who appeared to them as 
being closer to the secularist ‘camp’ and of the motivation to protect themselves from 
a potential threat as a result of their participation in the research.  
At the beginning, the research was intended to be conducted in Ankara, 
however only one Islamist woman, the woman from the Great Unity Party, accepted 
to participate in the research. Then, it was decided to conduct the research in 
Istanbul, since Istanbul offered a much wider possibility to find respondents. A social 
scientist from the Middle  East Technical University was utilized as a contact person 
to supply the network of Islamist women in Istanbul. Interestingly, introducing 
myself to the women by giving reference to a secular social scientist who had gained 
the trust of Islamist women during his research, was much more beneficial than 
giving reference to Islamists. His research was conducted in 1998 in Sultanbeyli, 
which is known as the ‘castle of Islam’ in Istanbul. He spent two months there, 
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forming close relations with Islamist women. Those relations created a trust on the 
part of Islamist women in Sultanbeyli towards social scientists. So, this provided me  
with the necessary network relations. After returning to Ankara, two Islamist women 
were interviewed as well.  
Except for one of the interviews, all of them were conducted in the public 
places, such as in the  work places of women, the party buildings of the Great Unity 
Party and the Virtue Party, and a pastry shop in Sultanbeyli. The conduct of the 
interviews in such public places instead of private places, such as houses, made this 
research more formal. The only interview that was conducted in a house was quite 
informal, but it was frequently interrupted by the children of the woman. In spite of 
the formal character of the interviews, good relationships between the researcher and 
respondents were established, and some very sentimental moments were shared 
during the narrations of life stories.  
The interviews lasted in general about three hours. Some of the interviews 
were recorded, but some were not when the respondents were disturbed by the 
presence of tape recorder. 
 
4.2.2. The Research Group 
During the research, ten Islamist women who were actively fighting for Islamic 
cause were interviewed. The reason for calling these women as Islamist is their way 
of engagement with religion. They all have a story of active participation in the 
Islamist movement in Turkey. Their Islamic understanding is shaped around 
reinterpretation of Islam and refusal of traditional practices imposed in the name of 
Islam. In that sense, they are actively and dynamically constructing their Islamist 
outlook and Islamic identity. The construction process of Islamic identity is realized 
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along the pendulum of ‘tradition’ and ‘modern’. Moreover, they are defined as 
Islamist, because they are trying to carry this Islamic mental map to their everyday 
lives. Their way of understanding Islam shapes the politics of everyday life in their 
effort to construct a life-style alternative both to the secular and traditional Islamist 
ways of life.  
Islamist women in the research have different class origins, they further differ 
in their marital status, age, educational level, family background, and employment 
status. Their ages differ between 22 and 40. Their educational level is quite high. 
One of them has Master’s degree in the area of economic history, one of them is 
currently a university student, three of them are high school graduates and other 
women have university degrees. Beside this official education, all have at least 
Koran knowledge taken from unofficial Islamic education centers. Additionally, 
some have good knowledge of Arabic, Ottoman Language, and of meaning and 
interpretation of the Koran. This shows that they have access to alternative Islamic 
intellectual circles and centers, and to the tools to develop themselves in the area of 
Islamic knowledge. However, this availability in no way leads to the replacement of 
‘modern’ institutional official education with the alternative Islamic education, 
because, Islamist women value university education at least for the advantages it 
provides to them in the secular public space. 
The employment status of the women in the research group is as follows: 
three of them are employed by the Istanbul Municipality as workers. Three of them 
are unemployed and actively looking for a job and complaining about the 
discrimination they are subjected to due to the problem of headscarf. Another woman 
has solved this problem by the strategy of homeworking and she designs web pages 
at home. One of them is currently a student at the Department of Geology 
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Engineering at METU. The remaining two women define themselves as 
‘housewives’. 
The marital status of the women and the jobs of their husbands also display a 
variety. One of the women is divorced, while four of them are single. Other five 
women are married with men from different professions. The husbands’ jobs are: 
civil engineering, computer engineering, teaching, management and administration. 
The class positions of the women in the research group, which is the effect of all of 
the factors above, naturally differ from each other. The district of residence is a good 
indicator of the women’s class positions. The women from upper-middle class live in 
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Ankara. Additionally, it is found that there is a relationship between the level of 
religiosity and selection of the district to live only for lower-middle class women. In 
other words, while being committed to the Islamist ideology is decisive in the 
selection of the residential area for the lower-middle class Islamists as displayed by 
the fact that they live in the so-called Islamist districts of the city, this is not true for 
the upper-middle class Islamists who are not spatially concentrated on the basis of 
religious outlook, rather they live in the urban districts inhabited by the upper strata 
of the society, secularists and Islamists alike. 
Despite the heterogeneity of the research group with respect to the factors 
mentioned above, Islamist women in the group also have some important common 
characteristics. Firstly, they all have urban background in the sense of spending their 
whole life in Istanbul or Ankara. They all are socialized in the urban environment. 
Secondly, as pointed out before, all of the women are politically active Islamists 
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having at least a past as Islamist activists, and they still have strong bounds with 
these groups. However, the frameworks in which their activism takes place differ. 
Five of them have their pasts in tarikats. Two of them reported that they have 
worked for the Welfare Party Ladies Commission in high ranks. One of them is still 
working for the Virtue Party Ladies Commission as a district manager. One of them 
is currently working for the Great Unity Party, in an influential position in the Ladies 
Branch. One woman is a part of a small Islamist intellectual group having a radical 
Islamist outlook. However, except for the women who are working for the legal 
political parties, other women hesitate to overtly announce the name of the groups 
they were member of. This is probably due to the instinct of preserving themselves 
from the potential pressures that can be practiced by the state. The third common 
characteristic of the women is also related with their political activism. All of the 
women in the group have organic and strong ties with Islamist networks in their 
everyday lives. Fourthly, their Islamic understandings are not in the confines of 
traditional religiousness observed in the Turkish society, and this forms an important 
demarcation line between them and their families who are traditionally religious, 
except for one of the families, which is strongly secularist.  
 
4.2.3. The Relationship between the Researcher and Respondents 
Although, Islamist women were reached through someone whom they trusted,  this 
was not sufficient to break down all the walls between the researcher and Islamist 
women, stemming from the differences between the researcher and respondents with 
respect to religious attitude, life-style, way of dressing and positioning with respect 
to the hegemonically constructed duality between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’.  
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Due to the fact that interviews were conducted in the places which had 
dominantly Islamic rather than secular atmosphere, such as the building of an Islamic 
party, or Istanbul’s districts such as Fatih, Eyüp and Sultanbeyli, which are known as 
the places whose inhabitants are dominantly Islamist and religious people, I felt the 
necessity to pay attention to my way of dressing and behaving. Moreover, I did not 
reflect all my ideas, all aspects of my personality and of my way of life in order not 
to disturb the women who were interviewed, despite the fact that sharing of 
experience is one of the basic principles of my research methodology, namely, 
feminist methodology. In this respect, differences in ethical and moral values, and 
the worldview adopted by the researcher and Islamist women who were interviewed 
draw boundaries of the process of experience shared on the basis of womanhood. 
The mechanism of differentiating the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ worked for the 
both sides of the ‘researcher’ and the ‘researched’, the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ of 
the research process. During the interviews, both sides, on the one hand, objectified 
the ‘other’, and on the other hand, were objectified by the ‘other’. Islamist women’s 
reaction towards their representation by the secularist discourse as ‘pre-modern’ and 
their efforts to declare this image as false in an apologizing way, covertly dominated  
the interview process. Islamist women were continuously underlining the similarity 
of their life style and their use of urban space to the researcher’s who was in their 
mind conforming to the image of the so-called ‘modern’ woman of the Republican 
ideal. They repeated the argument that they were also the part of modern life and 
adapted to modern the public sphere, by pointing out the similarities between them 
and the researcher. To exemplify this apologizing attitude, it is useful to close this 
section by quoting some of their words: 
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According to the outside appearance, people think that you are a ‘modern’ 
woman and I am a Muslim woman. But I can go everywhere you go. What is 
the measure of being ‘modern’? 
 
In some places, people direct strange gazes to me because of my appearance. 
As I respect you, people have to respect me. Because, it is my choice. I don’t 
give harm to anybody. If people don’t want to see me with headscarf, they 
shouldn’t look. 
 
We are all Muslims. Your style is being open, mine is being closed. 
 
4.3. Interpretation of the Life Stories of Islamist Women 
In this part, the life stories of Islamist women in the research group are analyzed.  
The interpretation and analysis of the life stories are made in two subsections. The 
first subsection mainly deals with the everyday life survival strategies of Islamist 
women in the research group. Islamist women’s process of bargaining with Islamist 
patriarchy when constructing alternative Islamic ways of life is analyzed. For the 
analysis their everyday life the private sphere and in the public sphere are separately 
considered. In the second subsection, the alternative Islamist women identity that is 
dynamically constructed as a result of practices of everyday life is presented. The 
efforts of the Islamist women to reconcile the ‘traditional’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘modern’ 
are considered. Their understanding of gender identities and their interaction with 
feminism  during the process of identity construction are described. 
 
4.3.1.  Islam as the Main Parameter of Everyday Life 
Islamist discourse forms the main axis of the everyday life of the women in the 
research group by representing a set of values, norms and practices to shape their 
everyday existence and discourse. However, what is defined as Islam here does not 
refer to the scripture. Rather, it is taken as an effect of the dynamic power relations in 
the society.  
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There are several reasons for arguing for the centrality of Islam in the lives of 
these women. Firstly, Islam is decisive in the lives of the women due to the fact that 
the dichotomy between Islam and secularism, and the resultant scenarios about the 
‘ideal’ woman that are of the most important dimensions of discursive construction 
of the Turkish Republic, have significant effects on the stream of Islamist women’s 
everyday life. The conflict between the Islamist and secularist ideologies directly 
shapes and draws limits to the discourse and practice of these women. Secondly, the 
women in the group spend their lives in Islamist circles and environments that are 
tried to be marginalized by the secularist hegemony in the country. Thus, on the one 
hand, the secularist discourse, and on the other hand, the Islamist discourse put 
limitations to Islamist women’s lives. Moreover, as mentioned before, all of the 
women in the group, except for one, come from families with traditional Islamist 
outlook, in turn, traditional Islamist patriarchy draws the basic borders of their 
everyday existence. In relation to this factor, thirdly, Islamist women in the research 
group develop resistance strategies by envisaging these limitations during the process 
of ‘bargaining with patriarchy’. Lastly, Islam which is utilized by family and Islamist 
circles in a way to limit, oppress and suppress these women, turns to be a 
legitimization mechanism at the hands of Islamist women when resisting to Islamist 
patriarchy. Islamist women criticize the ‘conservative’ ideas and traditional Islamist 
understanding by making an alternative reading of Islam. As a result, these women 
dynamically construct an alternative urban way of life based on the confrontation 
with the notions of ‘Islamic’, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. However, this practice of 
construction is full of contradictions and conflicts due to the efforts of reconciling 
different and contrasting effects and frameworks. 
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In the following, the sensitive equilibrium in the lives of Islamist women, 
considering the contradictions they face, and the strategies they develop, is tried to be 
described. This description is made in two sections. In the first section, the tensions, 
resistance and confrontations in the private sphere are analyzed. In the second 
section, this analysis is done for the public sphere. Such a narration strategy is 
adopted, because there is a relational feeding mechanism of empowerment and 
oppression between the public and private spheres. During the interaction between 
these spheres, Islam, tradition and modern are used in an interconnected articulation, 
namely, alternative reading of Islam and the aim of struggling for Islamic cause 
establish a crucial legitimization ground for Islamist women’s entrance into the 
public sphere. Besides, their presence in the public space as active agents provides 
them necessary mental and material tools to resist to patriarchal expectations in the 
private sphere. A sense of self-worth, experience of defending and expressing oneself 
can be mentioned as mental tools; while, education, public network and salary/wage 
as material tools that are gained by the active agency in the public space.44 
 
4.3.1.1. Confronting and Transforming the Traditional Islamist Patriarchy 
in the Private Sphere 
The concepts of family45 and marriage, by adding an Islamic emphasis to both, can 
be used as efficient tools to narrate the construction of the private sphere where 
Islamist women realize important part of their struggle combined of resistance and 
confrontation. Islamic emphasis mentioned above, indeed, hegemonizes entire 
framework as the source to legitimize both the subordination of Islamist women and 
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 However, it should be kept in mind that, direct, simple causality and parallelism do not exist 
between the dynamics of the patriarchal constraints working in the public and private spheres. 
Namely, individual empowerment in one of the spheres does not directly translates itself to the other 
sphere and transforms it. 
45
 During this chapter, I refer to the family by birth when I use the concept of ‘family’.  
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Islamist women’s resistance strategies towards gender oppression. In the private 
sphere, Islamist women in the group resist to patriarchal limitations put on them, by 
rejecting and criticizing ‘traditional’ version of Islamic understanding. 
During the process of ‘bargaining with patriarchy’ in the private sphere, 
Islamist women’s adoption of the Islamic belief functions as an important 
legitimization mechanism. Islamist women generally draw a bold distinction line 
between their Islamic view and the traditional interpretation of Islam. Göle also 
makes this inference with reference to Islamist women whom she interviewed. She 
argues that, Islamist women in her research claim that traditional Muslims accept 
religious precepts without discussing, in contrast to them who search for the truth of 
these by returning to the ‘sources’ (Göle, 1993: 86). In a striking contrast with the 
uncritical and conservative Islamic understanding of traditional Islamists, the women 
in my research group draw portrait of Muslims continually criticizing and developing 
their Islamic view. In that sense they are in a continuous effort of questioning the 
deep-rooted beliefs in society in the name of Islam.  One of the women says: 
Now, I’m critical of myself. I realized that we were living for others in the 
past. There is a rule in Islam, ÕÖf×ﬂØ/Ù¿Ú . Still many people interpret it as learning 
something for teaching to others, but they don’t put this knowledge into 
practice in their lives. I hate this attitude. When one of us makes a mistake, 
we exaggerate it. 
 
With these words, she overtly complains about the use of Islam as a tool of pressure 
on the people. Her reaction towards this traditional Islamist view also stems from the 
repression she is subjected to. She continues her criticism by describing the 
environmental pressure she felt:  
For years I run away from myself. The reason of this is the Islamic 
understanding in the 1980’s. It was as if I would be misunderstood if I told 
my ideas because, the Islam I understood was not similar to theirs. I was 
afraid of being excluded, if I tell my ideas. 
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As opposed to the traditional Islam that is imposed on them, they try to construct 
their own understanding of Islam. Their gender identity and living in the modern 
urban environment create an ambivalent position for these women. They cannot 
easily accept the traditional gender role and Islamic precepts that are leaned on them. 
They are trying to reconcile many tensions in their lives and in their Islamic 
understanding. They adopt two strategies of reconciliation, which gain visibility with 
two different attitudes. As the first strategy, they continuously review their Islamic 
views and consistency of their lives with this view in an effort to obtain a consistent 
whole and legitimize their criticisms towards traditional Islamic understanding. One 
of the women narrates her inspection as follows: 
Islam is at the center of my life. I hope that, it won’t shift from the center 
even one millimeter. I want to shape my life according to Islam. The first 
thing is the approval of Allah-u Teala. I’ve many faults as a human being. 
But, there is the door of repentance. The leg of my compasses is on Islam. It’s 
at the center of my circle. I always measure so as to prevent even a minor 
change from its central place. A Muslim has to live his/her life with 
continuous inspection. 
 
As her words demonstrate, Islamist women are developing a critical attitude towards 
the so-called Islamist precepts without distancing themselves from the Islamic belief. 
As the second strategy, they develop a more tolerant attitude towards the others 
thinking and living differently as a reaction to the intolerance displayed towards 
them by traditional Islamists. One woman says: 
Everybody’s Islamic understanding is different. For example according to 
many friends of mine, a woman’s going to holiday by herself is not very 
right. But everybody draws his/her own line according to himself/herself. I 
can go to holiday by myself and I’m going. I’m trying to live Islam according 
to myself. Everybody’s life style is different (Single, High School Graduate). 
 
As the case of this woman shows, the relativity and multiplicity of the  
interpretations of the Koran and existence of içtihad principle (personal variations in 
the adoption of Islamic principles to the everyday life), open a space of resistance 
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and criticism for Islamist women. Their claim of being conscious Muslims and 
establishing life forms consistent with their içtihad, give them the opportunity to 
resist the pressures of Islamist patriarchy. 
However, the difference between their Islamic understanding and traditional 
patriarchal understanding also push Islamist women into a situation of conflict with 
the traditional Islamist circles and with their own families. Özdalga points out to the 
‘friction’ caused by this difference by referring to one of her Islamist student 
respondents, Zeynep: 
Asked whether she is a more conscious Islamic believer than her mother, 
Zeynep answers with an emphatic: “Of course!” and hastens to add that it is 
not unusual that the differences in learning and outlook between the student 
and their families cause friction between the generations (Özdalga, 1997: 80). 
 
Disperancy in Islamic understanding due to the generational difference is quite 
common finding indicated in many pieces of research made on Islamist women. 
Although, all the women in this research group, except one, reported that they took 
the basic Islamic education from their families, then they developed an Islamic 
outlook different from their families’ traditional Islamic belief structure. Cihan 
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scholarly one, also shows 
that students wearing headscarves do not simulate the religious view of their 
families, in contrast they live conflict with their families due to the differences in 
Islamic interpretation. Similarly, Göle (1993: 84), on the basis of her research 
findings demonstrating the difference between traditional Islam adopted by families 
and young women’s interpretations, argues that the young generation of Islamist 
women represents the urban, educated and militant face of Islam. 
The women in the research group refer to their families’ Islamic outlook by 
descriptions such as “having a traditional religious culture” or “trying to live Islam in 
a traditional way”. However, sometimes, engagement of one of the children in the 
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household with the Islamist politics may influence parents’ view of Islam. One of the 
women describes the changes in her parent’s Islamic understanding with her oldest 
brother’s becoming a member of Nurcu community. According to her narration, 
while parents were praying in a traditional way, with the brother’s entrance to the 
Nurcu community during his ø'ùúù - Hatip school years, all family members’ 
religious understanding changed. Parents understood that the Islam they believed was 
not the true Islam. They began to read Islamic books brought home by the oldest 
brother. From then, the woman describes: “They try to teach us the Islamic identity. 
Their Islamic mentality is no more traditional, but it gives importance to self 
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 Islamist children on the 
families. She points out to her finding that many respondents report that their 
mothers started to be veiled in accordance with the Islamic principle of modesty, 
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However, as mentioned before, arousal of conflicts rather than peace with the 
family is more common due to the different interpretations of Islam. One of the 
women who reports that she took her moral and religious background in family 
environment, describes the process of her distancing from her family with respect to 
Islamic views as follows: 
Then some books started to be published. One questions whether the things 
written or the ones we have lived is the true Islam. After secondary school, I 
have attended to a Koran course with my own free will. There were very 
knowledgeable teachers, well known religion authorities of Istanbul. We 
were lucky. Although we didn’t understand everything, we breathed the air. 
 
The generation gap becomes very important with respect to the Islamic outlook. The 
Islamic understanding of all of the women interviewed are shaped in the post 1980s 
atmosphere of Turkey when the Islamist movement was in rise and Islam was 
discussed with reference to sources of Hadith and Koran, that is, the time Islam 
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entered the public sphere as an important political and intellectual discourse. So, 
these women who also participate in Islamic environment, criticize their family’s 
way of living Islam. They are affected by outside Islamic circles when developing 
their Islamic understanding. One of the women says: 
There is much difference between the 1980’s Islamic understanding and 
today’s. In the 1980s we were thinking rather in the limits of tradition and 
had some traditional beliefs without understanding Islam, the mentality about 
dressing or male- female relationships was quite backward. It was as if you 
mustn’t go out and talk to men. 
 
They see their family’s Islamic outlook as traditional and somehow inferior to theirs. 
One of the women criticizes parents’ attitude towards their daughters in the name of 
Islam as follows:   
I see many women around who wear headscarves because of family pressure. 
When asked, they never say that they are veiled because of pressure but on 
their own will. In Turkish society both in Islamist and secularist families, 
girls are subjected to pressure especially during their puberty. Women are 
perceived only with their sexuality whereas their conscious and self-
development are disregarded. Their appearances and dressing are very 
important. Imagine a young girl, in pain, needs someone to talk, needs to be 
understood and listened to, but there is nobody around her who will care 
about her feelings instead of her appearance. Nobody understands her. I lived 
all of these pains. 
 
When they conflict with their families, they refer to Islamic sources to legitimize 
their ideas. They generally conflict with their families when they reject the traditional 
gender roles imposed on them by their families. They criticize the traditional Islamist 
understanding defining women with her sexuality and the limitations put on them 
due to this understanding. The debates between the women and their families on the 
style of outside dressing are good examples crystallizing the women’s reactions and 
their feelings about the pressure they experience, and their demand and struggle for 
being accepted as individuals who have the right to take decisions for their life and 
style in various respects. Two women’s ideas about the conflicts on their style of 
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veiling are very informative. One of them expresses the reaction of her family as 
follows: 
I always wanted to be free about my dressing. I have some problems with my 
family on this issue. My current Islamic understanding is never in line with 
the 80’ s understanding. If you pay attention, important poets’ and writers’ 
ideas are verifying that this Islamic understanding is wrong. Maybe my 
standpoint has changed with the effect of the books I read, of my 
environment and of my husband. 
 
The ex-family influences are clearly observed in her speech. This is similar to the 
case of another woman whose preferences about dressing is also affected by factors 
other than the family: 
My family was strict about my dressing; they wanted me to wear black TUVXW	U)Y  
when I was 16-17. I didn’t want to dress in this way. It was strange to me, 
maybe because this kind of dressing was representing some groups I do not 
approve of. Since my teachers at the Arabic course were rejecting the tarikat 
belief. I accepted to wear TUVXW	U)Y  for not making my parents unhappy. But still 
I have the pain of this event. As soon as I was married, I left wearing TUVXW	U)Y . 
Now I am wearing black coat and black headscarf. It was a beautiful thing for 
me to wear in this way, because the important people, the people I loved in 
my environment were dressing in this way. Now my parents accept that their 
behavior was wrong. 
 
The narrations of both women reveal the fact that Islamist women want to break the 
hegemony of their families on their lives. During this process, they construct their 
ideals and values with reference to some Islamist groups or people in their 
environment and also use them as examples to defend their position against their 
families. Criticism of traditional Islam provides them the possibility of constructing 
an alternative identity from within the newly emerging Islamist discourse whose 
terms are not as definite and clear as the traditional Islam. In that sense, the trend of 
Islam, which is closer to fundamentalism, gives these women the chance of 
reconstructing the gender roles and identity. Research findings show that, all of the 
women in the research group were struggling with their families for the small details 
of daily life and using Islam as an important tool for legitimizing their arguments. 
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The references made to some famous and respected Islamist intellectuals also 
provide them solid legitimate grounds during the conflict with family. In addition, all 
of them reported that currently they had good relationship with their families and 
conflicts were resolved with time. They succeeded in making their families to accept 
that they behaved wrongly towards them in the name of Islam. Here, the emphasis 
made on true Islam is also remarkable. It shows that the distinction made between the 
traditional beliefs accepted as Islam and true and real Islam becomes very functional 
as a resistance and survival strategy. The idea of existence of true Islam, also gives 
Islamist women a moral and religious superiority in comparison to their families’ 
less conscious religious practices. They speak with a self- respecting and self- 
confident voice when narrating their conflicts with their families. One of the women 
who is 31 years old and currently living with her parents says:  
I inform my parents when I go somewhere. But nobody can ask me where I 
am going. I don’t like this kind of interventions. I can’t accept nonsense 
things, such as they have some rights on me because they are my brothers or 
father. If I go somewhere it is because I have something to do. Nobody can 
intervene. Maybe they can’t dare to intervene, because I put it in this way. 
 
Another woman who also lives with her parents and is 27 years old, describes the 
development and resolution of a conflict with her family as follows: 
In my youth, when I was 17-18 years old, there were some limitations put on 
me. But they were right because I was not quite experienced to understand 
what was right and what was wrong. They wanted me to take permission 
from them when I was going somewhere. My father didn’t want me to work; 
he doesn’t approve women’s work. I worked for AMWAY. We made 
activities with my friends to help poor children. My family saw that I was 
successful. When I had an offer from the Istanbul Municipality, my father 
didn’t object to it. It was interesting that, 15 days before I had this offer, I had 
asked my father for his permission, so that I could get a job, but he had 
replied “I can give you what you want. But I don’t want you to work”. After 
the job offer, when I asked him again, he said, “Up to now I didn’t give 
permission, but my confidence to you is limitless. You know people; your 
dialogue with people is very good. You can understand what is good and 
what is wrong. If you want to work, you are free”. 
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This woman’s case highlights that during the process of bargaining with their 
families, their efforts are important, but the moral framework of family limits the 
acceptability of their demands. A job in an Islamic municipality can be permitted, 
because it is harmonious with the family’s ideological and moral codes. Although 
they struggle with their families when constructing their identities, they use some 
mechanisms which can be accepted by the families as legitimate, such as referring to 
Koran or Islamist writers, giving examples from the lives of faithful people, limiting 
their demands of work and outside socialization to the Islamist circles.  
The rights gained by and limits of freedom of these women are determined 
through the dynamic bargaining process with the families. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that Islamist women in the group have active roles in this bargaining 
process. One woman describes her relationship with her family as follows:  
My parents are very mature people. They carry me very well and I carry them 
very well. We have a very good dialogue. I don’t behave in a way to make 
them sorry, I don’t intent to do anything they wouldn’t approve. We do not 
have any problem at home. 
 
As reflected in these words, there is a latent, untold agreement determining the limits 
of demands by women and suppression by families. Both sides’ acceptance of 
Islamist worldview despite the differences in interpretations, establishes the basis of 
this silent equilibrium. 
However, to manage such an equilibrium in marriage life is much more 
difficult for Islamist women due to the increasing ‘responsibilities’ loaded on them. 
Islamist women who are not married are quite aware of the limits and pressures that 
will be caused by marriage. For that reason they display reluctance towards the idea 
of marriage and anxiety towards a future marriage life. These feelings of reluctance 
and anxiety are largely due to their observations on the status of the sexes in the 
marriage institution and the patriarchal relations in the private sphere. It is enough 
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for them to consider the lives of their mothers to portray the subordination of the 
women in the private sphere. One of the single women in the research group 
describes the burden women have in marriage life as follows:  
Women have to be self-sacrificing house wives. For example, when I think of 
my mother… When I return home from work, I can say ‘I’m tired’, but as a 
housewife, my mother is responsible for all work. Working married women 
have material satisfaction, but there are many mental difficulties. When she 
returns home she can’t say, ‘I’m tired and I will rest’. All the responsibility is 
on her shoulders. 
 
As the above quotation shows, Islamist women carry a latent critical approach to the 
gender inequality in marriage. The awareness of the possibility of the increasing 
limitations and oppression with marriage is revealed in the ironic expression of one 
of the women who is currently working for the Istanbul municipality: “ I like 
walking outside at night, in the darkness all by myself. In the past I couldn’t. But 
now I am going outside at night. I can’t marry for that reason, my husband will not 
let me”. Another woman shows a similar reluctance towards marriage. She is 
interested in calligraphy, and this art has a central place in her life and her identity. 
With the awareness of the demanding nature of marriage for women, she is afraid of 
the possible conflicts between the ‘necessities’ of her art and marriage life. She does 
not want marriage life to break the bound between herself and calligraphy, which is 
crucial for her self-realization. She exemplifies a possible conflict situation as 
follows: 
I’m afraid of getting married indeed, because calligraphy is so demanding. 
When the love of art is born in my heart… I am afraid that there will be 
responsibilities, dirty dishes in the kitchen waiting for me. It is very important 
to catch and use the moment when the love of art is born. At that moment, my 
pen doesn’t limit me, it moves as if by itself. But, for example, what if some 
guests come in that moment? When will happen? I will miss the moment. 
 
As the words of this woman demonstrate, Islamist women do not want to abandon 
their current life-styles because of marriage life. Such a reluctant attitude of Islamist 
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women towards marriage is found in many researches. One of the respondents of 
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her future husband. She also mentions the ‘unsuccessful’ marriages of her Islamist 
friends as the reason of her suspicion. She says that her married friends ironically 
describe their life after marriage as “nothing, but making jihad with the dishes” 
|J}~FQHQŁHX Jz337Dﬁ	ﬂ jJc)u7 o¡70¢0	:J£3D
not sufficient condition for realizing marriage life they are dreaming. An Islamist 
women taking part in Saktanber’s (1994: 109) research says: 
My fiancé is also a good Muslim, but I am afraid he is not as a conscious 
Muslim as I am. I hope what I have learned will help us both to make our 
marriage truly Islamic. I am fully aware of my rights as a Muslim woman and 
I hope my husband will respect them. 
 
Also the women in the research group report that they do not accept the traditional 
gender roles in family. They claim that they are aware of their rights and will fight 
for them if necessary. They argue that they cannot bear any denigration directed to 
them by their future husbands. One of the single women describes her personality as 
follows: “My dignity is very important. I can’t bear even a single negative word. My 
husband has to know my heart and never break it. When he breaks my heart, 
counting down starts.” Another woman tells how she will resist to her husband in the 
case of conflict with the words below: 
As long as I want to work, I don’t obey my husband’s wishes on this issue. 
What is important is what I want; I don’t think that my husband will have 
authority on my work life. I can persuade him. 
 
The single women in the group plan to solve the problematic nature of marriage for 
women by selecting a husband who will be respectful to their wishes and demands. 
They postpone their marriage to a time when they “find the right person who shares 
their thoughts and Islamic views”. They think the dilemma stemming from the 
conflict between the ‘necessities’ of marriage life and their self-identity as 
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individuals can be resolved by marrying with men who can understand them. As one 
of the women says: 
I look for equivalence in manners, culture, morality, life-style and spiritual 
conditions. We will accept each other with all our aspects. I don’t know 
whether these are too utopian. But people can make everything possible with 
understanding and affection. People should love each other, because you 
can’t sacrifice, if you don’t love. 
 
This description and idealization based on the equilibrium and affection between the 
husband and wife is quite in line with the Islamic utopian description of harmonious 
family life based on the complementarity between the sexes. However, it is seen that 
Islamist women are much more realistic when it comes to practical matters related to 
the organization of everyday life. For example, on the issue of domestic division of 
labor, although they do not accept the traditional male breadwinner/female 
housekeeper model as women who actively participating in the public life by the 
channels of politics and paid work, they do not demand absolute equality between 
the husband and wife. Instead of demanding the share of responsibilities of the 
house, they plan either “to demand help from the husband” or “to hire a helper for 
the housework”. Different from their mothers, they think that it is their right to reject 
to carry all domestic burdens. They legitimize this rejection by referring to the rights 
given to women in Koran and claim that according to the Islamic principles, women 
are not even obliged to nurse their children. What is striking in the cases of single 
women is that although they are aware of the unequal power position of the sexes 
and oppression of women in marriage, they are quite optimistic and self-confident in 
the issue of solution of conflicts and establishment of harmony in their own 
marriages. Islamist writer Mualla Gülnaz points out to the fact that young, single 
Islamist women do not take seriously the patriarchal power relations in the domestic 
sphere, because these more clearly manifest themselves and become much more 
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evident in marriage life. Single Islamist women think that oppression to which they 
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interpretation made by Gülnaz is also supported by the research findings. The single 
women in the group think that the reason of gender oppression is the traditional 
structure of Turkish society. For example one of the women says: “I am absolutely 
against the Turkish traditionalism and Turkish-Islamic traditionalism which lead to 
oppression of women.” But, as also pointed out by Gülnaz, they suppose that their 
future marriages with Islamist men will be free from these traditional constraints and 
patriarcha µÆ¥:¦JªJ¨x­® «;¦§zºﬂ»¤¼½¥F¾¿uÀÀÀcÁÂ&¿ÃÇÄ  
However, the research findings show that the utopian view of single women 
about conflict resolution in marriage and the dreamed consensus between the couples 
collapses in the life practices of married Islamist women. Although the married 
women, too, started their marriage lives with the utopia of Islamic family, and the 
husbands were thought as different from ordinary Muslims with respect to 
intellectual level and Islamic understanding, they realized that they were viewed by 
their husbands as mainly wives and mothers who should be controlled and guarded 
by the male authority. The story of one of the women, who live in Sultanbeyli and 
actively worked for the Welfare Party Ladies Commission for two years, is an 
excellent example displaying various contradictions in Islamist women’s lives in the 
crudest form. On the one hand, it reveals the illusionary nature of the utopia of 
Islamic marriage, and on the other hand, it describes the various bargaining strategies 
developed by Islamist women.  
Now, at the age of 26, she is married for seven years and has two children. 
She is graduated from high school and planning to take sociology education at the 
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university. Hers is a story of struggle, story of victory and defeat. She starts to 
narrate her marriage story, which is not at all a fairy tale, as follows: 
My husband is over-È:É;ÊË ÌÍcÎÏÐ?É±ÑÒFÊ0ÓÍxÊAÔÉ0ÓﬁÕÒ:ÌÖØ×'ÙﬃË ÓÙÚ¸ÛzÉ0ÜÝÞDß Ü0ÊË9àjÞß$áuÉÒXÎß<ÔâxÏ
University graduates who have Islamic outlook generally do not marry 
women from university; they want ‘family girls’. Although our Islamic 
understandings are similar, we are interpreting differently, because we are 
looking from different points. He wants me to live like the Mohammed’s 
wives. He once said to me “House is sufficient for a woman’’. But my 
character is not convenient to this kind of life style. In the first year of our 
marriage, I wanted to teach Arabic. He also knew this before our marriage, 
but as soon as we got married, he became very jealous. My students were 
taking me from home to the National Youth Foundation, in a sense they were 
escorting me. My husband did not allow me to go outside alone. I got very 
angry with him, but he did not understand me. 
 
Different from her unmarried counterparts, she realistically argues that solving the 
problems in marriage is not easy: “I always try to understand him, abstain from 
accusing him. But I am worn out. There is a communication problem. There is love, 
but it is not enough.” In her marriage, she uses several strategies to persuade her 
husband, to widen the limits of her life. She uses the strategy of silence: 
When for some period of time, I didn’t go out of the house, my husband 
started to plead me: “ Go outside, relax a bit, go out with your children.’’  I 
was waiting for this, for him to understand me, for him to say these words. I 
waited at home without going anywhere, without talking to anybody. 
 
At the expense of breaking the story, it should be added that strategy of silence is 
intensely employed by Islamist women during their resistance. Islamist writer Elif H. 
Toros says about Islamist women that women are looking for the possibilities of 
transforming their lives without using words and attracting attention. According to 
her, the first principle of this art of resistance is staying silent (Toros, 2000: 205). 
However, this strategy is not sufficient by itself. Our storyteller also uses the strategy 
of talking and repeating the same things. Let the story continue: 
During my seven years of marriage, I constantly talked. I talked despite every 
difficulty. Although I knew that something would be broken… And we came 
to the point of break. He could not do what he wanted and put pressure on 
me. Maybe it is due to his environment. But when he looked at himself, he 
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realized his mistakes. For two years he has been accepting that he was wrong 
towards me. He says: “I understood you late.’’ Maybe he understood Islam 
late. But he was a candidate for change. However, as a male, if I hadn’t 
insisted, he wouldn’t have changed. I had very frequently repeated the same 
things and made him feel that he was suffocating me. 
 
As the story reveals, the struggle of Islamist women with their parents and the 
traditional Islamist environment that is shaped around resisting to the limitations and 
pressures put on them because of their gender identity, is repeating itself in marriage, 
now with the husband. In that sense, the experiences of Islamist women do not differ 
very much from other women’s in Turkish society. The difference appears in the 
strategies of legitimization of the resistance. Islam, ‘true’ Islam, is used as the basis 
of demand of rights by Islamist women. The values degrading women are labeled as 
traditional. Husband is described as the one “who never understands real Islam” or 
“who understood Islam late”. However, during the process of struggle and resistance, 
the aim of Islamist women is never to obtain complete equality or total emancipation 
from the oppressive mechanisms of patriarchy; rather the their efforts are directed to 
open wider space to breath and to widen the limits of their lives, such as by entering 
into the public sphere as active agents. To be sure, taking active part in the public life 
is also a crucial tool to be employed during the process of ‘bargaining with Islamist 
patriarchy’ to transform the private sphere. 
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4.3. 1. 2. Islamist Women in the Public Sphere 
“If I were a man, I wanted to walk in the streets at nights” 
(Married, 26 Years Old, ‘Housewife’)46 
 
The presence of Islamist women in the public sphere has very crucial functions and 
meanings for their self-images and life styles. However, this presence is constructed 
to a large extent with the effect of the tension between the Islamist and secularist 
ideology. Islamist women’s expel from the public space by the secularist discourse, 
in a sense condemning them to the Islamist circles, obliged them to legitimize their 
presence in the public sphere in the eyes of Islamists. Due to the of the ban of 
headscarf in official education institutions, this situation becomes more visible in the 
area of education.  
Islamist women in the research group reported that they had to struggle on the 
one hand with their families, and on the other hand with official regulations for 
continuing their education. They succeeded in finding cavities of official oppressive 
structures, and by insisting in their demands for university education. The woman 
who has a  master’s degree from History of Economics tells her education story as 
follows:   
My father didn’t want me to attend university. But I wanted it. I started 
university education after I got married. I finished Department of Economics. 
Then I took a break while the children were growing. After they grew up, I 
decided to joint a MA program. I don’t like ordinary, monotonous woman’s 
life; it is like playing a game called as neighborliness ( ã&äå'æÇçè0çéçã ). I meet 
my neighbors, but I’m bored of neighborly meetings morning to evening.  
 
As this narration reveals, Islamist women use to transcend the hindrances they faced 
in relation to their education. In the case of woman above, marriage can create an 
                                                
46
 One of the Islamist women in the research group said this at a telephone conversation. At the 
interview I asked her what she wanted to do if she was a man. One day after the interview, when I call 
her for asking her help to contact another Islamist women, she said: “Yesterday I forgot to mention a 
very important thing. If I were a man, I wanted to walk in the streets at night”. This was surprising 
because of its similarity to the one of the most important slogans of the feminists in Turkey: “We want 
both the nights and streets”. 
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opportunity to continue education in the cases when parents have conservative 
attitudes. Islamist women do not want to live like ‘ordinary’ women. They want to 
take advantage of modern life. Like the women in the research group, other Islamist 
women in social science research (Özdalga, 1997, 1998; Göle, 1993; Saktanber, 
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the difficulties they live due to the two sided obstacles and pressures imposed on 
them both by their families and by the state. Also, Islamist women in the group 
overtly express their disappointment caused by the Islamist men’s unsupportive and 
conformist attitude during the period when they live problems due to their 
headscarves. The words of one of the women in the research group who lived 
difficulties because of her headscarf during her university education, reflect this 
anger and disappointment: “I’m angry towards Islamist men. If they didn’t shave 
their beard when we were struggling for headscarf, everything might be different. 
But, Islamist men found it easier to shave their beard”.  
Islamist women see official education as important as Islamic education. In 
that sense they seem very much adapted to the necessities of city life. Education has 
two important functions for them: pragmatic function, and function of self-
development and realization. University education is very important in the 
personality and the development of the Islamic worldview of Islamist women. 
University years are the formative years when Islamist women’s understanding of 
Islam matures and their ideas on future lives, wishes, ambitions and their self-
definitions become consolidated. Socialization within the institutional structure of 
university give them the opportunity to question the traditional environments from 
which they come and the social structure of the country as a whole. An identity 
formed in such a process of questioning provides them a sense of self-respect and 
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self-confidence. In that sense, Islamic socialization in the university environment is 
absolutely different from the one in the traditional familiar environment. The 
description made by a woman who is working for the Great Unity Party Women’s 
Branch, about her changing in the university years also validates this finding: 
In the first year of my university education, I lived an important change. At 
the university, one’s ideas start to be settled, one finds her identity.  I started 
practice veiling, because, I started to question the place of Islam in my life. I 
started to read and tried to learn about Islam. 
 
However, during the university years most of them experience many conflicts due to 
their insistence on wearing headscarves. A woman who sacrificed university 
education for headscarf says that it was not an easy choice at all, since education had 
a very important pragmatic function in modern life. For that reason, she says that she 
does not accuse the ones who are unveiled as a result of the state’s pressures and 
accepts the vitality of education for a woman who wants to actively participate in 
urban life as a respected person. She says: 
About the girls who are uncovering their heads, I both get angry and 
understand them. God commands veiling, but the conditions of Turkey are 
also important. There is capitalism. You can’t apply to jobs without a 
diploma. I’m the person of my conditions. Although I’m self-confident, I 
don’t know what I would do if my parents insist that I unveil. I’m accepted 
into the Department of English Literature at Hacettepe University. Many of 
my friends couldn’t register to university because of their headscarves. I lived 
the same thing. In this period, I visited the Hajj. It created a very different 
psychology in me. Think, the places where Islam was born. You become 
more spiritual. I said to myself that I wouldn’t pay any effort to register to the 
university. If I read, write or do something else, I will do it by myself. I love 
reading. What is important to me is to be able to read. But considering the 
conditions of Turkey, I was thinking before that I had to take a university 
diploma to gain respect, to find my place in society. 
 
For Islamist women, education is an important tool to continue their active presence 
in the public life and to use the advantages and opportunities of modern urban life. It 
will provide them the necessary labels and status to be respected in the public sphere 
and in the areas of paid work and politics. Göle points out to the decisive role of 
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education for Islamist women in construction of their identity, and the development 
of individual survival strategies (Göle, 1993: 112). 
Another striking fact, as also pointed out by the authors studying Islamist 
women, is that Islamist women in the research group use Prophet’s sayings and 
Koran to legitimize their demands for education towards the Islamist circles and their 
families. They argue that Islam values the effort to reach knowledge; it is an 
obligation and worship for human beings to develop and educate themselves. 
The legitimization mechanisms that are used by Islamist women are 
interconnected in a circular way. Islamist women interpret Islam in a way to 
legitimize their demands for education; education provides them the tools to 
legitimize their presence in the public sphere towards the Islamists and secularists; 
then by increasing their advantages in the public space by using education and 
diffusing into the various areas of the public space such as politics and paid labor, 
Islamist women empower themselves to transform and to resist both to the secularist 
version of the modern urban public space and the traditional Islamist understanding 
of women’s status and role in the public and private spheres. This circle continuously 
repeats itself in the dynamic life struggle and survival strategies of Islamist women 
for active agency. 
Paid work has also a function similar to that of education in the lives of 
Islamist women in the research group. It has two important meanings for them: 
material and social. One of the women’s words illustrate the social meaning of paid 
work very well: “My biggest ideal was to earn my living, although my family could 
too cover my needs. To be with people is also important. By this way, you recognize 
the world and can decide better about what is right or wrong”. As her words show, 
working outside the home doe not only mean gaining money, but also gaining 
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experience in life and breaking the boundaries of the private sphere. However, 
material aspects of the paid work are also very crucial for the working women in the 
research group, and they overtly declared its importance during the interviews. One 
of the women reports that she wants to get the material equivalence of the work she 
performs as follows: “I want to get what I have right. I want to take good money as 
everybody.” This finding conflicts with the analysis made by Göle (1993) and 
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Islamist women emphasize the aspect of being socially useful by working outside the 
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reported the motive of ‘helping people’ or ‘serving to society’ behind their 
participation in the labor market. However, the women in my research group do not 
hesitate to demonstrate that their salary/wage is a crucial part of their motive of 
working, and they do not try to legitimize this by such arguments of social 
usefulness. This difference may be due to the dramatic changes in the Islamist 
movement, and the life space and public visibility of Islamist women in the 1990’s.  
Islamist women in the group repeatedly make differentiation between them 
and ‘ordinary women’ during their narrations. The activities in the public sphere such 
as education, paid work or politics are crucial in their effort to construct alternative 
ways of life and to differentiate themselves from the ‘ordinary’ women who spend 
their time with ‘gossiping with the neighbors’ or ‘caring children’. Their work is 
very important for this process of self-valuation. Working Islamist women in the 
research group are very rational and conscious about the necessities of their work and 
try to do their best. They like taking initiative and improving the standards of their 
work place. In a way, they attach many meanings to their work performance, and it is 
an important part of their self-identify and self-respect. The words of the woman who 
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is working as a manager in one of the departments of the Istanbul municipality 
reflects the self-confidence of Islamist women: “Because I know the necessities of 
the job, I established very good dialogues with the people in my work place. Now I 
can think of working in the private sector. Because, I am self-confident”. Another 
woman evaluates her work conditions again self-confidently and realistically as 
follows: 
Indeed, I don’t like working. I’m working here, because here is so 
comfortable and peaceful, and I’m with books here. But I don’t think that I 
will work here for very long. I prefer to work in a job in which I will take 
initiative, and be more active, in a job requiring higher qualities. 
 
She continues with her future plans about her work life:  
In the future I plan to work by myself. I’m interested in calligraphy for ten 
years. I plan to open my calligraphy workshop and do my art. In my future 
workshop, I will give lessons one day of the week. The other days, I will 
work if I want or take a walk around if I want. Here, working hours start at 
8:30 a.m., in my calligraphy workshop, I may start as late as 11:00 a.m. or 
very early in the morning. I will be on my own. Nobody will tell me what to 
do. I’ve already a place in Fatih. The capital needed for this job is a chair and 
a table. It only waits for a bismillah (with the name of the God). And I will 
say it one day. 
 
Islamist women in the group display self-confidence over their work life and do not 
feel the need to legitimize their demands for working outside the home with 
reference to being ‘socially useful’. They argue that women have the right to work as 
men. On the other hand, they do not want to be perceived as feminists due to their 
demands for women’s right to be employed as paid workers and construct their 
arguments on the issue on the basis of personal preferences and personal differences. 
They emphasize that they do not advocate for the view that all women in the society 
have to participate in the labor market for liberating themselves. They say that what 
they mean is rather related to the personality. One of the working women in the 
research group reflects this conciliating attitude with the following words: 
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For some women what is important is motherhood, while for others, social 
and intellectual environment. Some of them want to earn money; some of 
them want their husbands to earn money for the household. These are 
personal preferences depending on character. 
 
This woman’s explanations show that, in the mental map of Islamist women, there is 
a place for Muslim women who choose to earn their living by marketing their labor. 
And, this does not need to be legitimized by referring to social utility as in the case 
of Göle’s and Ilyaso hij_kml1nolp2qrsoﬀrRt[lEuv)qw)oEx2oﬀn[yfz+r{t&|o)}ﬀno})q~p2qiQzt&z4lyw!|z4ﬀ|zl:lt&z+i+i
a sphere from which women are largely excluded even in the context of modernity, 
they are not so comfortable.  
Large number of women in Turkey have been mobilized in the post-1980’s 
Islamist movement. Participation in the political Islamist movement provided these 
women the opportunity to enter the public sphere. As Göle argues in radical Islamist 
movement, women found the opportunity to develop several survival strategies to 
obtain decision-making power on their lives as individuals (Göle, 1993: 112). 
However, Islamist women need to legitimize their active participation in politics and 
this is an important part of their survival strategy. Within this scope, Islamist women 
try to reconcile the traditional gender expectations and their demand for visibility in 
the area of politics by discursively ‘feminizing’ the political activities they are 
involved in. Their explanations about the reasons that led them to political 
participation are indeed clearly manifest their efforts for reconciliation. The aims 
they report as the motivation behind their involvement politics can be evaluated 
rather in the scope of charity than making a career in the political area, such as 
finding solutions to the everyday problems of people, and helping the needy. One 
says: “My aim was to educate ladies, to motivate them to develop themselves instead 
of staying as ordinary ladies.’’ 
Another one says: 
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I’m working in foundations.  But working in today’s parties is not suitable for 
me. I define myself above parties. I also worked in women’s foundations. I 
want to help needy people and to canalize the people in my environment in 
this direction. 
 
While another woman who used to work for the Welfare Party expresses her 
thoughts on politics as follows: 
I don’t believe that any party in Turkey is making politics. None of them 
gives priority to national-moral values and interests of Turkey. My entrance 
into politics was related with my wish to see politics from inside. I was 
criticizing some of my friends working for the Welfare Party. They said to 
me: “If you are criticizing us, come and do better than us”. We made good 
things, prepared high quality education programs for ladies. This is satisfying 
for me to give something to others, produce something. 
 
As the above quotations show Islamist women in the group are unassertive and less 
confident in the area of politics when compared to the confidence they display in the 
area of paid work. The key words used by Islamist women during their narration of 
their experiences are politics are “to be beneficial to the society and people”. But, 
being beneficial is indeed provides them high level of satisfaction and self-esteem. It 
provides them the channels for becoming individuals having role in the public life 
outside the domestic domain where they are ‘valued’ only as ‘mothers’ and ‘wives’. 
Similarly, Islamist women in Arat’s research on the Ladies Commission of Welfare 
Party, report increasing self-esteem and autonomy, such as improvement of status 
both in the public and private spheres, that are gained due to active political 
participation. Also, a clear increase in confidence in relation to self-perception is 
observed. One of Arat’s respondents describes the change in her self-perception with 
the following words: “It was wonderful to be a person who was needed” (Arat, 1999: 
38). However, Islamist women in the research group, and others participated in 
similar researches limit their expectations from politics to the individual matters and 
personal social and psychological satisfaction. Macro politics, high rank positions in 
the political institutions, decision making power related to macro-politics and 
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political career continue to be reserved for the Islamist men, while Islamist women 
satisfy with gains that seems little and unimportant, but also very decisive and vital 
for them to open wider spaces to live and breath.   Even for the women who are in 
some way related to institutional party politics, politics is rather a matter of everyday 
life. Their definition of politics evolves around their current social networks and has 
micro rather than macro connotations. When the place of politics in her life is asked, 
one of the women replied: 
It has an important place. I make politics by myself. Don’t we all make 
politics? We have attitudes towards each other. If you ask about politics at a 
more macro level, my reference point is what I believe good for Turkey. I 
have never seen up to now that party programs are put into practice. All 
parties are making daily politics; coalitions are being established between 
parties who have very different political programs. They are making cheap 
politics; I don't like their promises. I don’t approve this kind of politics. I 
don’t like party politics. For this reason I support the individuals whom I find 
trustworthy instead of parties.   
 
A general suspicion towards politics is clear in the words of all the women in the 
research group. One of them says: “I don’t trust politics. Yet, it’s mandatory that 
somebody represent others. But I support the Virtue Party as long as it doesn’t distort 
my ideas’’. 
 One of the women who worked in the Ladies Commission of the Welfare 
Party for two years, explains her departure from politics as follows: 
I started to think of my priorities. My husband asked me: “Home or party, 
which is important to you?’’ I answered “Certainly home is important’’. I 
said to myself that my home, my family is more important than politics. What 
do I gain from politics? Politics is so ungrateful. You are there as long as they 
need you. But when you need, there is nobody behind the door. Finally I 
decided that my home was important, my child was important, my husband 
was important. 
 
In the face of the unpromising nature of women’s participation in politics, this 
woman who finds herself in a position to make choice between her ‘home’ and party, 
plays her cards for the  ‘home’. Another woman makes a very good analysis of the 
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women’s disadvantageous position in politics by referring to women’s lack of 
necessary material and social tools. She says: “Women are suppressed in politics. In 
the area of politics, simplest election campaign costs ten billion Turkish Liras. Also, 
social popularity and charisma are crucial. Women don’t have both of these assets”. 
Besides, it is possible to mention a critical attitude in the group towards the 
W.P. / V.P.’s and Islamist groups’ perceptions of women’s political participation 
limited by patriarchal gender stereotypes. Women’s words on Islamist women’s 
political activism reflect the awareness of women’s subordinate position in the 
Islamist movement. To quote the worlds of two women in the research group, first is 
from the Welfare Party Ladies Commission, second is from a small intellectual 
Islamist group, will exemplify this awareness:  
In the Turkish society women have been always the progressive force. But 
they are used in politics, then forced to return their home when they are not 
anymore needed. This attitude is also relevant for the Welfare Party. 
 
In the Welfare Party women worked in the secondary positions and are 
perceived as secondary by the influential persons in the party. Women are 
used in the Islamist movement. They are seen as the porters and rabble of the 
movement. 
 
With the awareness of the perception of women in the secondary status in the 
Islamist politics, Islamist women do not expect to gain high level of social status or 
material well-being as a result of their Islamist political activism. The meaning the 
they attach to politics is rather related to micro level relationships and problems. 
Politics is an important tool for socialization in a different environment and social 
approval as echoed in the words of a woman: 
I want the duty in the Ladies Commission because of the opportunity of 
entering into a social environment, because I will have a different network. 
During the two years I worked there, I met very good, very beautiful people. 
People loved me. After I resigned, they said about me: “Only one real 
president has come to the Sultanbeyli’s Ladies Commission”. The president 
after me is not loved by the people as much as I was loved. 
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In a way, they are staying within the limits of political participation which is defined 
for women and do not imagine a political career for themselves. On the other hand, 
they are trying to break the boundaries surrounding them through their participation 
in politics, and reject being “ordinary’’ women. Similar attitude towards politics is 
also found by Saktanber. She argues: 
Muslim women get the opportunity of taking part in activities similar to those 
of men by organizing seminars, discussion groups and various educational 
activities. These activities thus make their efforts as valuable as men’s and 
create for them a public image of active, intellectual Muslim women. 
Actually what is at stake here for Muslim women, is not simply the 
comparison of the value of their activities with those of men or rivalry with 
them. Much more important is their attempt to obtain a status of ‘person’ in 
the community (Saktanber, 1994: 116). 
 
Even this kind of a demand for unpretentious political participation puts them in a 
position of conflict with their expected gender roles. They find themselves in a 
position of struggle to transcend the conflict between the expectations from them as 
women and what they wish to be. It is clear that social acceptability of their political 
participation increases due to their work in Islamic parties and Islamic foundations, 
but the conflict between their domestic responsibilities and demands of political life 
creates an unsolvable tension in their lives.  Again to quote the words of a woman 
who worked for the Ladies Commission of the Welfare Party for two years: 
My husband allowed me to work for the Party. But he had one condition: 
“Nothing will be neglected at home”. He gave me permission, but afterwards, 
he never supported me. Never supported. He continuously said: “Ladies 
Commission is more important to you. More important than me”. I got tired 
of this very much. Think of a mother taking her child from the kindergarten 
in the evening… Do I look well after my child? Do I cook? Moreover, I had a 
very busy program at the Party. He never showed any understanding during 
that period. Now I understand very well that if you want to do something 
perfect, you should not have many branches because, you are being confused, 
your body, your brain cannot stand it. An intolerant husband… I question 
sometimes whether I am doing injustice to him. But I don’t. For example he 
wants three kinds of dishes at meals. I was saying to him: “Look, today we 
brought food to people who cannot find anything to eat”. But he didn’t want 
to share me with others. He wanted me to belong only to him.  
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For Islamist women, participation in politics necessitates huge efforts to overcome 
the double burden they shouldered. Because, they are allowed by their husbands to 
enter sphere of politics, as long as they do not destroy the ‘ordinary’ flow of life in 
the domestic sphere. Another women from W.P. Ladies Commission describes how 
she overcome the difficulties by strictly programming her daily schedule and 
planning her daily activities according to the practical necessities of the public and 
private sphere: 
I don’t know how I had overcome. I think self-sacrificing is necessary. 
Besides, I became more disciplined, when I was working in the Commission. 
I was washing the cloths in the evening. In the morning, I was ironing, while 
also cooking the meals for the evening. I have to plan even a single minute of 
the day. 
 
Although, the heavy psychological and physical burdens they shouldered and 
tensions they lived, political activism provides Islamist women very vital means to 
construct an alternative ways of living as women, a life different from their mothers’ 
who are encircled by the obligations and limits of traditional patriarchy. 
 
4.3.2. A New Islamist Women Identity Based Both on  
Reconciliation and Resistance 
Islamist women are trying to dynamically construct a new identity for Muslim 
women, which distances itself both from the secularist and Islamist constructions of 
Muslim women. Both the secularist and Islamist discourses impose the ‘traditional’ 
on Islamist women, while Islamist women as active agents define themselves within 
the scope of modernity and demand to participate in the modern public sphere. This 
effort towards constructing a new way of life also creates a new Islamist women 
identity. Moreover, these alternative life styles and alternative identities presented 
and practiced by Islamist women, seem to be both very well-known and unknown at 
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the same time. It seems to be that there is nothing new in the new Islamist women 
identity, because what it all includes are what already exists, such as Islam, tradition, 
modern, and a kind of pro-feminism. The new Islamist women identity is a 
combination of them. On the other hand, this new identity is very unfamiliar and 
unknown, because it is a very original attempt to melt these in the same pot. 
Moreover, the resultant identity is quite fractured and full of contradictions, 
reflecting the dynamism of identity construction from within the life practices.  
As some authors argue, Islamist women are questioning the traditional 
Muslim women identity when they enter into the public sphere (Göle, 1993: 126; 
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traditional Islamist patriarchy with their life practices. They develop several survival 
strategies to overcome the gender stereotypes imposed on them, as mentioned before. 
They argue that the source of values and norms oppressive towards women is 
traditionalism rather than Islam. By referring to the Just nature of Islamic religion, 
they voice their demands for taking the advantages of modernity and for using the 
rights women get in the modern life. In that sense, participation in modern life, which  
is different from the previous generation of women who are constrained in traditional 
circles, is a very crucial part of their identity.  
Islamist women in the group are exemplifying a way of being modern 
different from and alternative to the secularist version. While they are struggling with 
their Islamist circles to use the public space actively, Islamist women also try to 
show to the so-called ‘modern’ people of Turkey that they do not represent the 
Muslim woman stereotype who is super-oppressed due to the patriarchal nature of 
Islam. One of the women in the research group reacts as follows: “My husband is 
©ª&«2¬­
 (someone who has learned the whole Koran by heart) . According to the 
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secularists, I am in the most oppressed group. They think: “Her husband is a ®¯&°2±² . 
She is veiled. She is oppressed like a slave”. But, this is not the”. Another woman 
also reacts to the representation of Muslim women as victims with the following 
words: “We are not ones who are oppressed, closed to house by our families, living 
in conservative environments. But, the secularists represent us with this image”. 
These quotations show that Islamist women are rejecting to be passive victims, and 
actively struggling for make use of the advantages of modern urban life, similar to 
their ‘modern’ sisters in the country. They repeatedly emphasize the meaninglessness 
of the dichotomy of modern women and traditional women. They argue that, 
although they are living in a quite modern way, they are stigmatized as ‘traditional’. 
In this situation, the term ‘modern’ itself becomes meaningless, and they ask:   
“What is the meaning of modern?”. They criticize the definition of modern, 
traditional, and Muslim on the basis of dressing, more clearly on the basis of being 
‘open’ or ‘closed’; veiled or unveiled. They define alternative parameters of being 
modern, such as ‘working outside the home’, ‘reading books’, ‘attending cultural 
activities such as, cinema, theatre and concerts’, ‘taking university education’, all of 
which are the advantages presented by the modern metropolitan life, and necessitates 
the active use of the urban public space. All of the women in the research group, by 
making a similar argument, declare that they have quite modern ways of life and 
refuse to be defined as ‘Muslim women’ who are squeezed into their traditional 
circles. One of them criticizes the vulgarity of the separation between being modern 
and Muslim, declaring that she sees herself as quite in line with the modern: 
There is no difference between modern women and Muslim women. There 
are quite modern Muslims. There are Muslim women who are making things, 
which the so-called modern women can’t do. For example, when I think of 
myself, I don’t want to be seen as a Muslim, I am an human being. There are 
many passive, illiterate ‘unveiled’ women. People cannot be modern with 
regard to their dressings. Being unveiled is not sufficient for being modern 
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and being veiled does not mean being pre-modern or traditional. Sometimes I 
get suspicious that people don’t want veiled women to be educated. Why? 
They say: “Cover your head like your mothers”. I live in Istanbul. I have to 
pay attention to my style of dressing; I can’t dress like my mother. This 
headscarf suits me well and it never prevents me from being modern. 
 
This woman’s words reveal that Islamist women demand the right to be modern. 
They see themselves as quite modern. They emphasize the difference between their 
mothers’ headscarves, which are the signifiers of tradition, and theirs, which indeed 
signifies the break from the tradition. Veiling style differences between the two 
generations indeed connotes the differences between the life styles and identities. 
Islamist women’s headscarves are part and result of modern urban life, of ‘living in 
Istanbul’; as opposed to their mothers’ headscarves associated with traditional village 
life. Ahmed’s argument on the ‘new’ veiling puts forward the same reality:  
Far from indicating that the wearers remain fixed in the world of tradition and 
the post, Islamic dress, is the uniform of arrival signaling entrance into and 
determination to move forward in, modernity…in adopting Islamic dress, 
then, women are in effect ‘carving out legitimate public sphere for 
themselves’, and public sphere is by this means being redefined to 
accommodate women. The adoption of dress doesn’t declare woman’s place 
to be at home but legitimizes their presence outside (Ahmed, 1992: 225). 
 
Similar analysis of ‘new’ veiling is also made by Göle (1993). She argues that, by 
veiling, Islamist women are trying to differentiate themselves from traditional ways 
of life, and veil is an important part of the construction of a new Muslim women 
identity (Göle, 1993: 128). On the other hand, the headscarf does not only signify an 
alternative modern identity, but it is also an important tool for legitimizing their 
entrance into the public sphere in the eyes of Islamist circles. The effort towards 
constructing an alternative, Islamic way of being modern is, for Islamist women, 
indeed an important part of the process of bargaining with the Islamist patriarchy for 
increasing their autonomy. With their headscarves, Islamist women promise to the 
Islamists that they will not be as ‘modern’ as the secularist women, they will protect 
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their honor, and that their participation in the modern public life never means a 
decrease in their Islamic belief. Such a compromising entrance into the public sphere 
makes life easier for Islamist women. However, it also shows that the connections 
with tradition are never totally cut off, rather some traditional patriarchal Islamist 
precepts are accepted as a part of their survival strategies. Moreover, headscarf 
protects Islamist woman by declaring her honor and virtue publicly. One of the 
women in the group describes the comfort she lives when she wears headscarf as 
follows: 
I feel like being behind a shield against sexual harassments. For example, I 
can get in touch with men easily when I am veiled. Even if a man has a sexual 
intention towards me, I can give him the necessary message with my 
headscarf, that is: “I’m a Muslim woman, honor is important to me, I can’t 
live any sexual relationship with you”. 
 
As the above words demonstrate, Islamist women are continuing to hold many 
traditional values and norms on gender relations and gender roles during their efforts 
of reconciling Islam and modernity. With respect to the patriarchal gender 
stereotypes imposed by Islam, Islamist women display both resistance and 
confrontation. They argue that patriarchal precepts imposed in the name of Islam 
have no relevance to Islam, but they are the result of the interpretation of Islam by 
men. One woman says:   
All books on religion have been written by men. Everything is under the 
control of men. However, men can’t understand the situation of women, in 
order for them to understand what it is like to be a woman, they have to live 
as women for at least 24 hours. This is the reason of the Islamic 
interpretations oppressive towards women. 
 
All of Islamist women in the group have reactions towards patriarchal Islamic 
interpretations. They report that the source of the injustice towards women is not the 
Koran itself, but its wrong interpretations. They refer to the Asr- ³  Saadet (golden age 
of Islam during the life of Prophet and four Caliphs) and Prophet’s sayings on the 
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value of women. Ironically in all Hadith examples given by the women in the group 
women are valued as mothers. However, the women in the research group emphasize 
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Süreyye, for explaining the ‘real’ status of women in Islam.  They argue that 
according to Islamic religion, women are as valuable as men. On the other hand, they 
accept the basic ontological assumptions of the patriarchal Islamist discourse, and 
compromise with their Islamist circles. They argue that men and women are not 
equal but complementary.  For that reason, they are reactionary towards the feminist 
calls for equality between men and women. It is seen that Islamist women’s negative 
attitude towards feminism has two main sources distancing them from it. Firstly, 
what they understand from feminism is seemed to be formed around the negative 
image of feminism represented by both the Islamist and secularist Turkish media. 
Secondly, the secularist feminism’s hegemony in Turkey, and secularist feminists 
exclusive and reactionary attitude towards Islamist women affect the view of Islamist 
women, in the research group, on feminism. One of the women criticize Turkish 
feminism with the following words: 
Have feminists in Turkey found solutions to the problems of women except 
their own, up to now? Or even have they attempted to think of other women? 
I’m a woman too, yet has feminism been interested in my problem at all? No 
feminist protests the headscarf ban. Isn’t it a woman problem? 
 
Although, they display a quite reactionary attitude towards feminism, they accept 
that they have behaviors labeled as feminist in their environment. They are aware of 
the fact that their gender identity has led them to limit their lives. One of the women 
describes how she suppress herself: “I draw a narrow world to myself. My gender 
may have effects on this. I think that I’m narrowing my world because of my sex.” 
This awareness of the gender oppression they face directs Islamist women to protect 
their rights and resist towards patriarchal limitations in their daily lives. However, as 
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an ideology they do not adopt feminism. The most positive approach to feminism in 
the group comes from the woman who currently works for V.P. Ladies Commission: 
When it is necessary, I am very feminist to protect my rights. I think I am the 
feminist of the Muslims. I believe that women have rights as men have. 
Women have to protect their rights. I don’t say directly that I am a feminist, 
but I show it in my life, with my life. 
 
In a stark contrast with their life practices that can be defined as pro-feminist, and are 
full of resistance towards patriarchy and efforts towards overcoming the limitations 
imposed on them by patriarchal Islamist understanding, widely described previously, 
at the level of discourse, it is observed that they repeat the patriarchal Islamist 
arguments on the ontology of sexes. In a similar fashion with their patriarchal male 
Islamist mates, Islamist women develop their arguments towards feminism on two 
grounds. Firstly, they argue that they are against the separation of sexes, and against 
a feminism which advocates hostility between the sexes. Secondly, they report their 
reaction towards feminism of equality with the argument that there is not equality but 
equity principle between male and female human beings. They claim that women and 
men are different from each other biologically and psychologically by creation. 
Women are better than men in some areas and issues, and vice versa. By repeating 
that the difference between men and women is not based on any kind of hierarchy 
and both sexes are equally valuable before the God, Islamist women in the research 
group set the equilibrium differently from the patriarchal Islamist interpreters, and at 
a point more advantageous to women compared to the patriarchal Islamist 
framework. However, they stay within the boundaries of conservative, sexist 
understanding of gender relations with their acceptance of the patriarchal conception 
of complementarity between the sexes based on biological reductionism. 
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CONCLUSION
 
 
In Turkey, the opposition between the Islamist ideology and the secularist state 
ideology has created a very original discursive space in which the identity of women 
is constructed. After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the dichotomy 
between Islam and secularism has played a constitutive role for both the secularist 
state ideology and Islamist ideology, each of them defining itself as the negation of 
the other. During the process, the identity of women has become a crucial symbol 
and indicator for both ideologies. The discursive space developed on the basis of 
women’s existence and body has become a ‘fertile’ sphere where these two 
ideologies conflict with each other and where power relationships are inscribed.  
Women’s identity and political participation is to a large extent affected by 
the state ideology whether in the form of supporting or opposing to the state’s 
measures and legislations on women. In the last decades many academic works 
problematizing the relationship between the state ideology and gender identity in the 
late Ottoman and Republican era, have been produced. With the effect of the post 
1980’s feminist movement, increasing number of scholars have evaluated state 
feminism of the 1930’s and 1940’s from a critical point of view. 
However such critical accounts on the relationship between the state ideology 
and Islamist identity of women are still rare. Most of the works elaborating on 
women’s participation in the Islamist movement are in parallel with the established 
stereotypes about the relationship between women and Islam. However, it is crucial 
to look critically to the relationship between the state and Islamist ideology and their 
reflections on Islamist women’s identity for analyzing the life experiences of Islamist 
women. There are two general tendencies in the social science studies on Islamist 
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women. One of them emphasizes the Scripture as the basic source, while the second 
one constructs the narration on the basis of womanhood of Islamist women. 
However, when considering Islam, the historical analysis of state- religion 
relationships seems to be more important than the analysis of what is written in the 
Koran. Similarly, it is not possible to explain several aspects of Islamist women’s 
identity and their life spaces with reference to the principles about women as dictated 
in the Koran. 
Göle argues that political Islamists are struggling for alternative lives by 
creating their own ethics and aesthetics. Woman’s body that is also an important 
symbol for the Kemalist civilization project, now carries important connotations in 
the identity struggle of Islamists. Islamist women have important roles in the 
direction of the debate and tension between the two opposing narrations of 
modernity, namely, Islamist and secularist, presenting two conflicting habitus (Göle, 
1997). The visibility and political activism of Islamist women, on the one hand 
transforms the tension and political antagonism between the Islamist and secularist 
discourses, and on the other hand, the activism and life style of Islamist women are 
realized within the limits determined by this tension. The two conflicting hegemonic 
narrations on the identity of women, the Islamist and secularist narrations, construct 
the hegemonic sphere in which Islamist women interpret their experiences as women 
and are ‘bargaining with patriarchy’.  
The ‘new’ way of the presence of Islamist women in the public sphere 
disturbs the framework of both the secularist and Islamist ideologies. Within the 
patriarchal scope of the secularist ideology, women’s way of presence in the public 
space is conceptualized mainly around their contribution to the ‘modern’ appearance 
of the Republican public sphere. Islamist women with their Islamic way of dressing 
 139 
cannot have a role in that show. So, they are suppressed by  the secularist ideology 
mainly on the axis of the dichotomy of modern/Islamic. However, the higher rate of 
discrimination and suppression towards Islamist women compared to the practiced 
on men also reveals the patriarchal nature of the secularist modernization project. 
On the other hand, within the framework of the Islamist ideology, women 
have the right to enter the public sphere as long as this existence is functional for the 
Islamic cause. Their participation in the Islamist movement, in no way gives them 
the right of active agency that is reserved for the Islamist men. Islamist ideology 
excludes women from the position of power mainly on the axis of dichotomy of 
male/female. So, Islamist women are suppressed by the Islamist discourse with 
patriarchal concerns, while excluded by the secularist discourse with their concerns 
regarding ‘modernization’.  
Islamist women display an ambivalent position between the two patriarchal 
discourses that oppress them. The oppression on them has increased in the 1990s due 
to the changing character of the Islamist movement, which lost its radicalism and 
tried to be articulated to the system as a new color in the area of politics. This shift in 
the demands of the Islamist political movement deeply affects the position and 
legitimacy of Islamist women who have opened wider life spaces to themselves 
throughout their Islamist activism. The hegemonic attitude prevalent in the Islamist 
circles, which has become more visible after the February 28 in 1997, shows that the 
choice is made on the behalf of the ‘traditional’ and Islamist women who are 
expected to return to their homes and to start replaying the role of the ‘traditional 
Muslim women, abandoning all the gains they had in the 1980s. For Islamist women 
of the 1990s, these developments mean to find themselves alone without the support 
of the Islamist movement in their quest for an alternative identity and a way of life as 
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Islamist women; they further mean increasing contradictions in their identities and 
suspicions towards the Islamist movement and its discourse. They are continuing to 
struggle for their presence in the public sphere as active Islamist women agents. 
Islamist women are developing various survival strategies to overcome the 
limitations imposed on them by the secularist and Islamist ideologies in the process 
of developing an alternative Islamist women identity who are actively participating 
in life and resisting to be objectified by either discourses. As Saktanber (1994: 123) 
suggests, in their attempt to “cope with dominant discourses, both religious and 
secular… they discursively reorder and re-conceptualize these  dominant discourses 
in their practices of life”. 
In the interviews, it is apparent that Islamist women are trying to find a way 
between the dichotomies, and their identity and self-image is constructed in lines 
with the tension between the dichotomies of secularism/ Islam, and modern/Islamic. 
They redefine the Islamic according to the modern and the modern according to the 
Islamic, namely they are reproducing an Islamic modern way of life. This is an effort 
for being Islamist yet modern. Theirs is certainly not the identity of modern women 
constructed by the secularist ideology, and it is in no way the identity of traditional 
Muslim women.  
Women’s participation in Islamist movements or their appropriation of Islam 
as the central parameter in coordinating their lives, does not necessarily mean that 
they are all-powerless and passive towards the patriarchal principles of Islam. 
Moreover, they interpret Islam not as a religion oppressive of women but as a 
religion giving the best position to women. The Islamist women in the research and 
the Islamist intellectual women reviewed in the third chapter frequently emphasize 
the difference between the ‘real’ Islam which is not misogynist, and the traditional 
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beliefs and practices represented under the name of Islam to legitimize the 
oppression and subordination of women. This rhetoric on ‘real’ Islam which provides 
a kind of autonomy to the Islamist women is an important part of Islamist women’s 
discourse as one of the main axis of their survival strategy. Moreover, many research 
results show that this strategy is commonly used by Islamist women in different 
Muslim countries. DeGroot (1996: 44) who argues about the possibility of 
coexistence of patriarchal view of Islam and “a strong sense of self-worth and self-
definition”, gives examples of Islamist women who claim that “an Islam which 
denies (them) the right to political activity and education is not the ‘real’ Islam, and 
(they) feel confident to criticize their own fathers as well as unbelievers or ‘bad’ 
Muslims”.  
Islamist women in Turkey in general and in the research group specifically 
make use of the new interpretations of Islam made by the Islamist intellectuals, in 
their arguments to show that patriarchal elements known to be dictated by the Koran 
are indeed stemming from the traditional patriarchy. Siddique (1983) is one of the 
Islamist authors referred by them47. He argues that the oppression of women by the 
religious communities, authorities and institutions is justified by the misuse and 
misquotations from the scriptures (Siddique, 1983: 12). According to this 
interpretation, what is written in the Koran is that both sexes have equal status before 
the God and they have to struggle side by side for the Islamic cause. Such kinds of 
interpretations are important for Islamist women’s search for legitimacy for their 
demands of active subject position, despite the emphasis on the struggle for Islam 
                                                
47
 Siddique (1983: 7) is also the director of the Jamaat al-Muslimeen in England, 
which  “was established to promote and practice the Islamic equality of men and 
women and to give Muslim women the opportunity to participate in the Islamic 
movement as equal and active participants”. 
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because, Islamist women’s participation in Islamist politics with the responsibility 
felt towards the duty of ÑÓÒÕÔÖ=×Ø enables them to construct an active and autonomous 
woman identity. The poem of Ali Shari’ati, who is a very influential Islamist 
ideologist, and read and referred to by most of the Islamist women in the research 
group, “Fatima is Fatima” may explain to some extent why many women are 
attracted to the Islamist movements:  
I wanted to say, Fatima is the daughter of noble Khadija. 
I saw, this is not Fatima 
I wanted to say, Fatima is the daughter of Muhammad 
I saw, this is not Fatima. 
I wanted to say, Fatima is the wife of Ali, 
I saw, this is not Fatima. 
I wanted to say, Fatima is the mother of Hasan and Husayn. 
I saw this not Fatima. 
I wanted to say Fatima is the mother of Zaynab,  
Still, I saw that this not Fatima. 
No, she is all of these but all of these are not Fatima. 
Fatima is Fatima (in Roded, 1999: 260). 
 
Islamist women in the research, taking Fatima as a model to themselves, tend to 
define themselves as autonomous individuals, and not only as daughters, wives, or 
mothers. What is clear in the narrations of Islamist women in the research is that 
their identity and self image is full of contradictions, as well as, their discourse 
oscillating between the traditional a-priori judgments about abstract definitions of 
womanhood and almost feminist arguments on the issues directly related to everyday 
life. In that sense Saktanber (1994: 130) finds them “quite successful in capturing the 
various elements of secular discourse of women’s rights and investing them their 
own discourses of women’s rights in Islam”.  
In a sense, Islamist women, as survival strategy, utilize the Islamist discourse 
and mimic the traditional role and status given to women in order to participate in 
various areas of the public sphere, such as politics, paid work and education, and try 
to make themselves accepted and visible. To some extent, the activities of Islamist 
 143 
women can be handled around the concept of mimicry. Lacan defines mimicry as 
follows:  
Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be 
called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage. … It is 
not a question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled 
background, of becoming mottled- exactly like the technique of camouflage 
practiced in human warfare” (Bhabha, 1984: 125)48. 
 
But this kind of a conception leaves no space to agency and conscious activity, but 
everything seems to happen at the level of unconsciousness. Irigaray suggests an 
alternative conception of mimicry which emphasizes the difference of mimicry from 
loyal repetition of the hegemonic and says: 
There is an initial phase, perhaps only one path, the one historically assigned 
to the feminine: that of mimicry. One must assume the feminine role 
deliberately. Which means already to concert a form of subordination into an 
affirmation and thus to begin to thwart it… to play with mimesis is thus, for a 
woman to try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse without 
allowing herself to be simply reduced to it. it means to submit herself- in as 
much as she is on the side of the perceptible, of matter- to the ideas , in 
particular to the ideas about herself, that are elaborated in/by masculine logic, 
but so as to make visible, by an effect of playful repetition, what was 
supposed to remain invisible: the cover up of a possible operation of the 
feminine in the language. It also means to unveil the fact that, if women are 
such good mimics, it is because they are not simply resorbed in this function 
ÙÚ	ÛﬂÜ2ÛﬀÝÞÜßàáâﬂããåäæçèéEê
 
 
Islamist women are practicing mimicry in a sense that they demand autonomy and 
active participation in the public sphere, and transformation of gender roles in the 
private sphere by using the patriarchal discourse of Islam, which is quite suppressive 
towards women. For example, only through their participation in the Islamist 
movement and  their fight for the Islamic cause, both of which are framed by an 
ideology that traditionally aims at closing women to the private sphere,  Islamist 
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 Bhabba (1984) operationalizes the concept around the issue of colonial subject and suggests that by 
way of mimicry, by partial repetition of colonial subject by colonial object, authority of colonial 
discourse is disrupted, observer turns out to be observed, and gaze of colonial authority tends towards 
itself. He gives example of Indian working in the English Civil Service who becomes in certain 
respects ‘English’ but not quite. And emphasizes that existence of this mimic Englishman disturbs the 
authority of colonial power. 
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women can disturb the authoritarian patriarchal discourse of Islam, and deconstruct 
the image of the ‘ideal’ Muslim woman. However, what is more important is whether 
they are performing mimicry in the sense of Irigaray. They use traditional women 
practice of covering hair for very modern aims to resist secular modernity. As 
ë2ìíQîïKðñ$òóôìï&õðﬀö)÷[øﬂõìù4úﬀö;÷üû`ý{þ&ß2ö 	
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provides Islamist women a vehicle to assert their autonomy and wearing headscarves 
gives them the opportunity to enter into the public space and build social networks 
outside of the domestic sphere. However the question that still remains to be 
answered is whether Islamist women in the research group and Islamist women in 
Turkey in general, are aiming to undermine the patriarchal discourse of political 
Islam itself and to deny the dominant codes of femininity.  
Margot Badran (1998) sees the Yemeni women’s activism as an illustration 
of such a practice of resisting to Islamic patriarchy that can be termed as ‘local 
feminism’. She claims for the case of Yemeni women: “Activist women across the 
spectrum speak an Islamic language as they practice their feminism, and a feminist 
language as they practice Islam”49 (Badran, 1998: 512). 
In the case of Islamist women in Turkey similar attempts of using traditional 
or Islamic means for resisting to the patriarchal constraints to which they are 
subjected exist. However, the practice of mimicry may not be enough to displace the 
patriarchal discourse of Islam, for mimicry to produce such an effect it must be 
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 Badran (1998) reaches to this conclusion by analyzing the case of Yemeni 
Women’s attempts to prevent the imposition of the a less egalitarian version of 
personal status law in 1997. Yemeni women are organized in their professional 
associations and political organizations. They use quite conventional and traditional 
tools to legitimize  and propagate their resistance such as use of Islamic arguments 
against the repressive articles, anti- propagating the draft in iftar meetings. 
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combined with critical consciousness and a perspective somewhat distanced from the 
discourse of political Islam. 
Islamist women in the research group are actively constructing a new way of 
life and a new Islamist women identity. In their everyday life practices, they develop 
several strategies to overcome the patriarchal limitations imposed on them. They use 
on the one hand, the discourse of Islam to legitimize their demands for a subject 
position both in the private and public spheres, and, on the other hand the 
opportunity space opened to women by the modernity to empower themselves as 
individuals and to obtain the necessary skills for legitimate presence in the ‘modern’ 
public space. Moreover, Islamist women in Turkey organize around several 
independent Islamist women’s organizations and platforms. 50 They attend to 
international conferences on women, individually or under the roof of their 
organizations and platforms and try to develop an ‘authentic’ Islamist women’s 
discourse in these areas, and what they argue is neither in line with Western 
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literature, as mentioned before, they criticize the patriarchal framework of the 
Islamist movement and the traditional Islamist discourse, and try to construct a new 
Islamist discourse from this critical approach.  
Participation in the Islamist movement seems to create areas for enjoying new 
forms of agency for Islamist women. However, patriarchal agenda of these 
movements continues to constrain them. Some of Islamist women who articulate new 
public roles and public presence in their dissatisfaction with the patriarchal discourse 
                                                
50
 This is a development come forth in the 1990s. The most influential two platforms consisted of 
many number of Islamist women’s organization, are The Rainbow Istanbul Women’s platform 
P#QSR:TTUWVYX:Z[ \^]_`4a
 Platformu) and The Capital’s Women’s Platform (b	cedﬀfgh3i  j^ckl.h  Platformu), both 
of which give the issues related to women the most important status in their agendas (Arat, 1999: 77-
mnoqpGr^s5tvuwtYxyx{z}|$~ﬀp
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of political Islam are moving towards a more gender conscious discourse, and they 
reinterpret the Koran. Due to their reactions towards the oppression they face and 
limitations that are imposed on them under the name of Islam, in their everyday life, 
intellectual Islamist women are re-interpreting Islamic principles, prophet’s sayings 
and the Koran, in their own words, from ‘women’s point of view’. They argue that 
the interpretation of Islam by men throughout the Islamist history is the reason of the 
patriarchal elements embedded in the Islamic practices, rather than the sui generis 
patriarchal structure of the Islamic religion. 51 
However, in the last instance they do not break with the Islamist and 
traditional discourse in the process of developing a new identity and discourse. They 
try to legitimize their somewhat pro-feminist discourse by referring to the historical 
examples of active women in Islam. They identify their struggle with that of the 
women’s movement in the late Ottoman period rather than the Turkish feminist 
movement in the post 1980s. They emphasize the ‘conservative’ sides and 
characteristics of the late Ottoman women’s movement. By this way they try to 
prove that a women’s movement can be  respectful towards local culture and Islamic 
religion rather than the feminist movement destroying the order created by the God.  
In that sense, today it is hard to talk about an Islamist feminism in Turkey 
because, the ontological framework that is developed by Islamist women shares the 
basic assumptions of the hegemonic Islamist discourse, although it is more women 
friendly than the latter. This framework is based on the difference between men and 
women due to the different @Ł>Ł  attached to them by Allah, and takes a very 
‘conservative’ color with the argument of the complementarity between the sexes. In 
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 Tuksal’s (2000) doctorate thesis submitted to Theology Faculty at Ankara University might be seen 
as the first in the efforts to develop theological knowledge from ‘women’s point of view’. In her work, 
Tuksal (2000) historically searches for the roots of patriarchal tradition in the Islamic tradition and 
how the prophets sayings were destroyed by the misogynist Islamic interpreters resulting in the 
embeddement of patriarchal elements to the Islamic religion.  
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that sense the dichotomy of men/women, which is the backbone of patriarchy, is 
stabilized as a trans-historical Truth. Moreover, the emphasis Islamist women made 
on the necessity of the institutions of the family and marriage, although not in the 
current suppressive form for women, is also in line with the conservative Islamist 
morality. Similarly, they align themselves with the hegemonic Islamist ideology by 
propagating for the importance and value of the motherhood for women.  
In conclusion, we can say that Islamist women adapt and accept the 
traditional values and roles attached to women as daughters, wives, or mothers. 
However, by accepting and reinforcing the existing patriarchal values about the 
‘proper’ womanhood, they widen their legitimate space of maneuver. They make 
their unacceptable presence in certain spheres acceptable by using the very 
framework which suppresses them. Islamist women legitimize their presence in the 
public sphere by using the conventions, which were formerly forbidding their 
presence in the public sphere. To use Kandiyoti’s term, they are ‘bargaining with 
patriarchy’, in this case with the Islamic patriarchy, as a survival strategy to open up 
new spaces of empowerment within the limits of the patriarchal value system, rather 
than to create alternative spaces to overtly resist Islamic patriarchal precepts. This 
process of bargaining does not liberate Islamist women from the patriarchal 
framework in the society and which is embedded in Islam, but enables them to have 
more power and to soften the effects of patriarchal limitations in their everyday lives. 
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